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भगवान गौतम बुद्ध एवं भारतीय समाज (बौद्ध धर्म के उदय से 12वी शताब्दी तक) ISBN: 978-93-93166-10-4 For verification of this chapter, please visit on http://www.socialresearchfoundation.com/books.php#8 |
Release from Conditioned Existence – The Buddha’s Denial of Gods and The Acceptance of Brahmā – The Love of The Self |
Deepa Chaturvedi
Associate Professor
Higher Education
Government Arts College
Kota Rajasthan, India
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DOI: Chapter ID: 16534 |
This is an open-access book section/chapter distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. |
No
God, no Brahmᾱ can be found, Creator of Saṃsᾱra’s round, Empty phenomena roll
on, Subject to cause and condition. Visuddhimagga, XIX. Buddhism
took root in India when the Brahminical polytheistic tendencies were spreading
throughout the Gangetic plain and in places becoming dominant. Marasinghe’s
analysis of the conditions of those times seems to be pertinent which says that
these tendencies were in a way becoming very popular, with the tribal India,
very uniquely preserving their own gods, major and minor and also assimilating
the tribal gods unto their fold. There is historical evidence enough that prove
that polytheism was a way of life with the people of those times, when Jainism
and Buddhism took birth in India (Marasinghe, 1974). Modern
scholars are almost unanimously of the view that Buddhism can be described as a
Non-theistic religion as in this tradition a belief in an omniscient,
omnipotent creator or God is deemed to be absolutely untenable and unnecessary.
Scholars like H. von Glasenapp (1970)
and Nyanaponika (1981) have argued in favor of this non-theistic tendency of
Buddhism saying that the origins of the universe, the moral order, man’s destiny
and salvation can be satisfactorily explained without the need to introduce the
idea of a supreme being that is responsible for them all—something which the
early Buddhism has capably handled. But
before we proceed any further, it would only be pertinent to say that those
beings, whose generic name of devā is generally taken to mean ‘ Shining Ones’
make appearances so often in the Pali texts that there is every justification
for an enquiry into their nature and the precise place they occupy in the early
texts of Buddhism. Here
a distinction needs to be drawn between the teachings attributed to the Buddha
in the Pali Canon or the Āgamas ( Early Buddhism ), which does not under any
condition affirm the presence of a Creator God ( but the texts are fraught with
the presence of devās or gods- a confusion which is the matter of analysis of
this essay) as it is done later in some Mahᾱyᾱna Sutras and Tantras where
acceptance is given to an apparent Ultimate Ground of all things- the
omniscient and transcendental Reality of the Awakened mind or the Infinite
sphere of the ‘Buddha-Nature’ (Buddha-dhᾱtu or Tathᾱgatagarbha) as is evident
from the study of Srimᾱla Sutra or the Mahayana Mahᾱparinibbᾱṇa Sutta. In this
essay, the exploration of the presence of gods will be limited to the ‘Early
Buddhist Tradition’ of the Pali Canon as is commonly agreed upon by the
scholars. But
even while dealing with the texts of the Pali Canon which negate the presence
of an Absolute presence, one is surprised to see innumerable suttas dedicated
to the description of the Buddha’s meetings with gods or devās or His solving
the riddle of their (devās) presence. If
Early Buddhism is generally regarded as a religious philosophy without an
Absolute Creator God who created the universe ex nihilo and to whom any
veneration or obeisance is due, then how does one explain the presence of gods
and heavens in the Pali texts. Now
this dilemma does not lead us to the simplistic argument of whether Buddhism
believes in devās or not but to more complicated psycho-scientific issues with
which the contemporary science is grappling too. We often question whether we
have any means of relating our subjective experiences and knowledge of the
external world to any objective reality existing outside our consciousness and
world of perception? Can we understand the real nature of the world by sensory
perception and intellect and are these sufficient tools of knowledge? Are
we in a position to avoid the evidence collected from umpteen sources which
bear testimony to the presence of certain beings who belong to a different
order of nature such as nature spirits, angels, djinns, fairies etc.? Are we in
a position to write off the mystical or extra-sensory experiences felt by
people over the ages? Can we just explain such experiences as falling outside
the areas of the particular space time continuum in which our consciousness
normally operates and therefore are these experiences not worthy of any further
explanation? While answering the questions posed by religious cosmology are we
not tempted to avoid the queries as to the whereabouts of beings and heavens as
our studies incessantly reveal that even if the concepts of space and time can
be reduced to one, there are no apparent, clear or absolute points of
reference, where the exact simultaneity of events could be determined. Are all
these questions not the result of our single plane of experience being
considered by us as the only possible, final one when all inferential logic
goes against this very assumption ?Are we not aware of two discrete and
seemingly opposed and incompatible worlds namely the one of our own subjective
experiences and the second of the objective world of science—where a meeting
point has been evading human history for a couple of thousands of years and
where we find ease in being comfortably poised in our own subjective heaven?
