For verification of this paper, please visit on http://www.socialresearchfoundation.com/anthology.php#8

The downfall of the Taliban regime in aftermath of the September 11 developments provided an opportunity for India to re-engage itself in Afghanistan with more serious and more constructive efforts through soft power initiatives. India extended its support in favour of the new government that was believed to be established on Liberal-democratic ideals thereby denying the re-emergence of the Taliban regime. Afghanistan provides India with a route via Iran to pursue its strategic goals in the regional and global context, because of the geo-strategic location of Afghanistan in between South, Central, West and East Asia as well as the involvement of world powers in this country from historic times to the present era. So far India has invested and reached more than USD 3 billion in the reconstruction process of Afghanistan since 9/11. India is believed to be the largest regional and fifth international donor in providing aid and assistance to war-torn Afghanistan. Under this aid recipient oriented programme, India has been engaged in a development partnership with Afghanistan, which consists of more than five hundred projects that cover the 34 provinces of the country in the core areas including Food supplies, health care, education, power supply, agriculture and capacity building initiatives. Hence India has worked with a broad understanding and high efforts, to ensure a prosperous, democratic, stable and peaceful Afghanistan that is significant for its political, strategic and economic motivations behind its proactive engagement with the country. However, keeping in concern, the withdrawal of US combat forces from the country and subsequent Taliban’s control over Afghan affairs, India has to again rethink and revise its policy options to stay engaged there. India can come out of its ‘Wait and Watch’ policy for the ongoing security situation in that country and can play a more robust leadership role in the democratization process of that country, which is gradually decreasing. India can open convincing channels with the Taliban however based on certain pre-conditions that the Taliban needs to be persuaded for democratic principles, cutting off their links with terrorist networks and exploitation against women’s rights. Along with it, India can make possible a regional solution to the Afghan conundrum by bringing the countries on a single platform with which it shares common interests concerning Afghanistan.

1. To assess the role that India has played in the reconstruction process of Afghanistan. 2. To examine the shifts and continuity in India’s reconstruction process with regard to Afghanistan.

Ministry of External Affairs, Text of Agreement on Strategic Partnership between the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2011).

India and Afghanistan signed an agreement on Strategic Partnership on October 04, 2011, during President Hamid Karzai’s visit to India based on“mutual understanding and long-term trust”. The agreement signifies the areas of common interest that include trade, economic expansion, education, capacity development, security and politics. Along with it, the agreement signifies the commitment to strengthen cooperation in social and cultural areas. Developing relations with Civil Society and people-to-people contacts were given due consideration.  In addition to it, the agreement guarantees to seek cooperation to fight against terrorism. Both countries have confirmed their adherence to the common ideals of peace, democracy, rule of law, non-violence, human rights and fundamental freedom. Also, both nations have reaffirmed through the agreement a commitment regarding international law, including to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. The agreement is considered as a landmark in Indo-Afghan relations as it symbolises the mutual trust and confidence between the two nations. It is the pact which reflects that how India made a shift in its Afghan policy by moving forward from soft power diplomacy to hard power diplomacy very partially. However, the agreement does not take direct mention whether or not India will rely on hard power initiatives with Afghanistan. The ongoing study has filled this research gap.

Harsh V Pant, “India’s Changing Afghanistan Policy: Regional and Global Implication,” in India in Africa and Afghanistan ed. Cameron Buzatto.

The work signifies the reassessment of policies by the regional players who have their stakes in Afghanistan including India, keeping in view, the changes that have taken place in the western strategy towards Afghanistan. The central argument of the work signifies that India’s policy towards Afghanistan has remained in a changing trajectory since 2001. In addition to it, the work provides insight into how New Delhi has responded to a strategic environment that is shaped by the involvement of other actors in the region. What is more, the book takes note of the fact that ISAF is preparing to leave the country and is in the middle of a pull out which evokes a concern for India to preserve its interests in Afghanistan. However, the book falls short of the policy options that India should take if the regional solution to the Afghan problem fails. Such a gap is addressed by the ongoing study which describes the policy options that should be carried by India in Afghanistan after the US drawdown.

