

India's Border Management Policy: A Critical Military Perspective

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Abstract

The geopolitical position of India has both the strategic leverage and vulnerability. The centrality of India in the Indian subcontinent provides exceptional strategic leverage. However, the civilizational and colonial legacies of Indian borders turn the leverage into strategic risk and vulnerability. India has strong civilizational and cultural bonds with almost all the neighbouring nation-states. At the same time India has disputed borders with most of the immediate neighbours.

These contradictory tendencies of relationship have many puzzling implications on India's national security and security guards. Indian borders have four typical categories: (a) natural frontier and contested borders in the Himalayan region; (b) an artificial and imposed cartographic border from Indira Col to Rann of Kutch; (c) the Indian maritime boundary; and, (d) India's narrow and wrinkled Eastern border with Bangladesh and Myanmar. There are different military and Para-military forces to guard and secure these diversified borders.

The paper attempts to engage with the puzzle: why does India not have comprehensive national policy for the management of borders despite having adverse implication for national security? How do the diversified and disputed borders hamper India's national security and the life of the security guards?

The paper argues that India's strategic inertia and political short-sightedness could be attributed to the lack of comprehensive national policy for border management. The mismanagement at the Indian borders makes them porous, precarious, and peculiar. Moreover, the continued ignorance of the role of borderland stakeholders in national security policies is a key lacuna in India's border management policy and national security strategy. A critical military approach would be used to investigate the implications of Indian borders on national security and lives of the personnel's who work in adverse situations.

Keywords: Border Management, India, Critical Military Studies, The Line of Control (LoC), and National Security.

Introduction

India's borders are complex borders. Geographically, the borderlands comprise mountains, plains, deserts, riverine, and jungle. Culturally, the borderland people are different from the mainland India. Except, Punjab, the borderland areas have low-human density and poor infrastructural capabilities. Politically, slow rate of economic and political development and hostile neighbourhood induces a sense of alienation in the peripheral peoples. Economically, India has failed to exploit traditional trade routes that could have integrated the alienated people. In sum, the conditions of India's borders make it evident that it is a case of ineffective border management. Moreover, the 'porous borders are a constant threat to the forces guarding the border and add extra tension to the troops and demand tougher measures to be adopted on the borders' (Jamwal 2002: 417).

The armed forces personnel's are the guardians of the borders. They serve the nation in extreme conditions. They are governed by rigid and extraordinary laws. Their role in securing the national security and territorial integrity remains integral and paramount. In other words, armed forces are always been in the driver's seat in the pursuit of national security. However, at the same time, they have been peripheral all the time. Their duties and life are always been at an extreme point. The profession of the arm is a specialised profession that demands a high level of professionalism as well as a different kind of moral and ethical values.

One of the critical aspects of national security is border security. In the Indian context, border security has greater significance because of the cross-border terrorism, territorial disputes with almost all neighbours, and, human and drug trafficking. Therefore, the Indian border guarding forces remain on duty during the war as well as during peacetime. Considering the vastness of India and its border, different border guarding forces are deployed. BSF is responsible for guarding India-Pakistan and India-Bangladesh borders, SSB for guarding the border with Nepal and Bhutan, and the ITBP along with the Indian Army guards India-Tibet border. And, the Line of Control (LoC) is guarded by the Indian Army. The coastal security is the responsibility of the Indian Coast Guard (ICG). The ICG comes under the control of the Indian Navy (IN). The role of these varies with the variation in the situation at the borders. For instance, in the wartime and less-wartime, the borders come under the army and the navy. On the other hand, in the peacetime the paramilitary armed forces man these borders.

This description shows that India has four types of Borderlands: the international borderline (IBL), the line of control (LoC) and line of actual control (LoAC), and the coastal line. The smart management of the border involves three stakeholders: the human resources, technological empowerment, and organisational procedures. However, former foreign secretary Shyam Saran points out that the recent terrorist attacks suggest that there is a serious problem with the effectiveness and adequacy of the existing system. For instance, 'border security is not only the responsibility of border-guarding forces', rather it requires 'a seamless connect among the forces deployed at the border, the law and order machinery of the state concerned and the central and local intelligence agencies' (Saran 2016).

