Indira Gandhi formulated and guided India's foreign relations for a period of fifteen years from 1966 to 1977 and then again from 1980 to 1984. Leaving aside her father, who had a tenure of nearly seventeen years in power, Indira had the longest tenure as Prime Minister. There were, however, some basic differences between their roles in the fashioning and implementation of India's foreign policy. 

Indira Gandhi came to power in l966. Her personality was influenced by this experience, leading to a realistic approach to international politics and awareness of the challenges that India faced. The more specific context in which she assumed power was an equally significant factor influencing her approach to foreign and national security policies. 

Nehru retained the foreign office portfolio with him and functioned also as India's Foreign Minister. In contrast, Indira appointed several eminent Congress leaders as foreign ministers, beginning with M.C. Chagla and Swaran Singh and ending with P.V. Narasimha Rao. Her foreign ministers were influential political figures in their own right. She nevertheless maintained a dominant influence over India's foreign and national security policies. The specific context in which she assumed power was an equally significant factor influencing her approach to foreign and national security policies. The stalemate on the Jammu and Kashmir issue, India's defeat at the hands of China in 1962, and the experience of 1965, Indo-Pak war, influenced her mindset."

According to J.N. Dixit,

She felt that Nehru's idealism was not responsive to the chemistry of power, which remained a decisive factor in international politics. She had a feeling that Nehru was betrayed by the UN and world powers on the Kashmir issue. She felt that the adversarial relationship with Pakistan would be a continuing phenomenon. Being a witness to the trauma of her father due to the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962, she felt that China had betrayed the goodwill and vision characterizing Nehru's policies towards that country. The 1965 war and the Tashkent agreement followed by Pakistan's rejection of this agreement, convinced her that reason and idealism had to be tempered by practicality and political realism in the conduct of India's foreign policy.

While sharing the Nehruvian vision of India shunning the cold war and remaining committed to non-alignment, and while inheriting the Nehruvian aspiration, of India playing a pivotal role in strengthening the forces of peace, stability and development, she did not share her father's idealistic view of the essential goodness of human nature or nation-states. Nor did she share Nehru's conviction that international relations could be managed on a purely moral and rational basis. She believed that India's foreign policy should be clearly and precisely related to the country's interests at a given pointin time. She also felt that safeguarding these interests primarily depended on India becoming self-reliant and strong.

Indira was conscious of the undercurrents of general antagonism towards India on the part of the US and its allies and was concerned about the threats posed to India by Pakistan and China. She knew the importance of maintaining a strategic partnership with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

She had to define India's foreign policy and strategic stances when the cold war was at its peak and when the Sino-Soviet differences and Sino-Pakistan collaborations were affecting India's security environment. She had to deal with the threat posed byChina, which had by that time become a nuclear weapons power. She had to replenish India's defence capacities which had been depleted during the 1965 war. She had to fashion her response to increasing international pressure on India to desist from improving its nuclear and technological capacities for defence purposes. These were India's important foreign policy concerns during the period 1966-71.

Relations with the Soviet Union were expanded and qualitatively improved by Indira. Indo-Soviet defence and technological cooperation came into full flow during the period 1966-70. Mutuality of interests and reciprocity of need brought India and the Soviet Union closer. High-level visits exchanged between Indira Gandhi and Kosygin and between Indian and Soviet foreign Ministers contributed to the process.

J. N. Dixit believes that in dealing with the countries of South-East Asia Indira's Foreign policy seemed to lack clear understanding. Indonesia under Suharto, despite remaining a member of the non-alignment movement become an ally of Western Powers.The other South-East Asian countries had also become an integral part of the US-led military alliances and defence cooperation arrangements. They were all supporting America's Vietnam policies. Desirous of asserting India's status as a country having the second-largestMuslim population in the world, Indira decided that India should become a member of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), which was in the process of being created. India received an invitation to join the inaugural summit of (OIC) at Rabat in Morocco in 1969." M.C. Chagla went to attend the conference, but India's secular identity could not win her many friends in O.I.C.