And the most important question of all- - is this construction of
subjective-objective duality itself void of any reality and can this reality be
discerned through any cognitive, empirical or meditative process? Can we
establish the presence of the worlds beyond the sphere of our consciousness? A
deeper delving into these questions does lead us a little closer to
understanding of the Buddha’s teachings of release from conditioned existence
and explain to us why the Buddha avoided getting entangled into questions
regarding the presence of gods or an interpretation of phenomena. And in order
to ascertain the views of the Buddha on the presence of devās, it will not be
out of context to begin with a description of devās in the different suttas of
the Pali canon. To
begin with, in these texts, the Buddha himself is addressed as Atideva,
Devātideva, Ādhideva. The Pali texts do talk of Gods and that too not only of Ṛgvedic
or the Brahminical tradition, but of their own forging also. It is difficult to
say how many gods were accepted from the Brahminical tradition directly and how
many as Marasinghe (1974) summarizes it underwent a ‘Buddhistification’. But
the Pali texts are in fact full of them. They mention one hundred and seventy
three devās, thirty six named and ninety nine unnamed who visited the Buddha
for the clarification of their doubts. There are twenty nine suttas in the
Ȧnguttara Nikᾱya which refer to gods. Out of these eighteen suttas are the
records of the visits of individual or of groups of devās, to the Buddha. Nine
suttas contain accounts of close associations of gods with various disciples.
Two suttas contain accounts of Moggallᾱna’s visit to the realm of the gods. The
Mahᾱgovinda sutta seems to support the view that the higher the realm of
heavenly existence, the subtler is the composition of the beings therein. The
Khuddaka Nikᾱya also deals with the tripartite division of the Sammuti,
Upapatti, and the Visuddhi devās. The Samutti devās (“by convention”), are human
beings of high worldly status; kings, ministers and the like. The Upᾱpatti
devās (“through rebirth”), are beings living in the deva lokas, or higher
spheres. The Visuddhi (“by their
purity”) are the greatest human beings who have attained the final degree of
self-liberation, and so are known as devās by purification who are yet alive.
These are Supreme Buddhas, Silent Buddhas (Pacceka Buddhas) and Arahats. Not
only this, there is evidence which proves the Buddha himself agrees to the
presence of devās. In
a question by king Pasenadi, the Buddha replies “Are you unaware of the
existence of such devās as Cᾱtummahᾱrᾱjika devās and the Tᾱvatiṃsa devās, that
you ask this question?” ( PS III, 359, 22 ). The same texts tells us that in a
conversation with Bhᾱradvᾱja, the Buddha says, “It is commonly agreed in the
world, Bhᾱradvᾱja, that there are devās”. There is a confusing reference in the
Saṅgᾱrava sutta (M II 209-13), where the Buddha evades the Brahman Saṅgᾱrava’s
question about the presence of devās. The interesting aspect being that the
Brahman asked the question immediately after the Buddha’s statement that devās
had approached him and shown great concern about his weak condition during his
pre-enlightenment ascetic stage. Now the purpose of the brahmana’s question can
only be to ascertain the Buddha’s view on the eternal reality and actual
presence of devās although the story told by him necessarily implies that he
admitted some sort of existence for them. According to Saṃyutta Nikᾱya, we come
to know that king Pasenadi was preparing an elaborate sacrifice to propitiate
gods. Certainly they were not the gods described in the Buddhist texts as these
gods are neither the objects for the offering of sacrifice nor prayer. We
find references to Sakka, the king of devās, who had a longer life span
compared to the other devās. When Sakka dies, as he is finite his place is
taken by another one immediately. The texts quote it as an evidence of
Mandhatar’s eminence and greatness that he outlived thirty sakkas, while the
texts also refer to those individuals who were born as Sakka a number of times.
