Abstract

This chapter encloses thoughts on Concepts and Conceptual scheme based on the issue of revitalization and re-clothing of concepts. The factor determining   our concept building like the relation of Resemblance is explained. Moreover the problem of ‘lack of specification’ is also addressed. In this chapter I have tried to make my point clear on having a conceptual scheme with myriads of concepts dotted therein. The purpose is to show that for each case of a new addition; the conceptual scheme becomes all the more nourished and we become all the more apt to communicate. The question of having two conceptual schemes in case we use metaphorical meaning of a given word or some symbolic innovative meaning of a given word is not accepted. In fact it is argued that the user carries a nice package of meanings (all symbolical, innovative meaning along with the basic concept) while he intends to communicate. The actual communication may be only a manifestation of the least indeterminate or closely approximating meaning of the word chosen from the conceptual scheme. The scope of the conceptual scheme thus is claimed not to suffer from any restrictiveness and is not bound.

 Universals as Concept

The several particular instances that sufficiently resemble each other to enable us to frame a common quality also help to frame concepts or Universals. Acquiring of concepts depends upon repeatable characteristics in this world. The recurrence of instances results in common qualities and generalization of common qualities or characteristics results in framing of concepts.

Concept building dependent on the Relation of Resemblance

H.H. Price in his paper “Universals and Resemblances” has discussed the Aristotelian theory of universalia in rebus (universals in things).[1] Price said that this Aristotelian theory might agree with such an explanation that; all objects characterized by whiteness for example do resemble one another. Resemblance according to them is just the consequence of the fact that the very same property or universal, example whiteness characterizes all white objects. Since resemblance in this case is dependent on universals it is derivative and not ultimate. Universalia in rebus leaves no room for inexact resemblance.  For example, a bit of chalk and a dirty white mantle piece, they are white objects, but certainly not exactly alike in color.  They resemble on the ground of having only a considerable degree of color-likeness amongst them.

There may be exact resemblance in this or that respect or total and complete resemblance amongst repeatable properties of objects. For example, two things may be exactly alike in color but not in shape which is a case of exact resemblance in one respect. On the other hand if two objects are completely and totally alike, that is if they resemble each other completely on the basis of given properties there could not possibly be any evidence for believing them as two objects any more. It is the intensity of resemblance that matters.  Two things may resemble in an inexact way when both being characterized by different characteristics (i.e. universals) yet have some common link so that we may call them to resemble each other. For example, the piece of chalk is white in color and the mantle piece is also white but a dirty white. The can be identified as white immediately, while the mantle piece can be identified as white only prior to its being dirty. Hence they resemble in an inexact way.

So when there is no single characteristic, which can be definitely and categorically stated; on account of which two things might resemble each other, then they may be said to resemble in an inexact fashion. This shows that resemblance admits of degrees of intensity. So it is true that both exact resemblance and inexact resemblance helps in the application of our concepts. The common problem that may arise and is difficult to decide; is, what should be the extent of likeness that is to be considered as sufficient? and how is the scope to be defined for something which falls just within the concept’s sphere of application and for something which falls just outside it?.

In exact approximation can  be the cause of bad instances where as the more the particular instances approximate or imitate the forms(platonic forms) the more are they proved as better or good instances. So moderation needs to take place and the requirement for an extreme sort of resemblance needs to be refined by a milder sort of resemblance.

The Problem of  ‘Lack of Specification’

The problem of “lack of specification” as has been dealt with by Paul Ziff in his article “Something about Conceptual Scheme”.[2] Paul Ziff comments that, the problem of lack of specification is somewhat related with the scope of a concept or the area that a concept bounds. For example, when we speak of a tiger we presuppose that the meaning is well conveyed regarding a fully grown tiger as a large carnivore but the specifications like that we are not speaking of a newly born tiger or an injured tiger or a disabled tiger are somewhat missing in our usage. It is perhaps true for all cases that we depend on our presuppositions without considering the fact whether the meaning is at all well conveyed to the hearer or not. It is not false that a new born tiger is also a carnivore and to remove all sorts of ununderstanding new born tigers must be excluded. The same is true in case of tigers which are half-nourished; for we are speaking of a large carnivore which is famous for its strength and vigor. So if one wants to carry on one’s communication or dialogue with other people without any hindrance he must exclude all unwanted implications, by specifying and making his scope of discourse well bound.  The communication may not succeed if it suffers from lack of specification.