India’s presence in Afghanistan: Brief Background

India and Afghanistan share close historical and cultural ties since times immemorial.  Both countries signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1951 to continue and institutionalise their historical relations.  After the Soviet withdrawal (1989) from Afghanistan followed by the civil war and the establishment of the Rabbani regime thereof in (1992-1996) to which India accorded recognition, however during this period India had a limited presence in that country. India together with Russia and Iran supported the Northern Alliance so as to check the resilient Taliban’s advance in the Afghanistan. However due to the demise of Rabbani government in 1996 followed by the Taliban’s hold over the power in Afghanistan a group that India considers illegitimate left India marginalised.  India did not accorded recognition to Taliban like most of the countries of the world except Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. India continued its support to the Northern Alliance led by Ahmad Shah Massoud that was believed to be the only significant challenge to the Taliban. India had to close its consulates in Kandhar, Jalalababd, Herat and Mazar-e-Sharief thus India had to shut down its diplomatic mission in Kabul till the USA’s intervention in Afghanistan in response to the episode of 9/11 in 2001.

The downfall of the Taliban regime resulted due to the military action initiated by the US-led Coalition forces in response to the event of 9/11 in year 2001. USA initiated the ‘Global War on terror’ at international level and ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ against Taliban regime in Afghanistan.  Anwesha Ghosh while analysing the event which is believed to be carried out by al-Qaeda against the United States through four coordinated suicide terrorist attacks says that the event was to a large extent responsible for tactical calculations of many countries Vis-a-Vis Afghanistan. For pursuance of national security concerns at that time the country like India was feeling like it was on forefront on America’s war on terror.  Having a broad understanding about the vision of a prosperous, peaceful, stable and secure Afghanistan India considers it crucial for the regional stability.  India therefore played an active role in the reconstruction of the country since 9/11. India developed its connections with the new interim government that was established under the leadership of Hamid Karzai in Bonn Conference of 2001 after the downfall of Taliban Regime. India wanted not to stand as a hesitant regional player and to be absent from the Afghan Affairs, therefore, India renewed its relations with the country with high efforts and was found to be actively participating in Afghanistan’s war-reconstruction programmes. India renewed its diplomatic ties with Kabul and re-opened its closed diplomatic mission and the four consulates as well in the Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Herat.  So far, India has reached to more than USD 3 billion confirmed by the Minister of External Affairs V. Muraleedharan in Lok Sabha.

Policy initiatives taken by India since 9/11: Humanitarian, Financial and Project Assistance

India’s presence in Afghanistan in aftermath of 9/11 increased largely principally in areas of institution building, capacity creation, and infrastructure and development assistance, largely in spheres of social, education and government sector projects. As is reflected in the words of Pranab Mukherjee then the External Affairs Minister, “India-Afghan bilateral relations are fast developing into a partnership which is very special to us… we are glad to be able to contribute to the reconstruction and rebuilding of Afghanistan.”

The chief developmental Projects and works where India has invested in Afghanistan include Construction of Parliament Building in Kabul, Zaranj- Delaram highway, Double circuit Transmission line from Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul and Chimtala Sub-Station, Salma Dam, Hajigak Iron Ore Deposits.

Construction of New Parliament Building

One of the main physical manifestations on part of India is promotion of liberalism and democracy in Afghanistan while constructing the new Afghan Parliament there. it was on the visit of Prime Minister Mr. Modi on 25 December, 2015, construction of its work was finalised. The cost of constructing it has gone over budget double to the original cost of USD 45 million to about USD 90 million on its inauguration.