Even Buddhaghosa relates a story that a Sakka was reborn immediately as he died
listening to a discourse of the Buddha, to continue hearing his sermons. The
canon speaks of a vast number of gods and spirits who assemble when the Buddha
was on his death- bed: “In great numbers, Ānanda, are the gods of the ten
world-systems assembled together to behold the Tathᾱgata ( Perfected one). For
twelve leagues…. there is no spot in size even as the pricking of the point of
the tip of a hair which is not pervaded by powerful spirits”. Similarly in the
canon elsewhere, vast numbers of gods or other- than-this- worldly forms of
appearance are described by Masson (1992). But
these gods were not necessarily good. An intriguing example here is the case of
Māra, the Tempter, who figured so prominently in the life of the Buddha from
the time of his Enlightenment until the final passing away. Because of his
sensual nature and his intense ill will to prevent and obstruct other beings
from gaining their release from saṃsᾱra he is known in Buddhism as Mᾱra and
Namuci, the personification of suffering and death. The Buddha invariably
refers to him as the Evil one, as sensuality in Buddhism is the greatest cause
of bondage. In some Buddhist texts Mᾱra is the name given to a subdivision of
devās belonging to the Yama realm. Besides
the reference to gods there are references to thirty one abodes where devās and
other beings reside. These could be put in three categories of existence in saṃsᾱra,
corresponding to three types of consciousness which are the result of the past
kamma. The three categories are: the sense- desire sphere ( kᾱma loka), the
fine-material sphere (rūpa loka) and the immaterial, formless sphere (arūpa
loka). Alligned with the sense-desire sphere ( kᾱma loka) are the sub-human
worlds which include animals. An understanding a nature of these celestial
worlds (deva loka) and their significant position is vital to the understanding
of the position of gods in the Pali canon. A brief study of the buddhist
cosmological system is thus imperative. The thirty one abodes have a nature of
their own, in which beings of a particular nature reside. The nature of beings
and the abode they dwell in is directly proportional to their kammic life i.e.
their stage in the Buddhist spiritual hierarchy. The
lowest in the rung is the sub human worlds which include realms of inferno or
hell, world of demons, unhappy spirits and the animal world. These beings are
characterized by unwholesome kamma. Above
this is the sense-desire or the kᾱma loka which includes the human world, realm
of the Four Great Kings, realm of the thirty three devās, Yama devās, devās
enjoying pleasures, devās enjoying their own creations or devās enjoying or
utilizing the creations of others. On the kammic chart their deeds fall under
the category of mixed kamma, predominantly good and very good kamma in the
field of worldly, material activity. These are the world of devās of the sense
–desire sphere. Superior to this is the Fine material sphere, Rūpa loka, which
includes retinue of Brahmā, ministers of Brahmā, world of Great Brahmās,
Brahmās of minor luster, Brahmās of infinite luster, world of radiant Brahmās, Brahmās of minor aura,
infinite aura, steady aura, greatly rewarded Brahmās, sensation-less Brahmās
designated as Lower Brahmā worlds. Then, come immobile Brahmās, serene Brahmās,
beautiful Brahmās, clear-sighted Brahmās and lastly supreme Brahmās designated
as Pure Brahmā worlds inhabited by non returners and Arahants. On the spiritual
scale their experience entails weak, moderate and full experience of the first,
the second, and the third jhāna respectively and the weak, moderate experience
of the fourth jhāna. From the immobile Brahmās to the Supreme Brahmās which
include in between them serene, beautiful and clear sighted Brahmās are the
ones who have experienced the attainment of the fruit of non-returning (Anᾱgᾱmi-phala)
with full experience of the fourth jhāna. The most superior
is the Immaterial sphere or the Arūpa loka which includes sphere of the
infinity of space, sphere of the infinity of consciousness, sphere of the
knowledge of nothingness and the sphere of
neither-perception-nor-non-perception designated as the Brahmā worlds of
disembodied consciousness (Immaterial sphere). The spiritual achievement at
this stage includes the experience of the four Arūpᾱyatana jhānas or the
formless sphere absorptions. These are beings having consciousness without
material body. The Buddha accepted the existence of the layers of hells
beneath, of the world, and of the heavens above-and he accepted all of them as
peopled by the forms of appearance which are appropriate to them—for example, Mᾱras
and Asurās in the hells below, devās and the Brahmās in the heavens above. So
the assemblies of the thirty three Vedic gods, of the Mᾱras and of the Brahmās
are accepted in DN.ii.109 as being as real as the assemblies of nobles,
brahmins, householders and wanderers. Now
the important thing to note about this classification is that their boundaries
or limits are absolutely negotiable and communicable. The world of human beings