One of the major challenges is the lack of a single decision-making authority for border management. For instance, Brigadier (Rtd) Gurmeet Kanwal argues that India's decision-making elites lack a military perspective on borders. As the existing situations show that India's borders are guarded by a diverse set of armed forces, such as military, paramilitary, and police forces. These forces have its own ethos and organisational culture. More importantly, each of these agencies reports to a range of different ministries in the union government and state governments. India has adopted a fragmented sector-oriented approach for the security of borders. It is justified on various grounds that fragmented, decentralised approach is a necessary requirement because of different threat perception, terrain, and the local population. However, the border management is an integrative process. It requires integration of intelligence agencies, technological innovations, coordination between the bureaucrats, politicians, economic agencies and security personnel. Primarily, the border management demands coordination within and between the armed forces. It also requires coordination between the international border security forces. The government of India has established a

department of border management under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). However, this arrangement has not met the recommendations of the Group of Ministers reports. The Group of Minister's report recommended that the border management policy should be based on the principle of 'one border, one force'.

The reports suggest that the Indian government is in the process to find out technological solutions through Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System (CIBMS) (Arora 2018; Shreyas 2018). One of the initiatives of Modi government is the establishment of a Border Protection Grid (BPG) on the Indo-Bangladesh border. Minister of Home Affairs, Rajnath Singh stated after a meeting with the officials of the bordering states on December 8, 2017:

Discussions were held to set up a Border Protection Grid (BPG) for a multi-pronged and foolproof mechanism to secure our border. The grid will comprise various elements namely physical barriers, non-physical barriers, surveillance system, intelligence agencies, state police, BSF and other state and central agencies. BGP will be supervised by a state level standing committee which will be chaired by respective state secretaries. BGP will ensure greater help for states in the overall border security. For putting in place the BGP, active participation of respective state governments is required.

However, the questions have been raised on the suitability and feasibility of these solutions in Indian contexts. It is because of the budgetary allocation for this project highly insufficient. A BSF Commandant R. K. Arora argues that:

It must be highlighted that the length of US- Mexico border roughly corresponds to that of Indo-Pak border. The amount of 15000 crores meant for both Indo-Pak and Indo-Bangladesh border is thus for almost double the length US-Mexico borders. What results can be achieved by a border guarding agency which is seven times the size of its US counterpart but budget allocation is just one-sixth and area of responsibility is more than double. Besides, a large portion of the funds allocated will have to be utilized for the upkeep of existing infrastructure. It may be seen that only a very small portion will be available for the acquisition of new systems.

Maintaining a large number of boots on the ground for border security is an outdated and costly practice. However, after the 26/11, the first move the government made is to recruit 1, 40, 000 more personnel for surveillance and internal security (Singh

2009). Brigadier Jaspal Singh argues India's 'border management is indicative of ad-hocism when viewed in the context of mission statement and structure of the security forces' (Singh 2009: 119). The Group of Ministers (GoM) report recommended for 'one border-one force' in 2001. However, the situation has not changed much even after the 17 years. For instance, the duplicity of forces can be seen in managing the northern borders. i.e. the army and the ITBP.

This shows two contradictory patterns in India's border management policy. On the one hand, India's border demands effective management. On the other hand, India has not been able to develop a comprehensive, and unified national border management policy. There is no institutional mechanism for coordination and cooperation among these agencies. In addition to this, India's border guarding forces are facing a range of pathetic conditions. According to the report of the Standing Committee on Defence, tabled in the Indian parliament on March 2018, the border guarding forces do not have sufficient arms for self-defence and life-saving equipment, such as bullet-proof jackets, night-vision devices, and the modern weapon systems. The more worrisome situation was revealed, last year, by a head constable of the BSF, –Tej Bahadur Yadav, in a video circulated on social media. Wherein, he has shown the poor quality of food. More critical fact is that they work in very extreme environmental and psychological conditions. These problems have been reiterated by the personnel of various BGFs. They serve to sacrifice everything to secure the sovereignty of the country. But, their voices remain excluded and marginalised. Their concerns did not get sufficient space in the mainstreams narratives on India's national policies and academic discourses.