Zarang-Delaram Highway

Zaranj-Delaram road link that has been built by The Border Roads Organisation is of 218 kilometres long. Afghanistan’s Garland Highway is linked by this road to the Iran border via Milak Bridge. Finally it would link Afghanistan to Iran’s Chabahar port providing an alternative outlet to the nearby port. The said highway has facilitated movement of goods and services through Iran.  Carrying the strategic importance as per its location is concerned; it connects Zaranj a border town on Afghanistan-Iran border and Delaram along with Garland highway to the major cities of Afghanistan including Kabul, Kandhar, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif and Kunduz. The Chahbahar port where from Iran is upgrading a road, is situated in a free trade zone on Iran’s Makran Coast. The finalisation of work was completed in 2008.

Double Circuit Transmission Line from Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul and Chimtala Sub-Station

An integrated rural development plan was announced by then the India’s Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh in which 100 villages of Afghanistan were included. The plan was followed with Installation of solar electrification along with rain water harvesting.  The said development plan also incorporated generation and transmission of power for that purpose India built a power transmission line to Kabul.  In this course, a construction of 220 KV Double Circuit Transmission Line was brought under work from Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul and Sub-station at Chimtala so that a supplementary power facility can be brought from northern grid to Kabul, This work was initiated in 2005.   It is said, this transmission line has to cross over the Salang range at a height of 4000 mts.  since January 21st, 2009 the line is in operation and provides an uninterrupted 24-hour power supply to Kabul.  The Project was completed in year 2015.

Salma Dam Power Project

Salma Dam Power Project has been India’s another noticeable accomplishment. It is now renamed as Afghan-India Friendship Dam on August 27, 2015.  The said dam is located in Herat province on river Hari Rud.  The Salma dam was inaugurated by both the heads of two countries jointly, namely, the President of Afghanistan Dr.Ashraf  Ghani and Mr. Modi on 04 June 2016. The said project has increased water availability downstream that has lead to possibility of second crop cultivation. The said dam is going to generate 42MW power and is expected to provide irrigation facilitation for about 80,000 hectares of land. Furthermore, it includes construction of 107.5 m high and 550 m long rock fill dam and some technical parts of any hydroelectric power project comprising the Spillway, Powerhouse, Switchyard, and Transmission line.

Hajigak Iron Ore Deposits

Afghanistan government has provided mining rights to the largest iron ore deposit located at Hajigak in Bamiyan province in combination with India’s largest state-owned mining company.  The report was provided by Bloomberg and such process was initiated in late 2011. India is operating three out of four mining blocks there at Hajigak.  The said work needs USD 11 billion to mine the deposit, construct a power plant along with steel mill as well as to facilitate transportation links for the movement of equipment and extract the ore out of Hajigak.

Besides it, India has extended various forms of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. It has invested in Small Development Projects (SDP’s) by extending basic facilities in the spheres of health, education, livestock and building of bridges, wells, public toilets etc to the Afghan people. It has also worked for better and fair elections developing a sense of political consciousness. Amidst of all these, India has shipped food supplies for the Afghan people from time to time. It has granted a number of scholarships on an annual basis to Afghan students under the aegis of the Indian Council of Cultural Relations (ICCR).Similarly, the country has worked for the capacity building programmes in various fields including Afghan public administration, Banking administration, Afghanistan Foreign services, Defence and has also provided services for self-help groups.  Besides providing vocational training in carpentry, tailoring, welding, masonry and plumbing through the confederation of Indian industries, the economic development of the Afghanistan has been taken care of by linking it to several numbers of regional organisations.

However worth to mention here is that such an engagement of India with Afghanistan was driven by the India’s striking capabilities in terms of political, economic and military dimensions along with some other motivations Afghanistan provided a space for this aspiring global power to enhance its security parameters and increase its sphere of influence over external environment. India increased its bi-lateral relations with Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11, however opined by several analysts that such a course of relation remained in a changing trajectory that is divided into three distinct phases.

In the phase first, India extended aid-receptive programmes to Afghanistan for institution building, capacity creation, and infrastructure development in reference to social, education and government sector projects for that India invested USD 3 billion. Therefore, it can be said that India used soft power initiatives in Afghanistan that generated goodwill among Afghan people for India and helped her to develop a state identity and strategic narratives as a rising global power.