In 1977 and 1984 the US military assistance to Pakistan due to developments in Afghanistan increased Indian threat perceptions about Pakistan. Pakistan's nuclear weaponisation programme was viewed with concern by India. Zia's suggestions and proposals for normalizing Indo-Pakistan relations were perceived by India for what they really were, namely, cosmetic public relations exercises aimed at the international community. India's negative reactions to Pakistan's proposal for a non-aggression pact can be attributed to the following reasons: (a) Pakistan's unwillingness to extend the provisions of this pact deliberately omitted the principles of the Shimla Agreement about bilateralism in resolving the pending issues; and (b) Pakistan's refusal to accept the Indian suggestion that if a non-aggression or a no-war pact came into existence, it should also bind both India and Pakistan not to allow foreign military bases in their respective countries. While Zia encouraged exchanges of views between the two countries, he pulled back whenever these discussions reached the crucial stage of decision-making. India acknowledged that Zia was a shrewd and practical leader without any inclination towards military adventurism. His primary concern was to consolidate his position within Pakistan. The basic Indian approach, therefore, was to continue contacts for bringing about normal relations to the extent possible and to firmly counter Pakistani moves against India in the political, diplomatic and security spheres. Pakistan, in turn, perceived Gandhi as an extremely assertive leader who had an antagonistic mindset towards that country. The memories of the defeat in the 1971 war impinged adversely on the military regime of Zia-ul-Haq."

During this period India ceased to be a model for other newly independent, third-world states India's credentials on non-alignment became questionable due to the signing of the Indo-Soviet treaty in August 1971 which, among other things, provided for "consultation" with each other, in the event of a threat to peace, or of aggression on, either of the parties. It must be emphasized, that the Treaty also, provided that the Soviet Union had due respect for India's policy of non-alignment. The treaty gave the impression to India's adversaries (notably Pakistan) that if they had two big Powers (China and USA) on their side, India too had one the Soviet Union on its side in the event of any threat to India's security and vital interest. This diplomatic strategy worked in favour of India. When Pakistan declared war on India in early December 1971, India could successfully meet it, without either China or the United States coming to Pakistan's rescue. After the creation of Bangladesh, the Economist called Indira Gandhi the "Empress of Asia" and President Nixon said in May 1973: "India emerged from the 1971 crisis with a new confidence, power and responsibilities."

The Shimla agreement (July 1972) ensured that thereafter all disputes were to be resolved through peaceful means, and bilaterally. The other states of the Indian sub-continent too became conscious of India's new power status. Despite the misgivings of many in India and abroad, India maintained its policy of non-alignment with the Cold War blocs. This firm and continuing stance were strikingly demonstrated a couple of years later in India politely ignoring the Soviet proposal on "Asian Collective Security". India did so to avoid entangling itself in Soviet manoeuvres to stem Chinese and American influence in Asia, being itself (partly) an Asian Power.

India has been opposed for years, starting during the Nehru years, to nuclear weapons and all that they represent in political and strategic terms for world peace. It was opposed, not only to manufacture but also to their storage/transhipment, transfer and their testing. India urged the use of nuclear power only for peaceful purposes. But India under Indira Gandhi's leadership made a nuclear devise explosion in May 1974-not a bomb as such, but as a technological demonstration of India's scientific capability. However, it was mistaken abroad as India's sudden change of policy on the issue, although, even then, India made it clear that India was not going in for the manufacture of nuclear weapons but was only "keeping the options open". Support to, and strengthening of, the United Nations (and generally, other international organizations too) has been a basic objective of India's foreign policy. When the Cold War between the Western-Eastern blocs started adversely affecting the functioning of the Organization, it did its best along with other nonaligned countries to protect and save it from the harmful consequences of the Cold War (e.g., it opposed the replacement of the Secretary-general's post by a Troika of representatives of the Western, Eastern blocs, and of the nonaligned group).