Therefore, the research puzzle is: why India does not have a comprehensive, inclusive, and unified border management policy? The subsidiary research question is: how this state of affair, affects India's national security and the life of BGFs? The objectives to analyse these questions are: an examination of India's BGFs, their origins, role and limitations; implications of this mismanagement; the state of reforms suggested by the Indian Government for 'smart' border management. In this regard, this paper submits that: the short-sightedness (implies lack of vision, parochialism, and immediate electoral calculations) of Indian political class explains lack of India's comprehensive border security policy. This argument makes a value addition to a larger argument on India's national security policies, which is, Indian political class is least bothered about India's national security and strategy, because, it's not a major poll agenda. In other words, In India, national security issues have the least influence on the electoral outcome. In case, it has some influence, then, the political class does adulation and deification of armed forces, rather than doing the required reforms and allocation of resources. The paper also argues that weak management at the Peripheral level leads to some internal security issues. Therefore, without overhauling the existing internal security systems and

personnel management, India's national security remains vulnerable and susceptible.

Aim of the Study

This paper is intended to analyse India's border management policy in the era of globalisation. The paper will make a critical survey of literature on border management. It aims to figure out problems with India's border management policy. It analyses the existing institutions of national security and border management. The paper also establishes that border guarding forces have been serving the nation in extreme conditions. The paper employs a critical military perspective to analyse some of these issues.

What is a Critical Military Perspective?

The paper uncovers the significance of social practices as well as ideological constructs that provides false hype to the profession of armed forces. It is argued that the critical military studies 'problematize the idea that a neat boundary can be delineated between what is 'military' and what is 'civilian' or otherwise' (Basham et al. 2015: 1). A critical military perspective attempts 'to question how military institutions, practices, processes, and geographies are an outcome of social practices and political contestation' (Basham et al. 2015: 1). The critical military studies as an approach:

to the military, defence, conflict, and security issues which foregrounds an understanding of military processes and practices as the outcome of social life and political contestation in multiple ways and at a range of scales from the embodied to the global, rather than as given, functional categories beyond interrogation. Critical military studies, for us, is about opening up possibilities for unlimited questioning of the ways in which military, defence, conflict, and security issues are not only manifest as social phenomena, but become apparent as foci for scholarly critique (Rech et al. 2015: 48).

Put differently, the critical military perspective is a perspective of 'sceptical curiosity' about the military forces, military institutions, and the nature and role of armed forces in society. As some scholar argues, a critical military perspective is not about simplistic positions (such as "pro-military" or "anti-military"). Rather, it is about engagement with the fundamental military problems and practices and its root causes. The Critical Military Studies 'creates space for is a different mode of critique, one less driven to denunciation than bound to exploring, describing – and not necessarily resolving – the ambiguities and contradictions that animate war, military action, militarization, and their logic and lived experiences' (Wool 2015: 25). For instance, Saucier (2010, 3) argues the modern military recruitment is based:

Firstly, Provid[ing] [as part of recruitment incentives] better pay,

housing, and educational opportunities to compete with the civilian job market, as well as [by] recruit[ing] more women and racial minorities. [Secondly, it took] the unprecedented step of hiring advertisers to create a massive print, radio, and paid national television advertising and recruiting campaign.

The 'market-model military' has commoditized the soldier. The soldier has become a mere employee rather than a proud servant of the king/queen/country (Rowland 2006). However, the state still projects him/her as Hero. The critical military studies 'project has to develop on the basis of informed critique in which the nuances and complexities of civil-military relations are identified, rendered transparent (or as transparent as any other complex social phenomenon might be) and shared across academic, military, and other civilian spheres'. It is a concern to bring positive changes in the existing military practices by identifying the ossified procedures and its irrelevance. The paper applies some of these concepts and a theoretical tool to investigate the problem of India's border management and condition of the border guarding forces.

The point is that this representation of military personnel are not only images or textual forms but also includes a series of practices of production, distribution, and consumption. In this way, a meaning of soldier is made in such a format that even if you ask for their fundamental rights, dues and entitlements, you will be called a traitor or 'anti-national' rather than their well-wisher. Militarisation is a multidimensional and diverse concept. It is a set of social, cultural, economic, and political processes and practices 'unified around an intention to gain both elite and popular acceptance for the use of military approaches to social problems and issues' (Rech et al. 2014: 48). In the Indian context, it is found that armed forces have been used for political purposes such as regionalism, communalism, and caste atrocities. On the contrary, a parliamentarian Shri Rajeev Chandrasekhar rightly pointed out that the Indian political system is least bothered about the welfare of armed personnel and their families. He points out that 'India is the only country that does not have a Military Memorial to honour the sacrifices of brave men and women'. For instance, the queues during demonetization was justified with the arguments such as – *Ki Sainik LOC par khada hai*. A depiction of the soldier in the Hero Bike advertisement – 'Hero behind the Hero'. Similarly, most recently we have seen the debates over the One Rank, One Pension (OROP). The OROP is reasonably an emotional issue. This does not involve only the economic demand rather it is also about honour and pride, it's about *izzat*.