In the phase second, power equation shifted in the hands of Pakistan and its allies and New Delhi stood marginalized. Thus, India faced a risky track at this juncture, this was the outcome, when west got diverted by its war in Iraq and had to withdraw some of its forces from Afghanistan. This paved a way to Taliban in claiming the strategic space back that it was enjoying earlier.

Phase third resulted in the signing of a historic pact- The Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) on October 2011 between India and Afghanistan. Such a development signifies that India had to rethink over its engagement with Afghanistan keeping in views the changing security scenario in that country. The signing of 2011 Strategic Agreement is observed as a great shift in India’s policy attitude towards Afghanistan as it released India on having restraint on security matters and on carrying the exclusive focus on development to a greater security engagement. Such an engagement reflects the fact that India shifted its focus from Soft power to Smart power initiatives. SPA is going to play a critical role that India will play in shaping Afghanistan’s future and this pact is reflecting the increased India-Afghanistan bilateral relations from 2011-2014 and from 2014 to onwards, keeping in view the exit strategy of US from the country. The former is marked by the formalization of Strategic Partnership Agreement and later by the continuation of the said pact.

India’s proactive role that it played in Afghanistan has generated a great goodwill among the people of Afghanistan. Such a fact is revealed by many opinion polls in which 71% people of Afghanistan has granted a most favourable nation recognition to India, corresponding figures for US, UK, Iran and Germany were 51%, 39%, 40%, 59% and 15% for Pakistan. Corresponding to India’s development engagement with Afghanistan it was said that India gains a benefit from the presence of US-military forces in this country for the sake of security reasons. 

The withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Afghanistan has changed the security situation in that country. The power balance that has again shifted in favour of Taliban has lead to the outbreak of a more volatile situation that concerns the regional powers who can receive the spill over effect of such a situation. Therefore, India who has showed its rise of soft power influence within that country since 2001 by investing almost 3 billion USD for strategic infrastructure and capacity building projects has to reassess its strategies in relation to the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan- the group that India considers illegitimate. Therefore as Kabul again fell in the hands of Taliban on 15August, 2021 and has completed its seventeen months in power on January 15, 2023. The country is again held in chaos. None of the countries around globe has provided recognition to this regime including Pakistan which has withheld his stand officially. India being concerned about its national security has not provided any positive signal for recognizing Taliban rule. However, it is being noticed that New Delhi has added some sort of flexibility in its approach towards the Taliban as is evident from the fact that India has showed its presence in several negotiations that were held between Taliban and the US over a peace deal with the intent to address its security concerns that are going to emanate from Afghan soil, and is committed to its all-time stand of continuing people to people exchanges. India did not lag in providing emergency humanitarian assistance to the nation. It was also observed that the country stood cooperative to the Afghan refugees, particularly with the Hindu and Sikh minorities as New Delhi’s MEA has asserted that it will facilitate the said communities in Afghanistan, however, would such a stand welcome all the Afghans is yet undecided. It has also been stated by Taneja that India’s responses to the changing power matrix in Afghanistan resembles to the strategy that it adopted when Taliban gained its power in 1996 up to 2001. At that time India along with other nations like Iran chooses to extend its support in favour of Northern Alliance. Once again, India’s engagement with the persona from the said coalition and others that sideline themselves from Taliban seems appearing on the ground. Thus, resurgence of Taliban in Afghan matrix has sent the alarming signals to the countries that are likely to receive the security implications from the ongoing chaotic situation of the country including India. India has to fully balance the challenges that it is facing in order to remain engaged with that country so as to pursue its strategic goals. India can come out of its ‘Wait and Watch’ policy for the ongoing security situation in that country and can play a more robust leadership role for the democratization process of that country which is gradually decreasing. India can open the convincing channels with Taliban however based on certain pre-conditions for that Taliban needs to be persuaded for democratic principles, cutting of their links with terrorist networks and exploitation against women rights. Along with it, India can make possible a regional solution to the Afghan conundrum by bringing the countries on a single platform with which it shares common interests with regard to the Afghanistan.