Keeping in view the implications of India being larger/stronger, economically and militarily, India avoided any move in regional cooperation. According to M.S. Rajan India has always been guided by reciprocity and mutuality of interests, including the vital interests of all sub-continental states, apart from its own. But the "Gujral Doctrine" promotes unilateral initiatives, by India, without expecting any reciprocity; Non-interference in the internal affairs of its neighbours, peaceful solution of all disputes or conflicts of national interest bilaterally, avoiding, as far as possible, third party involvement (whether of external Power or even the United Nations), are other aspects of this policy. India's neighbours have come to accept, India's policy towards them. They no longer seek the assistance of extra-continental external powers for resolving their problems with India. The External Powers no longer seek to intervene in the resolution of these problems-in effects, both of them accepting India's bonafide for resolving them peacefully and in mutual interests."

Indira visited Dhaka in March 1972 and signed a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation with Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, which provided the framework for future relations between India and Bangladesh. Despite Mujib's request that the Indian armed forces remain in Bangladesh for six to eight months more to ensure his country's security against Pakistani subversion, Indira insisted on complete withdrawal from Bangladesh by 17 March 1972 which was eventually carried out. The Bhutto-Indira Gandhi meeting in July 1972 resulted in the signing of the Shimla Agreement under which Indira released all the Pakistani prisoners of war and vacated Pakistani territories that the Indian Army had occupied during the war. Indira was keen to resolve the Kashmir issue also, It was suggested to Bhutto that the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir be redrawn and readjusted in the context of the military operations of December 1971. It was also suggested that the ceasefire line should be initially called the "Line of control" and then the Jammu and Kashmir problem should be resolved by Pakistan retaining control over areas west of this line and India retaining jurisdiction over the area east of this line."

Indira's advisers felt that a failure of the Shimla Summit or imposition of an agreement on a defeated Pakistan would be counterproductive and would only prolong Indo-Pakistan tension. The Shimla Agreement stipulated mutual commitments by India and Pakistan to normalize relations and abjure the use of force for resolving bilateral disputes. It also sought to ensure non-intervention in each other's internal affairs and respect for each other's territorial integrity. However, Bhutto succeeded in persuading Indira to accept a clause in the agreement which acknowledged Jammu and Kashmir as "an issue at dispute" which had to be resolved bilaterally or mutually agreed by means.

Indo-US agreement to strengthen bilateral relations and to establish joint commissions for multidimensional cooperation was signed in 1974. In public pronouncements, the US acknowledged India as a dominant power in the south Asian region. The second event was President Brezhnev's visit to India in 1974 during which he tried to extract quid pro quo from India for the assistance which the Soviet Union had given India during the East Pakistan crisis. He suggested an Asian security plan under the Soviet Union's umbrella in which they wished India to become an active participant. India did not accept this suggestion, standing firm on India's position that it would not participate in any defence alliance systems under the umbrella of any great power as it would involve India in the cold war. In this stance, India was animated by her commitment to non-alignment and her determination to retain the freedom of options for India's foreign and defence policies. This development resulted in a certain cooling of Indo-Soviet relations for a brief period.

A highly significant defence and foreign policy achievement during Indira's first tenure as Prime Minister was India acquiring nuclear weapons capacities. India had known about having initiated a nuclear weapons acquisition programme for Pakistan in 1972. Indira, therefore, authorized the acceleration of India's nuclear weapons capacity research. Consequently, India conducted its first underground nuclear explosion inthe Pokhran desert on 18 May 1974. India managed to do so in secrecy. There was widespread international criticism of India in the aftermath of this successful nuclear experiment.

The major foreign policy concerns of Indira Gandhi during her second tenure (1980-84) as Prime Minister pertained to dealing with the crisis in Afghanistan, coping with a heightened level of Pakistani subversion in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir, and adjusting India's relations with the superpowers.