India's Border Guarding Forces

India's border management policy is determined by the four major sources: the colonial legacies; India's predominance in South Asia; bureaucratic politics in national security institutions;

and, the role of political class. The fourth factor is the most important factor. It is because the role of political class shapes India's political vision and the political class is influenced by these three factors.

First and the foremost important factor is the colonial legacies of India's borders. India's borders represent colonial legacies in many ways. Indian borders are a case of artificial cartography of the borders. Indian borders are also a case of territorial claims based on colonial documents or agreements. For instances, Simla agreement of 1913 for Indo-Tibetan border. Most of India's neighbours were the colonies of the British empire. Partition of India in 1947 has major implications on India's border management. In this way, the colonial impact is deep as well as wider in context. As the experts of geopolitics argue that the Westphalian notion of territoriality is insufficient to understand the borders of India. However, the Indian decision-making elites have failed to comprehend the diversity of the Indian borders.

The second, major factor that shapes India's border management policy is India's uncontested geopolitical predominance in the region. In the contemporary world politics, India is facing the dilemma of using its strategic leverage to resolve the border disputes with the small neighbours. The increasing influence of China has complicated India's relations with its neighbours. More importantly, India's defensive postures towards neighbours have been ineffective. For example, the policy of non-reciprocity, and the sloganeering of *Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai*. In the contemporary era of complex interdependence, India cannot adopt an offensive posture for border management. More importantly, contrary to the contemporary global trends, globalization has hardened the borders in South Asia. For instances, India's small neighbours such as Nepal and Bhutan has revised their border treaties with India. Traditionally, these borders were open, but in last five years, India has set up 450 border outposts on the Indo-Nepal border. India's cautious approach is rational in a sense that India has seen some of the terrorist activities through this open border. Despite this, due to the domestic political compulsions, India has failed to resolve some of the 'low-hanging' border problems.

This leads us to the third most critical factor, the bureaucratic politics in the national security institutions. As we know, many have argued that India national security institution is not functioning up to the mark. Most of the border management policy initiatives suffer from ad-hocism. For instance, the government of India takes crisis-oriented decisions to resolve the immediate problems. In addition to this, the border management is dealt with by the various ministries in the union government. The existing set up indicates that there is no coordination and cooperation between various stakeholders for border management. It does not have proper follow-up mechanisms. For instance, the Kargil Review Committee (KRC), pointed out that:

Border management has become immensely more complex over the

years. It is now handled by the Assam Rifles, the Border Security Force and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police. Border fencing in Punjab has produced positive results. Elsewhere, vested interests have come in the way of effective border management. The smuggling of narcotics, man-portable arms and explosives, illegal migration and the infiltration of trained mercenaries have all exacerbated border management. Narcotics is dealt with by the Finance Ministry while other aspects are handled by the Home Ministry.the present structure and procedures for border patrolling must be reviewed (KRC 1999: 257).

Moreover, the border management as a concept is very fluid. As a well-known advocate of police reform in India and a former Director-General of the Border Security Forces (BSF), Prakash Singh, argue 'border management is a fluid concept in the sense that the level of security arrangements along a particular border would depend upon the political relations, the economic linkages, the ethno-religious ties between people across the borders and the configuration of the border itself' (Singh 2001: 11). Keeping this backdrop in mind, let's analyse the situations of the Indian borders and the border guarding forces. However, before pointing out the conditions on the borders, it is essential to state that the Indian political class is the ultimate authority in terms of decision-making and policy formulations. However, the evidence suggest that the Indian political class has not paid adequate attention to the question of national security in general and border management in particular. As the history shows that the most of the policy initiatives were a knee-jerk reaction to the immediate crises and political circumstances. The next section illustrates some of these issues.