Our usage of words is presupposed to provide adequate specification. The problem here is what is supposed to be the ordinary meaning of a term; itself suffers from lack of specification. What is ordinary is itself quite difficult to specify. Ziff has suggested another way to come out of such a difficulty. According to Ziff, if a statement demands an act to be performed, then the proof of one’s understanding it is its performance as soon as feasible. For-example the imperatives like ‘Close the door’, demands immediate execution of the command. In such cases, just it is not sufficient only to understand the implicit command it is essential that it be performed.  It is also the case that by the enactment of the imperative we can well understand that the specifications were all fitting and was well conveyed. It is essential that the performance of the act as per the imperative cannot be undone until another imperative is given to that effect. In that case the imperatives also lack specifications in the sense that it fails to convey the message of an end to such enactment with the advent of a new imperative. In this case it has not been specified in the command ‘Close the door’ that one needs to undo when the reverse command is given as to ‘Open the door. This shows that appeal to the implicit command of an explicit injunction also lack specification because the initial criterion of understanding of the injunction, namely immediate enactment of the command is found to be insufficient in the long run.

Nature and Scope of the Conceptual scheme

Our intention must be concentrated on what we actually do while uttering a sentence instead of what we should do to remove lack of specifications. We actually carry all implications of a word   and the underlying concepts that we have probably acquired; but use only a single implication whatsoever. For example while we utter that, “A tiger is a large carnivore”, we are already carrying with us the concept of a new-born tiger, a half-nourished tiger, a tiger without whiskers or with whiskers, a fully grown tiger, a nourished tiger, tiger as an animal with large canine, tiger as a carnivore so on and so forth; but what we actually do is we start making a pictorial representation of it. Since it is made explicit that the tiger we are speaking of is a large carnivore, we relate the useful concepts in some specific relation. It is something like having a conceptual scheme where all the different implications of every word used in every sentence persists. The question arises; Is it the case that the conceptual scheme is innate or is it the case that through experience of this universe we construct a conceptual scheme?

My answer to this question would be, that it is certainly not innate neither is it constructed.  The Conceptual scheme gradually evolves as we gather experience.  The worldly experience revitalizes the scope of the conceptual scheme. Now let us see how do concepts of the conceptual scheme persists?

Concepts I consider act as specific points of the conceptual field; when we want to express some meaning we exhibit a portion of the entire scheme. The points are like symbols on a contour map which have their implications and we employ such portions and bits of the entire map to serve our purpose of communication. Since communication is a two-way process between the speaker and the hearer the portions of the entire map which is ultimately used must be commonly understood by both speaker and the hearer. A similar comment was made by Paul Ziff as well, “…if he is to understand what is said then it is up to him to read the map aright.”[3]

Communication is possible depending on the readiness of  the speaker or the hearer using a familiar sort of representation of the thought which they want to communicate. If it is one and the same thing that needs to be delivered both ways then the portion of the conceptual scheme must be of a similar sort or of a common kind which helps in dealing with the same sort of information. In other words a speaker may mean by a “tiger” a symbol of strength and power or of vigor and pride.  The speaker in fact may produce many such implications or symbolic representations preserved in the conceptual scheme. Despite of this when he utters the sentence, “A tiger is a large carnivore” and if his hearer understands the meaning then it must be understood that, the hearer must have a similar sort of presentation, for if he was said of delivering such a sentence as the speaker, he is expected of doing the same. So the points there in both of their conceptual scheme get related in a similar fashion or that they relate them in a similar fashion. In other words it is not the case that the speaker and the hearer share the same conceptual scheme but may very well be the case that they share familiar presentation.

The scope of the conceptual scheme thus cannot be bound. In fact it may not be legitimate enough to speak of any scope of the conceptual scheme. It must be open ended. Concepts which appear as points, dotted over the entire scheme is not arranged primarily and so there is no question of any specific relation holding them together and thus there is also no scope as such of our conceptual scheme.

When we frame concepts by way of generalization over the common element present amongst several particulars, we have the basic notion of an object, but as has been pointed out earlier, we may acquire certain metaphorical usage, certain implicative meaning of any word whatsoever. For-example “tiger” as a word may stand for an animal belonging to the cat family, a carnivore; again it might stand as a symbol of strength and vigor or a fierce depiction of cruelty etc .Every detail of being a tiger is there incorporated in the conceptual scheme. It is obvious then that when we gather the other usages of the word “tiger” and relate tiger as an object with objects of fear etc, then our basic notion of the word ‘tiger’ widens, until a real depiction of it is applied in a sentence.

Though we may not be able to talk of scope, we can well speak of a scheme where our concepts reside free of any specific relation and when we acquire new perceptions over anything it only revitalizes the already existing concepts, they are new recruitments which makes themselves attached to older concepts in the sense that they might find an expression in any sentence when it is needed that the speaker must express exactly that sort of a meaning. The new additions hang loose but in a very close proximity with the already existing older concepts.  The more, the concepts get revitalized, the more apt we become  in conducting the work called communication.