Indira had to revive Indira's external economic and technological linkages, which had gone into a limbo since her declaration of emergency in 1975 and which neither the government of Morarji Desai nor that of Charan Singh had succeeded in reviving. She had to define Indian attitudes regarding the fallout of the Iranian revolution and the Iran- Iraq war. She had to deal with an economically resurgent and politically assertive China on the northeastern flank. Indira was also clear in her mind that the financial, technological and defence linkages between India and the Soviet Union were vital in securing India's economic, strategic and political interests. Indira adopted a policy stance consisting of three main elements. First, India would convey its objections to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan bilaterally to the Soviet leadership. Second, in multilateral fora, India would not indulge in one-sided criticism of the Soviet Union-India would advocate non-intervention in Afghanistan by all externalSources and the cation of a democratic nonaligned government in Afghanistan. Third, India would be generally supportive of the government in Kabul led by the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Indira, therefore, sent new instructions to India's ambassadorto the UN, Brajesh Mishra, asking him to articulate India's modified policy to highlight the aforementioned three elements."

The simmering tensions between the Sinhala majority and the minority Tamils in Sri Lanka came to a flashpoint in the late 1970s and early 1983s, culminating in the explosion of anti-Tamil riots in July 1983. Nearly three hundred thousand Tamil refugees fled to India. There was tremendous anger against the Sinhala majority government and sympathy for the Sri Lankan Tamils in Tamil Nadu. This resulted in Indira's initiating a process that involved exerting pressure on the Sri Lankan government to resolve the issue, while, at the same time, she made efforts at mediation Sri Lanka was the major preoccupation of Indira's foreign policy during the last two years of her life.

She changed the moorings of India's foreign and security policies from idealism to practicality and political realism while sustaining their basic ideological framework. She sustained India's position and influence at the UN, in the nonaligned movement and other multilateral fora. She made India increasingly self-reliant in the spheres of nuclear and space technology and other related fields involving high-tech know-how. She guided India's economic policies in a manner that made the country progressively self-sufficient in food grains and in the agriculture sector. She stabilized the South Asian security environment, ensuring India had a position of strength. The 1971 victory in the war against Pakistan restored national self-confidence with regard to India's ability to ensure its security. The trauma of 1962 had been remedied. Levels of national consensus on security and foreign relations had reached a stage where the government reacquired acapacity for flexibility and forward planning in these spheres for the first time since the Nehru era.

Indira recast the terms of reference of India's foreign policy according to the realities of international politics, power equations and regional complexities and attitudes. She structured India's foreign and security policies in clearly Indocentric terms, avoiding getting involved in futile exercises in global prominence. She enhanced India's defence capacities and self-reliance in the sphere of defence equipment to the maximum extent possible, while at the same time ensuring the flow of such supplies and technologies on the basis of carefully crafted political equations with important foreign countries. She galvanized India's programmes of nuclear technology development both for peaceful and defence purposes. The 1974 Pokhran nuclear explosion was the first step towards India becoming a nuclear weapons power in May 1998. She faced external pressures and opposition to this Indian endeavour with resilience and courage. She redefined the ideology of non-alignment more precisely in terms of the interests of the developing countries. The two foreign policy decisions for which she could be faulted are her ambiguous response to the Russian intrusion into Afghanistan and her giving active support to Sri Lanka Tamil militants. Whatever the criticisms about these decisions, it cannot be denied that she took them on the basis of her assessment of India's national interests. Her logic was that she could not openly alienate the former Soviet Union when India was so dependent on that country for defence supplies and technologies. Similarly, she could not afford the emergence of Tamil separatism in India by refusing to support the aspirations of Sri Lankan Tamils. These aspirations were legitimate in the context of nearly fifty years of Sinhalese discrimination against Sri Lankan Tamils. 

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8. Mansingh, Surjit, (Ed.), Nehru's Foreign Policy fifty years on. New Delhi, 2003.