India-China Border

It is popularly known as Indo-Tibet border. It is a most hostile frontier in terms of nature of environment and enemy. Before the 1962 war, this border has got less attention. The aftermath of the 1962 war, the Indian army has taken prime responsibility for a section of the border. The Assam Rifles guarded the eastern sector of the border. The Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) Militia was responsible for the Western sector. Prior to the 1962 war, the central sector of the border was under the control of the UP Border Police. Later, the UP Border Police were absorbed with the ITBP. At present the Indo-Tibet Border Police (ITBP) guards it. The ITBP was raised in 1954, after the Sino-Indo trade agreement to regulate trade posts. After the 1962 war, the ITBP was trained as the guerrilla force on India's China border (Jamwal 2002: 411). In the post-Kargil crisis, as per the Group of Minister's report, 'the ITBP was designated as the sole agency that was to be assigned the responsibilities of surveillance and

security' of this border (Singh 2009). However, the prevalent practice is that the ITBP is deployed on the border along with the army. The ITBP is not 'autonomous' agency when it comes to planning and execution of the policy. Therefore, it is argued that 'duplication and overlapping of responsibilities between two agencies of the government, from two different ministries' (Singh 2009: 121).

In this context, many analysts suggested that the ITBP is not adequately trained and equipped to handle the Chinese threat. Given the scale and intensity of infrastructural building on the other side of the border, India's seems far away from matching these realities. Many veterans of the Indian army are in the view that this border must be controlled by the army.

Indo-Nepal and Indo-Bhutan Borders

This is an open border. The primary responsibility to safeguard this border is in the hands of the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB). This force was established in March 1963. Originally, it was known as Special Service Bureau (SSB). The SSB's primary task was to assist the RAW to gather intelligence in border areas through inculcating sentiments of nationalism in the people of borderlands. From 1963 onward, the Special Service Bureau (SSB) has performed their duties across all the borders. However, after the Kargil crisis, then this force is renamed as the Sashastra Seema Bal in 2001 and transferred under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). The Ministry has declared the SSB as a Lead Intelligence Agency and has increased its combat power on the Indo-Nepal and Indo-Bhutan border (Sarkar 2017). The SSB has deployed on the Indo-Bhutan border since 2004 (SSB website). This border area has been seen as the most stable and peaceful borderland. However, in the recent past, the Pakistani terrorists and the Maoist rebels have used this route for illegal trade and trafficking. Therefore, India has intensified deployment of the SSB and increased a significant number of check-posts. Some analysts argue that the deployment of the SSB has contributed to worsening the Indo-Nepal relations. These developments also restricted the free-flow of people and goods. The important point to note is that India is not following the principle of the 'one border, one force' to manage these borders.

Indo-Pak and Indo-Bangladesh Border

At presents, the BSF is guarding the Indo-Pak international border, Indo-Bangladesh border, and the LoC along with the Indian Army. Prior to the 1965 war, the State Police Forces and the CRPF guarded Indo-Pak border. In April 1965, Pakistan has attacked India on Sardar and Tak posts in Runn of Kutch. After the 1965 war, the Indian government decided to institutionalise a dedicated force to man the border with Pakistan. As a result, the BSF has born on December 1, 1965. An IPS Officer, at the time of writing, heading the BSF, Abhinav Kumar argues that:

The over one million-strong paramilitary forces are the backbone of India's internal security and along with the Indian Army, the

guardians of its lengthy, dangerous and inhospitable borders. From the icy heights of Kashmir and Ladakh to the parched wilderness of the Rann of Kutch, from the mangroves of the Sunderbans to the thick jungles of the Northeast, the men of the BSF, the ITBP, the SSB, stand guard over India's borders. While the CRPF battles Naxals in India's heartland, the CISF guards our vital infrastructure, the RPF guards our railways and the NSG performs a crack anti-terror and VIP protection role.

