

# Colonial Powers and Western Sahara during the Cold War Era

## Abstract

This paper deals with the various issue of Western Sahara during the cold war era, and the how colonial powers exploited natural resources of Western Sahara, which is the most important a key factor till now. And discusses about the geographical position of the Western Sahara, how it becomes the buffer zone in the cold war era specially for USA and USSR, how Morocco got the military aid by USA and the other hand Algeria was getting economical and military aid by USSR.

**Keywords:** Natural Resources, Phosphates, Vanadium, Polisario.

### Introduction

Western Sahara is the contested issue in the politics of North Africa. Spanish Sahara was the name used for the modern territory of Western Sahara' and it was occupied and ruled as a territory by Spain between 1884 and 1975.

Western Sahara is located in North-West Africa and covers an area of 266,000 km. It is roughly the size of Britain. It shares a 443 km-long border with Morocco in the north, a 42 km-long border with Algeria to the east, a 1,561 km-long border with Mauritania to the south-east, and has a 1,100 km-long Atlantic Ocean coastline" (CIA World Factbook,2015:1). The topography is mostly made up of low, flat desert with large areas of rocky or sandy surfaces rising to small mountains in the south and the northeast.

### Objectives of the paper

1. To examine the economic resources capacity of Western Sahara province
2. To examine the role of Spain's Initial Interest in Western Sahara
3. To examine the role of geopolitics of Western Sahara
4. To examine the role of Algeria towards Western Sahara
5. To examine the role of USA and USSR towards Western Sahara

### Review of Literature

Kumar, Suresh, 2012. Geopolitics regionalism under new Morocco constitution and Autonomy of Sahara. New Delhi.

Indian Journal of African Studies

This paper start with the reviewing the Historical development of Morocco shall be twofold: first, to delineate the politico geographical factors that were largely responsible for creating among the constituent units strong regional identities and the consequent desire for separate existence; and secondly to isolate the factors that in the end overwhelmed their feelings for separatism and persuade and them to unite into a functioning regionalism. From the two sets of factors one would proceed to infer the general relationships among centre and Sahara region. And the paper's main focus on Sahara Autonomy and territorial integrity.


Saxena, Suresh. Chandra, 1981. The Liberation War in Western Sahara. New Delhi. Vidya Publication.

This book deals with only one of these Freedom struggles the one that is being waged in Western Sahara .Causes and growth of the Liberation struggle in Western as well as with attitudes of the concerned and the involved powers was available to the readers hence people interested in the objective study of this problem were, more or less, in the dark about various dimension of the problem.

Saxena, Suresh. Chandra, 1995. Western Sahara: No Alternative to Armed Struggle. Delhi. Kaling publication.

This book has, therefore, been written with a view to enlightening the interested persons with all the necessary details regarding the grim struggle between the people of Western Sahara and Morocco, both in the battle field and on the diplomatic front.

Ouali, abdelhamid el, 2008. Saharan Conflict: Towards Territorial Autonomy as a Right to Democratic Self-determination. London. King s Lynn.



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Western Sahara has for centuries played a crucial role in the national history of Morocco. However, since the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when Spain established its colonial domination on the territory, it has become a troubled region. In the sixties, Spain was on the verge of returning Western Sahara to Morocco, but changed its mind after the discovery of phosphates.

Arnold, Guy, 2009. Morocco in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century. London. North South Books.

This book provides an overview of the current political, economic, and social situation and what lies ahead. Since the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century Morocco has gone through various phases to emerge as a regional economic power conscious of the privileged strategic position it occupies at the tip of Africa controlling one side of narrow strait of Gibraltar that links the Mediterranean with the Atlantic and Europe with Africa.

Ennaji, Maha, 2014. Multiculturalism and democracy in North Africa: aftermath of Arab spring. New York. Rutledge.

This book aims to provide an overview the Arab spring sparked dramatic change throughout North Africa, particularly Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and to a lesser extent Morocco, and Algeria. Popular movements have brought a range of avowedly Islamist political parties to power, replacing the largely secular forms regims.

#### **Natural Resources and Western Sahara**

Exploitation of Western Saharan's natural resources has always been an issue in the conflict, because there are two reasons for this. First the strategic importance of fisheries and hydrocarbons to the Moroccan economy has grown enough while that of phosphates has made more or less continuously, Second the Moroccan begging of oil exploration and by the different possibility that the European Union will recommence fishing in Saharan waters through an agreement with Rabat.