and animals is physically the same world, and is aligned to the sense-desire
sphere. Below it , but still in the same dimensional category are spheres of
beings in states of far more pronounced degradation, while above it are realms
of the sense-desire devās and as the boundaries are not sharp, distinct and
impermeable, the kammic angle becomes all the more important and conspicuous as
our deeds or for that matter the
Buddhist concept of deedlessness becomes instrumental in getting us a place in
any of these categories and our promotion or demotion in this spiritual
hierarchy is totally dependent on them. This
detailing of the Buddhist view of devās and
their relation to Buddhist cosmology is enough to convince us that Early
Buddhism had a belief in the presence of the devās- but what kind of devās were
they- this is a matter of further probe. The question now arises as to how does
one define devās or gods. They surely were not the gods of the then prevalent
Brahminic tradition, who luxuriating dwelt in unimaginable opulence and were
above any laws of causality, kamma and who were beyond the touch of death as
eternality was their essence and they in a way subsumed time and space- a
position which was absolutely denied to the ordinary men. According to K.R.
Norman (1977: 1), the real problem of Buddhism regarding devās was not in
accommodating them into the Buddhist Cosmology but in fitting the eternal gods
of the Ṛgveda into the system of saṃsᾱra. But this does not seem to be a
plausible view as the gods of the brahminic tradition were immortal beings
enjoying incomparable bliss in celestial abodes, enjoying the attributes of
omniscience, omnipotence and omnipresence—and the most important of all they
were above the effects of kamma- i.e. their lives were absolutely devoid of any
bondage to the karmic effect as stated above whereas Buddhist gods were so
bound. The Buddha made it clear that devās like all other mortal beings of the
saṃsᾱra were subject to death and rebirth. As super or superior men devās had a
longer life span than men whereas devās of the Brahminical tradition were
immortal and devoid of the concepts of birth and death. Their existence is both
timeless and temporal. Here
M.M.J. Marasinghe (1974:113) therefore asserts and rightly so, that from the
standpoint of the Pali canon, it was not Buddhism that changed in order to
welcome the gods through the admittance of the gods is a fact. But once they
were admitted, they no longer retained anything more than the mere outer shells
of the original gods, as they have been completely transformed in their
character, status, and relevance in regard to the Buddhist tradition.
Marasinghe furthers his argument by saying that “Every single episode of them
in the Nikāya texts is an essential item which contributed towards the final
accomplishment of their metamorphosis” (1974: 113). Norman further argues that
when Buddhist cosmology promulgated the existence of many world systems beside
the one in which we live, then as a matter of course since devās were of no
importance, each world system was provided with its full complement of devās.
Both these views, point to the sheer insignificance of the gods in the Pali
canon. Ascertaining
the importance of gods in the Pali canon is not a matter of much conjecture.
The Buddha, it seems accepted their presence to keep up to the moods of the
times he preached in but denuding them of all their rights, privileges,
magnificence and above all their vital role in the cosmic design of the world
viz-a-viz the human lot, he in a way denied their existence, though very
subtly. This could be seen as a balancing act between absolute acceptance and
complete denial. It is well imaginable how important could be a god who was
almost reduced to a level of a bhikkhu or the one who had to seek spiritual
guidance from an enlightened one? The belief in gods could be attributed to the
later stage as in the Mahᾱyana and Tantric Buddhism, there is more open-ness to
discourse upon metaphysical matters than is found in the Pali scriptures.
One
is here forced to think that the Buddha was personally against the possible
existence of any devās—as in the Aggaῆῆa sutta ( Dīgha Nikᾱya 27), the Buddha
explains how theistic religion originated as a result of an error—the error
being present in devās of the sense-desire sphere who are not enlightened
personalities and are deeply immersed in
the delusion of their godship. Not only this, this error has arisen due
to the delusion of the brahmās of the higher spheres too, for the Dīgha Nikaya
tells us that Mahā Brahmā imagined himself to be Almighty Brahmā, the Most
High, the Invincible One, the Omniscient one, the Ruler, the Lord, the Creator,
the Maker, the Perfect One, the Preserver, Controller and Father of all that
was and will be. Even when he realized that he was mistaken he continued to
maintain the deception before the minor Brahmās of his retinue (abodes 12-14). Similarly,
in the Titha Sutta A N 3.61, the Buddha clearly states that “reliance and
belief” in creation by a supreme being leads to lack of effort and inaction.