Except, the CRPF and RPF, the other border security forces are created in independent India for specific needs. The BSF has been given the responsibility of the Indo-Bangladesh border after the 1971 war. However, there is strong advocacy for creating a new agency for the Indo-Bangladesh border as per the recommendations of the Group of the Ministers report. But, in practice, rather than implementing the recommendations of the Group of Minister's report and the report of the Madhav Godbole Committee, the BSF has been assigned the additional responsibilities for guarding the Indo-Myanmar border. On the Indo-Myanmar border, the Assam Rifles is deployed in rear and conduct-insurgency operations in the North East region of India. And, the BSF has the prime responsibility on the frontier. In this context, it is argued that the BSF is an over-burden border guarding force. The concerns are also raised that the BSF duplicates resources of the Indian Army in the LOC region. For instance, Brigadier Jaspal Singh argues that the BSF has maintained its own artillery and Mortars units. This is a duplication of the army's resources. However, in some areas, the BSF works beyond its mandate. It implies protection of borders in a war like situations rather than policing only in peacetime. In this regard, it is asserted that these forces represent hybrid DNA of the Indian Army and Indian Police.

Major Problems with the Existing System

The smart management of the borders demands communication and coordination among all the security agencies to visualise a common perspective. To achieve this, the border guarding forces must have a synergetic relationship. According to the group of ministers report:

The term border management must be interpreted in its widest sense and should imply co-ordination and concerted action by political leadership and administrative, diplomatic, security, intelligence, legal, regulatory and economic agencies of the country to secure our frontiers and subserve the best interests of the country. Looked at from this perspective, the management of borders presents many challenging problems (KRC 1999: 58).

The existing system does not have synergy between the various ministries responsible for border management. For instance, more than five ministries of the Union government and some ministries of the state government deals with the border-related issue. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), the Ministry of Defence (MoD), and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) deals with a range of issues. However, most of the time-critical issues get trapped in the bureaucratic tussles between these ministries. In the absence of the clear political guidelines, the key issues of border management take years to reach a fruitful end. More importantly, the state police and various law-enforcement agencies are also involved in these cases. These agencies rather than solving the problem end up the inter-organizational rivalry.

Another major problem is Parachuted leadership. A retired BSF personnel claims that:

Having served in the BSF - the largest border force of the world - for over 38 years, I can confidently say that the major problems of the force emanating from the fact that policy-level and most of the supervisory-level leadership does not belong to it, and those in charge at the top, not being aware of ground realities, are not up to the task of management (Sood 2017).

Commandant Sood wrote:

Further, abysmal personnel management by the force speaks of the abject failure of the leadership. Cadre review of group A officers due every five years was done last year only under orders from the Delhi High Court after a gap of 25 years!

Moreover,

The career management of personnel below officer-level is even worse, with troops getting their first promotion only after 22-23 years. There is a lot of dissatisfaction among all ranks on this account. Acute stagnation has been caused by lack of planning and foresight in the growth of the force and intake of personnel.

It has been observed that the parachuted leadership of the ITBP, SSB, and the BSF is unaware of the ethos and roles of these services. The top leadership comes from the Indian Police Service (IPS) in the early career they have not faced with these situations. Due to the lack of exposure and experience, these leaders further complicates the decision-making processes and operational outcomes.

The third, major problem is about the status and service conditions of the security personnel serving in the para-military forces. The personnel of the ITBP, SSB, and the BSF get lesser economic incentives and rewards. There is a large number of legal cases are pending in the Indian courts by these

services against the Indian state. This has severe implications for the security of the state.

In the present context, we have seen that there have been many terrorist attacks. For instance, Gurdaspur in July 2015, Pathankot in January 2016, and thereafter a range of attack on the security establishments in the Jammu and Kashmir region of India. Most of these cases are instances of failure of India's border management. In this regards, the paper concludes that without having jointness among the border guarding forces, India will not be able to have a comprehensive border management policy. However, on the contrary, the realities of India's borderlands depicts that India's border management policies have been knee-jerk reactions to immediate crises. One of the prime reason this analysis finds is that the political class is least concerned with the visualisation of a holistic and inclusive picture of India's borders. The existing system lacks a unity of command.

Conclusion

The paper has made a survey of literature on India's border management. It analysed the major problems of border security in India. The analysis shows that India's borders are porous and conflict-ridden. Since independence, India has been struggling with effective border management. In this direction, India has many border guarding forces, namely, BSF, ITBP, SSB, and Assam Rifles. These forces do not have institutionalised mechanisms of cooperation and coordination. The paper concludes that border guarding forces in India lacks jointness. However, global best practices suggest that jointness and unification of border guarding forces have enhanced the effectiveness of border management.

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