In the Western Sahara Spain discovered phosphate deposits in the 1960, but their exploitation was starting by the Moroccan Government. These reserves give best quality phosphates of 80% purity, and become important revenue to Morocco, which had been among the first phosphate producers and sellers of the world. After the USA, it was Morocco where the largest amount of phosphate (22 million metric tons) was produced in 2002" (Philip A. Szczesniak, 2001:5). Spain wanted to exploitation of Western Sahara' resources badly and it did. The amount which Morocco got from the phosphate production, this revenue used to spend only for the development of the Western Sahara. New research findings explain that Western Sahara is also most rich in minerals, particularly in iron ore, uranium, titanium, natural gas and oil. The US Geological Survey of World Energy 2000 estimated Western Saharan offshore oil and gas resources are sufficient, while Morocco's reserves were small" (BBC News, 4 Mar, 2003). Some geologists say that vanadium is also abundant in this territory which then would result in high profit. The Spanish found oil already in the 1960, however, they did not attempt to launch offshore

drilling due to the underdevelopment of the area in economic terms. Morocco had some development plan for the Western Sahara being part of Morocco, it also need big amount of fund to provide basic facilities to citizens.

In October 2001, the Moroccan state oil company, ONHYM, entered into agreements with an American company, the Kerr-McGee Corporation (Kerr-McGee), and a French company, TotalFinaElf S.A. (TotalFinaElf), to engage in pre-exploration activities in the oil reserves off the coast of Western Sahara" (BBC News, 4 Mar, 2003). The reason was same behind this agreement to produces maxima revenue for the development, Morocco had good intention, it decided to used this revenue for Western Sahara.

Unemployment in the territory acknowledged by the state to run at around 25 % and estimated by others to be twice that and with the government committed to subsidizing settlers, the importance of fishing to Rabat's project in the Western Sahara is very important. But the importance of Saharan waters has also grown for the Moroccan economy as a whole. "This is due to many factors, first development of the Moroccan fishing industry as a generator of income and employment, second growing international demand for seafood and third a massive growth in the proportion of the Moroccan catch accounted for by Saharan waters" (Toby Shelley 2006). According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, over-fishing and shallow migration have reduced the sardine catch in Moroccan-controlled waters by 80 %. Only in the southern sector of the Western Sahara do stocks remain healthy. Cephalopods constitute 80-90 % of export earnings of the industry and they are found almost exclusively in Saharan waters. Indeed the boats at Leraa were broken up because they were working in a protection zone for cephalopods. Much of the state investment in the Western Sahara in recent years has gone to the redevelopment of the ports of Laayoune, Dakhla and Boujdour, reflecting the increasing importance of the fishing industry there to Morocco" (Toby Shelley, 2006). By 2007, a staggering 90 % of the total Moroccan catch is Front cast to be landed within the Southern Development Zone essentially the historic Western Sahara.

A small proportion of the artisanal fishermen are Sahrawi but lack of micro-credit limits the ability of families to purchase boats and equipment. More important, the members of the handful of rich Sahrawi families that work with Morocco are allowed to control some of the fishing licensees and to operate freezer units and sardine processing units, enabling them to distribute patronage in the form of jobs and fishing rights.

In 2005, the European Commission negotiated a fishing agreement with Morocco. In the past, European ships to fish off the Moroccan and Saharan coasts under agreements that derived from the Madrid Accords 12 under which Spain Handed over Western Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania. The discovery for oil in Western Saharan waters has attracted much notice since Morocco announced it

had licenses to Total and Kerr McGee in 2001. Morocco, of course, has no oil of its own or none discovered to date" (Toby Shelley, 2004). The fishing agreement with Europe will also make them tech better technique of fishing, because there is huge stock of fish at costal area of south of Morocco. The tribal people of Western Sahara all not much educated. This time Western Sahara needs more and more investment for the development and it was the good time that European came in Western Sahara for trade and business, beside the Morocco help Western Sahara.

Bou Craa has given important income and employment for the Sahrawis although both are fishing on the other side of the sand wall in the refugee camps, the pensions of former miners, paid by Spain, provides much needed income. This is probably a main reason why Polisario did not complain at the continued involvement of Spanish industry in Bou Craa. Morocco has done some looking for but it was easy to think titanium or vanadium becoming competitor's resource in the future" (Toby Shelley, 2006). Supporters of Morocco very fast argue that infrastructural and resource development in the Western Sahara has been greater than in Morocco itself, This is the evidence to the benefits of the territory being under Rabat's rule and there is no doubt that in the north Africa is the most develop country as compare to other.