1. “As a rising global power, what is India’s vision for the world?” World Economic Forum, published August 14, 2018, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/08/what-is-indias-vision-for-the-world-modi/. 2. Nihar Ranjan Das, “Afghanistan’s Relations with India and Iran: An assessment of Ghani Period,” Indian Council of world Affairs, last updated July 27, 2016, https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=1789&lid=787. 3. Larry Hanauer and Peter Chalk, “India’s and Pakistan’s Strategies in Afghanistan: Implications for the United States and the Region,” RAND Corporation, last updated 2012, http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional-papers/OP387.html. 4. Nandita Palrecha and MonishTourangbam, “India’s Development Aid to Afghanistan: Does Afghanistan Need What India Gives?,” The Diplomat, last updated November 24, 2018, http://thediplomat.com/2018/11/indias-development-aid-to-afghanistan-does-afghanistan-need-what-india-gives/. 5. Harsh V. Pant, “India’s Changing Afghanistan Policy: Regional and Global Implications,” in India in Africa and Afghanistan, ed. Cameron and Buzatto (New York: Nova Publishers, 2013), 43. 6. Anwesha Ghosh, “Indian Interests and Strategic Stakes in Afghanistan,” in International Intervention in Afghanistan, ed. Basu Arpita, Kumar Binoda and Aliva Mishra (New Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2012), 269. 7. Ministry of External Affairs, India-Afghanistan Relations (India: MEA, 2012) https://www.google.com/search?q=India+and+Afghanistan+share+close+ historical+and+cultural+ties+since+from+times+immemorial.+Both+the+countries+ha. 8. “Traditional friends, Modern Allies,” The Hindu, published November 17, 2015, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns/India-and-Afghanistan-Traditional-friends-modern-allies/article56845088.ece. 9. Avinandan Choudhury, “India in Afghanistan after the Soviet Withdrawal,” The Diplomat, last updated May 15, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/india-in-afghanistan-after-the-soviet-withdrawal/. 10. “Recognition and the Taliban,” Brookings, published September 30, 2022, http://www.brookings.edu. 11. Moonis Ahmar, ed., The challenge of Rebuilding Afghanistan (Islamabad: University of Karachi, 2005), 2. 12. Anwesha Ghosh, “Indian Interests and Strategic Stakes in Afghanistan,” in International Intervention in Afghanistan, ed. Basu Arpita, Kumar Binoda and Aliva Mishra (New Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2012), 269. 13. Ministry of External Affairs, India-Afghanistan Relations (India: MEA, 2012) https://www.google.com/search?q=India+and+Afghanistan+ share+close+historical+and+cultural+ties+since+from+times+immemorial.+Both+the+ countries+ha. 14. Aneek, Neighbours, Major Powers and Indian Foreign Policy, 92. 15. T. Chakraborti. “India’s Relations with South Asia in 2010: A Journey of Crests and Troughs,” World Focus 31, no. 11-12 (2010): 517. 16. “India invested more than 3 billion USD in Afghanistan: MoS Muraleedharan” Business Standard, last updated Feb 5, 2022, https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/india-invested-more-than-3-billion-in-afghanistan-mos-muraleedharan-122020500307_1.html. 17. Pattanaik, “India’s Afghan Policy: Beyond Bilateralism,” 570. 18. N. Dholabhai, “Accomplishment of Afghan Road Mission by India,” The Telegraph, July, 2008. 19. Ministry of External Affairs, India-Afghanistan Joint Statement during the visit of Dr. Manmohan Singh to Afghanistan (India: MEA, 2005) http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=530510092. Accessed on September 28 2019 at: 14:30. 20. T. Peter, “India Outdoes US aid efforts in Afghanistan,” Global Post, September 09, 2010, http://www.globalpost.com/print/5583950. Accessed on September 30, 2019 at: 18:05. 