 Some users of language prefer to stick to the basic notion and dread of any further encroachment which might dilute the basic notion, whereas there are some who intend to make innovations. In both these cases it must be remembered that the given was same for both. The user who is inclined towards innovation would always tend to use the metaphorical meaning (though if asked for the basic notion, he can well produce, even if that might go against his likings). So despite the fact, that the given is the same, it may be ordered differently. Such difference of ordering cannot cause us in conceiving of having different conceptual schemes for the two cases. It is according to the temperament of the speaker or a requirement felt by the speaker that the multifarious facets of a concept may be scanned and a single facet be chosen.

Kendall.L.Walton in his paper “Linguistic Relativity” has pointed out one interesting case of a tribe of people whose language is unintelligible to us:[4] “The incomprehensibility of the tribe’s language must  not be taken as a proof  that their language embodies a different conceptual scheme. So far as we could tell, it merely functions to describe kinds of facts which we are completely unaware of. Speakers of the language might simply have a form of sense perception, a method of apprehension which we lack and they may lack our senses. So the difference between their language and ours may reflect a difference of data rather than anything which could reasonably count as different ways of ordering or experiencing data”.

Kendall is actually trying to prove the Whorfian hypothesis wrong.[5] Kendall is of the opinion that if there be such a tribe whose language is unintelligible, in the sense that it is not translatable in English, that is the language with which we are comfortable with, then from that it is not necessarily implied that it is guided by some different conceptual scheme. It can very well be the case that we can learn such a tribal language just as we have learnt English. This is well understood as in case of a child who gets adapted to a certain language while living amongst the people using such a language. We may also undergo a similar adaptation but this must not be something imposed, otherwise adaptation would loose its very meaning. In other words we must not try to relate the tribal expressions with our familiar English expressions, instead we must leave it to a natural adaptation of a language as it happens, that is, just as a child (the reference of a child is used in order to mean a new adaptor of a language) learns when and how to use a language through several trials and error.

It might be the case that any two language frames given in a similar fashion may have corresponding expressions in both these languages. But if we intend to learn a language only for its own sake, without any interest to find out relations with our familiar language, we have no reason to suppose that the two groups of people have different conceptual schemes.[6] A mere difference of phonetic style or difference of symbols used does not prove that there is a difference of conceptual scheme. Even if a tribal language be translatable in English it should only be obvious that it is an effort to make the unfamiliar look like the familiar. It is only to express the unfamiliar in accordance to the familiar scheme or order. So translation, if possible, should only reveal the fact that there is a mere difference of notation, and not a difference of conceptual scheme.

A Few More Perceptions on Conceptual Scheme

I would side with Robert W. Binkley in asking the question that ;if the  meaning of the word used to describe a person’s belief undergoes a change, then are we liable of considering that the user has or is in possession of two conceptual schemes in two different circumstances. It might very well be the case that a person while using a particular word in a sentence for describing his belief about a fact feels that he must use another word which is more informative and appropriate than the one used earlier or the one he is still using. In such a case does the meaning of a word be said to change or is it the case that the person’s belief has changed. For example, I happen to use the word “round” in a sentence like, ‘The earth is round’, whenever I am said to describe the shape of the earth. According to me such a word as “round” can properly express my belief about the shape of this earth. Now that I have gathered new information about the shape of the earth, I become suspicious over my usage of the word “round” and choose to use the word, “oblate spheroid” in describing my belief about the shape of the earth. In other words after knowing that the earth is flat at the tops and bulging at the sides; I tend to use “oblate spheroid”. In doing so what has happened is that new information about the earth has been incorporated in my conceptual scheme by way of generalizations over common elements like ‘roundness’ and ‘flatness’ as well as for expressing the exact shape I have found one expression or a word which includes both roundness and flatness. An exact expression is needed, to accommodate in a single expression “oblate spheroid”, ideas of roundness and flatness, loosely hanging in close proximity.

The uncomfort lies in the fact that, “oblate spheroid” is a more determinate predicate under “round” and a mere determinable predicate over “spherical” and words are judged as more determinate by their meanings which again is believed by the user having concepts. Hence is it such that, since the words have changed along with meaning, it can cause any possible change of concept.[7]

The problems double if it is the case that, it is my belief that x believes that the earth is an oblate spheroid. In other words that I believe in the fact that, x believes and chooses to express his belief through such a sentence as “The earth is an oblate spheroid”. I believe in x’s belief i.e. I believe that the sentence, “I believe that, x believes that the earth is an oblate spheroid” certainly has a referential success. My way of expressing my belief which is a belief over any other person’s belief actually and exactly convey the meaning I propose to convey.