Some Sahrawis have been working in the field of fishing. Today, Sahrawi operators of small boats are being squeezed by limits of permits, lack of finance, and protection measures. The low paid fish processing jobs and, allegedly, control fishing licenses are the limitation for the Saharawis.

Polisario and its supporters are demanding to counter Moroccan exploitation of Saharan resources through a variety of strategies. It includes the threat of legal action against the EU if the fishing agreement is implemented lobbying campaigns against companies working in or importing from the Western Sahara issuing of exploration licenses and options in the name of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. It can be argued, that the resources issue in the Western Sahara dispute has become more important in recent time as fishing has become Important for both the liberalization project and for the Moroccan economy, and as hopes of oil discoveries have fast in equally with the rise in global prices.

#### **Spain's Initial Interest in Western Sahara**

The Canary Islands had become an important trading center for Spain, and the Spanish began to cast their eyes upon the African coast. In 1476, a small Spanish fort was established at Santa Cruz de Mar Pequena opposite the Canaries, but it was sacked in 1524, and the Spanish were not able to establish another settlement on this coast until more than three and a half centuries later in 1884 Berlin conference" (CUN, 2012:4). At the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, with European colonization advancing in Africa, Spain turned its notice once again to the Saharan coast, there being fears in Madrid that France, England or some other European powers might secure control of this coast so close to the

Canaries it was the major threat from European Power. In the 1870, Spanish public support for Spanish colonial risky work in Africa grew with expectations of commercial rewards from trade and exploitation of fishing resources. So by 1884, there had a formidable interlocking chain of business interests and Africanists propagandists who could bring considerable pressure to bear on the Spanish government. In 1884 Emil Bonelli, under the protection of the Spanish Society of Africanists and Colonialists had signed a treaty with certain nomadic tribes, giving over to the Spanish the territory called Madibu or Cape Blanc on the coast, so that this territory finds itself under the protection and government of His Majesty the King of Spain, Don Alfonso XII. In 1885, Spain placed the all coast between Cape Blanc and Bojador under the administrative responsibility of its overseas ministry" (Saxena, 1995:13), national and individual interest both could be seen in the Spanish policy. Fishing trade was the main resource since the colonialization.

The main reason of the treaties was to control the natural resources of the Western Sahara. Spain also gave promises for their Security. These treaties used to make by the tribal leader only and the local opinion (tribal individual) was not be included. Thus complying with article 35 of the General Act of the Congress of Berlin (February 2, 1885) requiring colonial powers to establish dominant administration of their colonies. In 1887, by order, the area of the protectorate was extended up to 150 miles into the interior, while putting it under the administration of the political-military sub-governor" (CUN, 2012:5). Overall Spain's all concentration were on the natural resources, all the treaties and pact used to make for the trade purposes or control to maximal land of Western Sahara. Spain government took lots of advantage, because tribal people were not much aware, they had lack of knowledge about their rights and for the future impact. Then the land of Morocco called Spanish Sahara.

#### **Western Sahara during the Cold War**

There had been an another interest in the northwest Africa of US and Soviet Union as both were trying to influence all the country which were geographically important for them. Morocco and Western Sahara have good strategic location that's why US were sporting to Morocco in the case of Western Sahara indirectly because they wanted to build a military base over there, Western Sahara become another buffer zone for the world dominated country in the cold war era.

#### **United States**

The United States has maintained an official policy of fairness on the substance of the Western Sahara issue. The USA has been an important arms supplier to Morocco, though on a smaller scale. Since US support for Morocco has been less important than that of France, it has not been such a major factor in US-Algerian relations. Finally, unlike French policy, the United States' involvement in the Sahara conflict is not affected to any appreciable degree by the Mauritanian factor.

In the late 1960s, however, during an exceptional brake in relations between Paris and Rabat, the United States was able to develop more important political ties with Morocco. The United States enjoys close political relations with the moderate, pro-Western government of Morocco.