The Buddha tells his monks who believe that whatever happens in this world is
caused by a supreme being’s act of creation—“when one falls back on creation by
a supreme being as being essential, monks, there is no desire, no effort (at
the thought), ‘This should be done. This should not be done’. When one can’t
pin down as a truth or reality what should and should not be done, one dwells
bewildered and unprotected.” The
concept of brahmins guiding the people to achieve oneness with the divine is
ridiculed by the Buddha in the Dīgha Nikaya, no.13, Tevijja Sutta as “foolish
talk”, as “ridiculous, mere words, a vain and empty thing”. The view that the
frequent appearance of the brahminical deities as disciples of the Buddha in
the canonical literature was aimed at emphasizing the falsity of the
brahminical belief in the power and potentiality of gods also seems more than
plausible. Even
if one were to take the Buddhist philosophy into consideration, the concept of
the universe and the laws of cause and effect that govern it leave no scope for
the idea of a supreme deity in the role of creator or ruler. As the Buddhist
causal theory developed, it did not seem necessary for it to deny the existence
of a Creator-God, the theory almost automatically excluded the belief in a
God-head. In
Buddhist thought devās are in no way necessary to Buddhist philosophy.
Everything that Buddhism asserts concerning the nature of reality can be stated
with equal truth and force without reference to devās or any other class of non
human beings. The Buddhist philosophy is a consummate, self-sustaining and
self-supporting system, requiring no intervention of supernatural or
supra-normal agencies, and not capable of being affected by the presence or
absence of beings of a non-human transcendental order. On
the psychological dimension also where Huston Smith in his book, “The World
Religions” points out very appropriately that unlike theistic religions which
begin with the notions of god and the creation of the universe, Buddhism begins
with the human condition as enumerated in the Four Noble Truths. Buddhism
endorses the view that the ultimate foundation or basis of the universe is the
mind, which does not require a god or gods, or any external agency to create
that mind. The processes of evolving (saṃvatta) and devolving (vivatta)
universe are carried on by the mental activities of the sentient beings (the
common human beings as contrasted to a super power of the theistic religions)
that are a part of it. It is this mind force of a human, not that of any
eternal or transcendent god, that cause the physical world to materialize and
go through the stages of growth, decay and dissolution. Therefore
Buddhism lays such emphasis on the immense importance and significance of man-
man is the most significant of all beings-man has even more importance and
vital role than the Gods as according to the Buddha the road to Nibbāna is open
to all and therefore all have the right to godship or Brahmā-ship. And as to
answer as to how this is explained-the answer is because the gods are merely
enjoying temporarily the results of good actions in the past, but man is the
master of his own fate, circumstances and destiny- in the arena of his mind he
can conquer numberless cosmological spheres and put an end to saṃsᾱra or the
continuity of being, just as did the Buddha. But to do this he must perceive
and realize the nature of kamma- the principle that governs his spiritual and
material world. As
already mentioned before, according to Ȧnguttaranikaaya ( From Burma, Rangoon
vol III, no.1; 1952.) a belief that the cause of happiness or misery is God,
Chance, or Fate leads to inaction. Our spiritual evolution depends upon our
spiritual efforts and ourselves alone. The Buddha emphasized that the true
knowledge could be gained by oneself, through insight, though it could not be
imparted to others. The iddhi, or the so-called “supernatural powers” gained by
the Arahats were simply the knowledge of hidden, unknown laws of the universe
or the reality and an insight into their utility, but even they were regarded
as only another greater obstacle to the attainment of freedom from the
continuity of being. It is a man only
who could understand and perceive the state of causality where, space, time or
events have any existence. This, a man can understand by direct perception,
which means breaking the bonds of relative existence, and acknowledging within
oneself the asaṃkhata or unconditioned element. The thinking, reasoning,
logical mind, after having consummated its exploration of phenomena and
discovering in it absolute elements of impermanence and finding it completely
void of any essential, absolute reality,
endeavours to cease the generative impulses or the waves of continuity, and
thus bring about final cessation of all processes. This final liberation or
cessation of continuity is called Nibbᾱna. Not
only this, the constant creation-destruction process of the universe too could