21. Peter, “India Outdoes US.” 22. Ministry of External Affairs, India and Afghanistan: A Development Partnership (India: MEA, 2009) http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/176_india-and-afghanistan-a-developmentpartnership.pdf. Accessed on September 30, 2019 at: 19: 10. 23. Peter, 20. 24. Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report on India’s Engagement in Afghanistan (India: MEA, 2015) www.mea.gov.in. Accessed on October 5 2019 at: 11:30. 25. Ministry of External Affairs, Summary of MoUs signed by India and Afghanistan during the Visit of President Karzai to India (India: MEA, 2005) http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=530590445.Accessed on October 1, 2019 at: 11:10. 26. ShanthieMariet D’ Souza, ed., Afghanistan in Transition: Beyond 2014? (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2012), 5. 27. Yow Peter, Raiphea, “India-Afghanistan Relations: 2001-2011” (Ph.D. thesis, Department of Social Sciences, Eastern Hill University, Shillong, 2016), 01, http://shondhganga.inflibnet.ac.in. Accessed on May 27, 2018 at: 13:30. 28. ErayBasar, “The Roles of India and Pakistan in Afghanistan’s Development and Natural Resources,” NATO CFC, last updated March 7, 2012, http://reliefweb.int/sites/files/resources/CFC_Afghanistan_Role_India_Pak_Mar12_final.pdf. Accessed on September 28, 2019 at: 13:40. 29. Pant, “India’s Changing Afghan Policy…,” 45. 30. “2011 Pact will guide Afghanistan ‘military ties’: India” Times of India, July 23, 2021. 31. “71% of Afghans say India playing most positive role in country: Poll” Times of India, January 21, 2010. 32. “ Afghanistan’s security challenges under Taliban,” Crisis Group, published August 12, 2022, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/afghanistans-security-challenges-under-taliban. 33. “Afghanistan: One year of Taliban rule” Chatham House, published August 15, 2022, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/08/afghanistan-one-year-taliban-rule. 34. “Taliban are back-what next for Afghanistan” BBC, August 30, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49192495. 35. BenSaul, “Recognition” and the Taliban’s International Legal Status,” ICCT, last updated December 15, 2021, https://icct.nl/publication/recognition-talibans-international-legal-status/. 36.R. Chaudhuri and Shreyas Shende, “India’s strategy in Afghanistan after U.S. withdrawal, Carnegie Endowment, last updated June 02, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Chaudhuri_Shende_-_Afghanistan.pdf. 37. “Taliban takeover of Afghanistan: India’s perspective,” Journals of India, published August 16, 2021, http://journals of India.com/Taliban-takeover-of-Afghanistan-India’s-perspective/. 38. Kabir Taneja, “India-Pakistan rivalry heating up over Afghanistan,” ORF, last updated May 19, 2021, http://www.orfonline.org/research/india-pakistan-rivalry-heating-up-over-afghanistan/. 38. 39. “India adopting ‘wait and watch’ policy on Afghanistan, says government,” The Hindu, published August 26, 2021, http://www.the hindu.com/news/national/jaishankar-briefs-political-leaders-on-afghanistan-situation/article36112751.ece. 40. RakeshSood, “Redefining India’s role in Afghanistan,” ORF, last updated November 27, 2021, http://www.orfonline.org/reserach/redefining-indias-role-in-afghanistan/. 41. SaloniKapur, “Why India should engage the Taliban,” Deccan Herald, last updated August 27, 2021, https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/why-india-should-engage-the-taliban-1024043.html. 42.Kamal Davar, “Afghanistan’s problems require a collective regional solution; India must play a leading role,” South Asia Monitor, last updated January 3, 2022. http://www.sothasiamonitor.org/spotlight/afghanistan-problems-require-collective-regional-solution-india-must-play-leading-role.