The United States military supply relationship with Morocco began in 1960. The bulk of US arms supplied to Morocco during the 1970s formed part of a modernization program for Morocco's general forces and were unrelated to the Western Sahara conflict. A U.S. military mission, headed by Brig. Gen. Edward Partain, went to Morocco in early 1974 to assess the needs of the kingdom's armed forces. The Partain mission proposed the equipping of two armored brigades to strengthen Morocco's defensive capabilities on its eastern frontier, where the Algerians have a considerable numerical superiority in armor and aircraft. The two brigades were to be completely formed by 1978-1980 entirely through military sales, with total package costing about \$500 million. Military credits to Morocco have ranged from \$14 million to \$45 million a year from 1975 to 1982, far too modest to finance the arms purchases" (John Damis, 1983:122). The gap had been filled by generous financial aid from Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Although the precise amounts of this financial support were not known, it is probable that Saudi aid to Morocco has averaged between \$500 million and \$1 billion a year since 1975.

Again USA in February 1979, it approved the sale to Morocco of six Boeing CH-47C Chinook heavy-lift helicopters, produced under license in Italy, under the category of defensive arms. The contract for this commercial sale signed in December 1977, that is before the Carter administration had decided to disapprove the sale of new weapons systems manufactured in the United States for use in the western Sahara" (New York Times, 7 July 1979: 17). The helicopter sale was a one-time exception to the Carter administration's arms policy for Morocco and resulted from special circumstances caused by considerable personal pressure from King Hassan.

The Continuing difference in interpretation between Washington and Rabat over Morocco's boundaries did not affect the sale of military equipment unsuited for the guerrilla war against the Polisario Front. In April 1977, Morocco signed a three-year \$220-million contract with Washington house to provide a system of air defense radar installations, a supporting communications system, and a control center." (Zoubir, 1990: 11). Morocco continually were getting a big threat on the border from the Polisario and it was the reason that king personally pressured USA for arms and the other equipment. During this period, the U.S. government began to change its view of the Saharan war.

In congressional hearings held in July 1979, the Carter administration stated that repeated and serious Polisario attacks inside Morocco since January 1979 had changed the legal nature of the war. Despite disagreement on the use of F-5 spare parts and to consider other Moroccan arms requests

on a case-by-case basis" (Zoubir, 1990: 11). The reason behind the US government's change, towards the Morocco was that time Polisario was also getting arms and economic aid from the USSR and Algeria. USA decided to support Morocco through arms supply and with economic aid. In October 1979, "the Carter administration reversed itself and approved the sale of a \$235-million arms package to Morocco, including six OV-10 Bronco armed reconnaissance planes, twenty F-5E jet fighters, and 24 Hughes 500 MD helicopters, to be delivered in 1981-1982. Several factors influenced this decision. In the context of broad foreign policy considerations, the Carter administration felt the need to reassure friends of the United States that U.S. military supply relationships were stable and reliable" (Zoubir, 1990: 11). The United States has used Moroccan territory for air bases and communications and will need to do so again if the Rapid Deployment Force is to become a reality. If Hassan were to lose the Western Sahara, his regime would probably be fall in down. An unstable or unfriendly Morocco will hurt the interests of Israel, Egypt, and Zaire. The United States will have to provide money, arms, and food to help Morocco in the struggle against the Polisario. It is worth the price to keep Morocco friendly and stable" (Zoubir, 1990: 11). The January 1980 congressional hearings indication an evolution of U.S. policy on the Western Sahara conflict. The Carter administration concluded that Morocco and the Polisario Front were locked in a costly but unwinnable war of struggle, and it had no illusions that additional U.S. weapons would enable Morocco to achieve a military victory.

The Reagan administration moved immediately to support Morocco's pending arms request 108 M-60A3 main battle tanks and twelve transport vehicles worth \$189 million. Morocco made this request in August 1980 after being informed by Washington that the M-60 production line was going to close down" (John Damis, 1983:126). The request was debated within the executive branch until November, when the Carter administration shelved the issue out of concern for offending Algeria, which had begun to play its crucial intermediary role in the hostage crisis with Iran. Since the tanks are badly suited for fighting the highly mobile Polisario forces in rugged desert terrain that contains narrow wadis and steep, rocky slopes, the arms request encountered little opposition from Congress.