Let us first dilute the aggravated portion of the problem. An answer which may be suggested is that; any sentence which is preceded by the phrase “x believes that” cancels my suggestion that the sentence is being asserted as true. The point is we do not strictly believe that such and such is the only way or the proper way of expressing my belief or expressing my belief about others belief. We rather indicate various ways with more or less precision of what a proper way may be of expressing our belief. In such endeavor we choose words also with at least a minimal level of indeterminateness or indefiniteness to frame our sentence through which we can express our belief or have a description of our belief. So there is actually two sorts of indefiniteness involved, namely, x is indefinite to a certain extent about the shape of the earth on the one hand, on the other I am indefinite to a certain extent about x’s belief over the shape of the earth. The conscious urge that should work on my part is, to be definite about x’s indefiniteness. Failing in my such effort I merely approximate. This is perhaps the reason why Binkley in his paper “Change of Belief or Change of Meaning?” has also commented that, “We do not use language in conscious obedience to any rule. We actually say what comes to our mind”[8].  Thus according to me, beliefs expressed in sentences are mere actualization of concepts. So change in belief (that is, change of belief in the meanings of words) is only a change of the degree of approximation towards the concepts, which lies as the pure source, whose language incarnations are rather impure and imperfect.

Moreover following Binkley once again it can be said that, if rules be accepted at all it must be looked upon as a guide to the language trainers. When a person acts as a language trainer; he is actually guided by the rules in his effort of installing proper language habits. This in turn would help the novice language user in employing his new skill of using a different language altogether. If this be the case then the language user who knows the meaning as well as the usage of both the word say, “round” (as earlier used) and “oblate spheroid” (as used now), is also expected to  know  the change or rather the utility of such a change. Thus the question of change; if change be understood as a complete topsy-turvy change does not arise at all.

So it comes to this, that we are back again with revitalization and re-ordering of older concepts and the conceptual scheme encompassing all possible combinations which can be actualized through usage. The jurisdiction of language usage draws its nourishment from our conceptual scheme.

Reference

1. Binkley. W. Robert, ‘Change of Belief or Change of Meaning?’, Conceptual Change ,edited by Pearce Glenn and Maynard Patrick D.Reidel Publishing Company 1973.

2. H.H.Price, ‘Universals and Resemblances’, Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings edited by Loux, Michael. J,  Routledge 2001

3. Kendall. Walton, ‘Linguistic Relativity’, Conceptual Change, edited by Pearce Glenn and Maynard Patrick D.Reidel Publishing Company 1973.

4. Sellars Wilfrid, ‘Conceptual Change’, Conceptual Change, edited by Pearce Glenn and Maynard Patrick D.Reidel Publishing Company 1973.

5. Ziff Paul , ‘Something About Conceptual Schemes’, Conceptual Change edited by Pearce Glenn and Maynard Patrick, D.Reidel Publishing Company 1973.

Endnotes

1. Loux, Michael. J, Metaphysics: Contemporary readings, p-20 Routledge 2001

2. Pearce Glenn and Maynard Patrick Ed, Conceptual Change, D.Reidel publishing Company1973, pp-31-41.

3. Pearce Glenn and Maynard Patrick, Conceptual Change p-38, D.Reidel publishing Company1973

4. This paper is from an edited book by Pearce Glenn and Maynard Patrick, Conceptual Change p-4, D.Reidel publishing Company1973

5. It is actually Sapir-Whorf hypothesis also known as the thesis of linguistic determinism. Edward Sapir(1884-1939) and Benjamin Lee Whorf(1897-1941), that the language people speak determines the way they perceive the world. Whorf, the pupil of Sapir, collected evidence of linguistic and conceptual divergence from many Native American languages. The Whorfian hypothesis tells us that linguistic differences is tied up with conceptual differences

6. Translation usually mean , the provision of an expression in one language meaning the same as that of another. Philosophically we may say that in so far as different languages reflect different cultural and social histories, because of the holism of meaning,  and tone of different words translation may be an ideal which can only be approached but never fully achieved. The determinacy of meaning is sometimes denied and said that radically different translations are equally correct. This thesis is called the indeterminacy of radical translation.

7. There are two words “round” and “oblate spheroid”. Since they are two their meanings are different; whether there is any addition or alternation over the underlying notion which remains static are questions of analysis.

8. Pearce Glenn and Maynard Patrick,Ed, Conceptual Change , D.Reidel publishing Company1973, p-68.