be understood with reference to man. When a cosmic entity is destroyed by
natural or other forces at the end of an aeon (kappa), all that remains of it
is a formless Brahmaloka, and it is this sphere which has to act as the potent
arena of future rebirths, until a new cycle of the development of the universe
(Saṃvatti) takes place according to the Brahmajala Sutta. It could be assumed
that beings revolving in the saṃsᾱra are inseparably connected with one
particular Cakkavᾱla , the history of which is like that of a living entity,
that is to say, it is the history of a causal continuum, not of an individual,
abiding, non-causal entity. The implication of this could be understood in an
analogy between the individual and the universe. When a human being dies, he
leaves nothing behind him but the potential of his kamma, which is instrumental
in producing another psycho-physical organism to carry on the similar order of
existence of conditioned phenomena, similarly a universe also meets it’s end,
but in due course another one starts to assume existence, addressing the same
route of cause and effect, through the sum-totality of Kamma , of beings
belonging to it. Thus every being in some sense identifies with his cosmic
system, his cosmic system with him, until the time he realizes its unreal
nature and puts an end to this unreal association by attaining Nibbᾱna. Added
to this, the Buddhist Texts make it clear that it is only a human being who is
capable enough to communicate with the higher realms of being in the
fine-material-plane but is possible by only those who have arduously achieved
and cultivated the four Jhānas associated with the sphere of infinite space,
infinite consciousness, no-thing-ness and
neither-perception-nor-non-perception. Hinduism terms it as the “Union with
Brahmā”, and it is considered to be Salvation or Nirvana (Nibbᾱna).The Buddha
who was a knower of Brahmā as he had on his own made acquaintance with the Brahmā-world,
had known the truth about the Godlessness of the world-an achievement that was
open to anybody who was ready and prepared to reach the level of the four
jhānas. But this truth could not be revealed to them who had not gone beyond
the realm of form and they were the ones who were liable to make the mistake of
belief in a Creator-God. The Brahmajaala and Aggaῆῆa suttas of the Dīgha Nikᾱya
, therefore give us an insight into the potentialities a man could reach in
knowing the ultimate truths as did the Buddha himself. Therefore,
in any case, there is a clear connection in Buddhist thought between the total
kamma of beings taking birth in a given world system and the fate of that
system and the fate of that system considered as a physical identity. And since
it is our kamma which decides the fate of the Universe, are we not Gods
ourselves? This is precisely the reason
why Buddhism has been described as a non- theistic religion by eminent
sociologists like Durkheim (T. Ling, 1973: 17). Such definitions have been
instrumental in creating a certain confusion with regards to the actual
position of not only Buddhism as a theistic or non –theistic religion, but even
as a religion for that matter- much to the inconvenience of the scholars who
believe that it contains some palpable poly-theistic tendencies. But as Norman
(1977:1) says that to a large extent this problem is a non-problem, since it
arises only from western scholars attempts to classify Buddhism. He furthers
his argument by saying that as soon as one interprets “non-theistic” as meaning
“accepting the existence of devās but denying them any causal role in the
universe”, then the problem disappears. This view perhaps, is the most
pertinent- a view that this piece of writing has been endeavoring to establish.
Once devās were denied any causal role, there existed no need to make
sacrifices to them, propitiate them. The whole ritualistic paraphernalia which
was so meticulously evolved by Brahmanism crumbled down and gave an almost
entirely fresh flavor to the new tendency that developed in the sub-continent.
A general belief is that Brahmanism had become so much overloaded by bloody
sacrifices and elaborate rituals that the religious world of the common people
had become almost unaffordable. It was to rid the laity of the burden of such
complicated system that a ritual free Buddhism got evolved and to make it
ritual free it was imperative to make it God- free. And perhaps it is just a
matter of probe that if a religion without God in the conventional sense of the
term became so popular and spread so rapidly, are the scholars in the academia
justified in defining religion by underlining the necessity of the presence of God
in the conventional way or has Buddhism given us a new definition of religion-
a religion without God? To
sum up, we could reiterate Norman’s view (1977:1) that this problem is a
non-problem, in the sense that Buddhism is a religion with both the theistic
and non- theistic dimensions to it – a unique combination of the presence of
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