The Reagan administration also agreed in 1981 to sell Algeria six Lockheed C-130 transport planes" (John Damis, 1983:126). Since the aircraft were valued at just under \$100 million, the deal could be handled as a commercial sale, which does not require congressional approval. In the wake of the Polisario's October 1981 victory at Guelta Zemmur, in which the front employed Soviet-made SA-6 missile systems for the first time, Morocco once again requested military equipment from the United States. Between October 1981 and February 1982, a stream of high-level U.S. officials visited Morocco, including Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Assistant Secretary of Defense Francis West, and CIA Deputy Director Bobby Inman, State Department

troubleshooter Gen. Vernon Walters, Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige, and Secretary of State Alexander Haig. During Francis West's visit in November, the United States agreed to provide Morocco with various measures to counter the SA-6 missiles, including training in evasive flying tactics and electronic counter-measures equipment that could be retrofitted on Morocco's U.S.-supplied F-5E aircraft" (John Damis, 1983:126). It observed that the demand of the Morocco totally based on its national security and any single country will not compromise with their security as Morocco did. Polisario continually was getting arms and other kind of aid from USSR and Algeria. During his visit Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger also felt that Morocco needs the defensive equipment and USA agreed to provide the defensive equipment. During Mr. Haig Secretary of State visit in February 1982, "the United States and Morocco had agreed to establish a joint military commission. Haig also expressed an interest in obtaining transit rights at former U.S. military air bases in Morocco for use by the Rapid Deployment Force then being planned for the Middle East. These transit rights would permit U.S. planes to land and refuel during periods of military emergency in the Middle East. Washington's interest in transit rights was pursued during meetings of the joint US-Moroccan military commission in Fez in April. Closer military cooperation between the United States and Morocco was accompanied by U.S. financial assistance. Thus, during its congressional presentations in March 1982 in support of foreign aid, the Reagan administration requested \$100 million in military sales credits for Morocco for fiscal year 1983, up from \$30 million the previous year.

The following month, the Pentagon notified Congress of its intent to sell Morocco 321 Maverick air-to-ground missiles for \$29 million. The question of U.S. use of Moroccan air bases was a major subject of discussion during King Hassan's official state visit to Washington, 18-20 May, 1982" (John Damis, 1983:127). Negotiations were completed the following week, and on May 27, the United States and Morocco concluded an agreement allowing U.S. military planes to use Moroccan air bases during emergencies in the Middle East and Africa. The main facilities made available to the United States were the military side of the international airport at Casablanca and the military airfield at Sidi Slimane, about sixty miles northeast of Rabat. Morocco reportedly retained a veto over the transit of U.S. forces if they were to be used against an Arab country friendly to Morocco. The United States has tried to avoid any direct involvement in the Western Sahara conflict, which it views as a regional issue that requires a regional solution. But the above statement showed that all the worked which had been done by the USA it was totally supporting Morocco during the cold war.

#### **Soviet Union**

The policy of Soviet Union for the Western Sahara conflict look in many ways, that of the United States. Washington and Moscow has maintained an official policy of fairness on the substance of the Sahara issue. It has not recognized Moroccan or

Mauritanian sovereignty in the Sahara. Like the United States, the Soviet Union has never been a colonial power in northwest Africa. Following Algerian independence in 1962, Moscow built upon its public support for the National Liberation Front (FLN) during the 1954-1962 revolutionary struggles against French colonial domination and established close political ties and a military supply relationship with Algiers" (John Damis, 1983). The USSR developed more modest ties with the Moroccan monarchy, centering on cooperation in the economic and educational fields and some limited weapons supplies. Like Washington, Moscow has not developed any important political, economic, military, or cultural relations with Mauritania, where the Soviets' main interest is access to the rich Atlantic fishing grounds.

The Soviet Union's relations with Algeria are of considerable importance both politically and militarily. Because of Algeria's revolutionary experience, its socialist ideology, and its leading and progressive role in third World politics, Moscow and Algiers find themselves in agreement on most international issues. The USSR has been a major diplomatic supporter of Algerian positions on Third World issues and considers Algeria an important means of entry into North Africa. The Soviet Communist party expresses its public approval of the Algerian FLN as a vanguard party that is building socialism. USA always against for this.

Moscow has been a consistent and important supplier for Algeria's armed forces. Although the Benjedid regime has taken steps to diversify military suppliers, up to 90 % of Algerian arms are of Soviet origin, including some of the latest and most costly equipment exported by the USSR. The Algerian Army is equipped with T-54, T-54, T-62, and T-72 medium-size tanks and 830 BTR armored personnel carriers, and the Algerian Air Force's 295 combat aircraft include 60 MiG-17s, 90 MiG-21 MFs, 20 MiG-23Bms, and 10 MiG-25. King Hassan frequently denounces soviet involvement in Africa and Afghanistan, on the occasion, Hassan has said that Morocco also is fighting the Soviet Union because of the sophisticated soviet weapons used by the Polisario Front" (John Damis, 1983:). Now the question comes here' why the Soviet Union was providing arms and other kind of help to Algeria, that was the cold war era and USSR wanted to make military base in the North West Africa that's why it was supporting to Algeria .

Beginning with an estimated 500 million deal in late 1975, the Soviet Union has responded quickly during the Saharan conflict to Algerian requests for advanced weapons for a major military modernization program. The highlight of this arms supply relationship was a five-year military sales agreement between the USSR and Algeria in mid-1980 worth an estimated \$3 billion. Because of several large arms deals since 1975, Algeria has become fourth largest purchaser of Soviet weapons among Third World countries. Although precise details of Soviet arms sales to Algeria since 1975 are not available, their total value is probably \$4-5 billion.

In addition to the hard currency earned from these weapons sales, the Soviet Union derives specific military and strategic benefits from its close relations with Algeria. Fiercely independent, Algeria has not permitted Soviet bases to be established on its territory, but it does allow Soviet vessels to make port calls. Furthermore, Soviet aircraft overfly Algeria and use its airfields for refueling stops, which was of vital importance during the extensive Soviet airlift to Angola in 1975- 1976. The basic Soviet interest in the Saharan conflict has been to avoid entanglement in a quarrel between two states with which Moscow seeks to maintain good relations. By exercising restraint in the Sahara dispute, the Soviets seek to protect their interests in both Algeria and Morocco.

The Soviet Union has much to lose and little to gain in the Western Sahara conflict. For Soviet foreign- policy makers, the whole issue of eventual Western Sahara independence is relatively unimportant but potentially troublesome. Unlike Ethiopia or Angola, an independent Saharan state would not be fertile ground for communist ideology or Soviet penetration. Above statement prove that both the country US and USSR influenced Morocco and Algeria for their own interest USSR wanted to spread capitalism of communist ideology in the North Africa and supplied aid and arms freely in response.

#### **Algeria**

In the 1975, Algeria has been one of the most important actors in the North West Africa conflict. Algeria maintains no territorial claim on Western Sahara, it has been consistently supporting Polisario's drive for self-determination diplomatically, militarily, financially and morally. There had never been a doubt, that understanding Algeria's role in the Western Sahara conflict is very necessary understand the reality behind this power driven Western Sahara issue.

Algeria's President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, in office since 1999, is a former activist in the Algerian revolution against French colonial rule. He and his countrymen see the Western Sahara as one of the world's last decolonization campaigns. If the Polisario won control of the region, Algeria would also benefit by gaining access to the Atlantic Ocean" (Congressional Research Service, April, 2013:4). Algeria just wanted to take advantage of natural resources Western Sahara has and wanted to excess costal line through Polisario, it is still a low-cost way to keep Morocco militarily bogged down and diplomatically separated in parts of Africa. While insisting that it is not a party to the conflict, Algeria has unwaveringly supported the Polisario's independence claims. Algeria and the Polisario reject the Moroccan autonomy plan and force on a referendum on self-determination. With strong ties in Sub-Saharan Africa, Algiers might be partially responsible for the SADR's African Union (AU) membership and for many African governments' recognition of the SADR. Some Latin American governments also have recognized it. Morocco had decided to suspend its membership in the Organization for African Unity (OAU) in 1988 and the AU over the OAU's recognition of the SADR. Morocco

was become the only state on the region who was not to member of AU.

#### **Conclusion**

The cold war ties involved varying degrees of political, legal, and especially economic dominance. Importance of natural resources was a key factor in the Western Sahara phosphates, gas and other rich sources of minerals, particularly in iron ore, uranium, titanium, natural gas and oil. The US Geological Survey of World Energy 2000 estimated Western Saharan offshore oil and gas resources are sufficient as compare to Morocco. It may better important revenues to Morocco, which had been among the first phosphate producers and sellers of the world. The colonial interests renewed their own purposes, which was continuously followed by USSR and USA during the cold war period. The regional intellects linked to USSR-USA were more important than to realise the real issue of Morocco and Sahara. As result the weapons of mass destruction well applied by both the World Power and the issue of development was totally ignored. It is realized that Morocco – Sahara issue become the victim of cold war and unnecessary labeled as one of the unresolved international issue and served the petty intellects of cold war leader of USA and USSR.

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