P: ISSN No. 2394-0344 RNI No.  UPBIL/2016/67980 VOL.- IX , ISSUE- IX December  - 2024
E: ISSN No. 2455-0817 Remarking An Analisation

Taliban 2.0: Afghanistan and Regional Security

Paper Id :  19559   Submission Date :  2024-12-01   Acceptance Date :  2024-12-21   Publication Date :  2024-12-25
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DOI:10.5281/zenodo.14678969
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Swati Kumar
Assistant Professor
Political Science & International Relation
YBN University
Ranchi,Jharkhand, India
Abstract

The Taliban's return to power in August 2021, almost two decades after being toppled by U.S.-led forces, was yet another major change for the country. This article reviews the new Taliban governance, “Taliban 2.0,” and its repercussions on Afghan society, regional security, and global relations. It examines aspects of the Taliban's policies that have remained consistent and areas that reflect adaptations compared to their earlier regime (1996-2001), including human rights, economic challenges, and the humanitarian crisis. It also mentions their new power on a geopolitical level and global responses to them.

Keywords Taliban, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Human Rights, Regional Security, Legitimacy.
Introduction

As the world watched stunned in August 2021 at the lightning seizure of Kabul by the Taliban, they have continued to promise a more inclusive and less draconian regime than their last time in power. Still, these assurances have been met with scepticism and trepidation. Their first year in power has mixed continuity and change in how Afghan life is governed — whether it be a potential rollback of women's rights or alternative economic policies. 

Objective of study
This article lies on the concept of Taliban 2.0 and how their policies in conjunction with the response from society and the stance of the international community have come out to be for Afghanistan.
Review of Literature

In the book ‘Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise if the Taliban” (2001), Larry Goodson tries to explain how religious, ethnolinguistic, social and geographic characteristics of Afghanistan have historically and even today limit the development of a viable and strong Afghani state. He addresses how war, neighbouring states, religion and geo-economic and geopolitical strifes have affected the state. The broader theme of this book remains what failed states mean to the residents and how these failed states impact the region where they occur. The point to note here is that Goodson is writing before the American intervention in Afghanistan; he foretold the coming future for Afghanistan would be a war between Taliban- a contender for state power- and the outside forces of the region and even beyond. The book provides a deep understanding of the history of the region and also a lesson to learn for failing states around the world.

The Human Rights Watch did a detailed study on the “Economic Causes of Afghanistan’s Humanitarian Crisis”, in 2022. The report stated that Afghanistan is experiencing a severe humanitarian crisis, with acute malnutrition having been reported in over 90% of households for nearly a year. According to the World Food Programme, almost 20 million people, half the population, are suffering from level-3 or level-4 food insecurity. The WFP warns of the scale of the crisis and the growing risk of catastrophe, citing economic shocks as the primary driver of hunger and deaths. Monthly, tens of thousands of children are admitted for emergency medical treatment because of acute malnutrition, while others in inaccessible regions cannot receive care and starve to death. More than a million children under 5 are suffering from long-term acute malnutrition, leading to considerable health problems such as stunting. The International Rescue Committee warns that the current crisis could lead to more deaths than 20 years of war if not addressed. 

The humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan has disproportionately affected women and girls, who face greater obstacles to obtaining food, healthcare, and financial resources. Taliban policies have barred women from most paid jobs, causing nearly 100% of female-headed households to lack enough food. Women are compelled to sell household necessities, send their children to work, or even marry off their young girls to collect dowries. The Taliban's restrictions of having a male family member accompany them to work and stay with them throughout the day have further compromised women's access to healthcare. The Taliban have closed almost all girls' secondary schools, eliminating their right to education and making children more vulnerable to child marriage. Humanitarian groups and the media have reported families selling girls out of despair so that they could get food or pay a debt. The humanitarian crisis is a result of the economic crisis, which includes millions of dollars in lost income, spiking prices, and the collapse of the country's banking sector. Since August 2021, more than four out of five Afghan households have faced sharp declines in income or lost their source of income. Private Afghan banks remain unable to meet the withdrawal demands of depositors, including humanitarian aid organizations, because of the shortage of both US and Afghan banknotes.

Main Text

Historical Background: Taliban and its surrounding region

Analyzing the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for regional security requires a detailed examination of some very important issues. The first requirement is to understand the background and the geopolitics behind the instability of Afghanistan, which is sometimes called the ‘Tyranny of Geography’. The landlocked situation of Afghanistan has made it strategically important harking back to the Silk Route days and later on becoming the venue for the Great Game between the British and Russian empires. Any discussion or analysis about Afghanistan cannot be done in isolation; that is to say that, to closely study the state of affairs in Afghanistan it is imperative to also examine the neighbouring countries, especially Central Asia.

Historically, Afghanistan’s borders with Central Asian states did not exist per se, rather they consisted of certain frontier areas, the control of which constantly went into different hands, as warfare used to play a decisive role in the region. Though the area comprising the Central Asian states and North Afghanistan were sometimes part of the same empire, it changed with the approaching Great Game in the 19th century. The growing influence of the British realm over South Asia and particularly India coincided with Russian colonial expansion into Central Asia, resulting in the creation of a buffer zone which is now Afghanistan. Later we see that with the transition from the Russian Tsarist regime to the Soviet Union in the 20th century the borders between Afghanistan and the Central Asian states are closed off, for the first time in history. This demarcation of borders and the different governing structures; led to the development of very distinct political and cultural traditions among the tribes staying in Afghanistan and those within Central Asia.

Nevertheless, the ties remained intact as these countries had porous borders because of the tough geographical terrain, particularly during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979-89. The Soviet Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turks met and were exposed to their more ethnic and tribal counterparts in Afghanistan which left a strong impression among the Central Asians. The collapse of the Soviet Union only two years after it withdrew the military from Afghanistan created a spectacular new environment within both Afghanistan and Central Asia. The five states of Central Asia, namely Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan – became sovereign republics for the first time in the modern sense of the word. They were now faced with the challenges of ruling their country on their own, deciding the political system, foreign policy, security, and governance;  in short building the nation, of which they had no experience. Because these were nations that had always depended upon external rulers for security and governance; getting the first chance to rule on their own, brought many challenges to the ruling class. 

The fact that Afghanistan’s neighbours – Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan still share a common cultural and social heritage makes the region strategically significant and all the more complex. The isolation during the Soviet era of Central Asian states from their more traditional and tribal neighbours ended in 1979 when Soviet Russia invaded Afghanistan and then later during Taliban years, these states supported their ethnic counterparts to form an anti-Taliban group, popularly known as the Northern Alliance[1]. In a practical sense, the stability in Afghanistan and regional cooperation amongst all the neighbouring countries is essential for the development of the area, but this also means that the continued fighting and instability will and has already damaged the potential it had. Links between Central Asia or the whole region and Afghanistan have always been security-driven and are seen as the source of problems like narcotics trafficking, Islamic extremism, militancy and others all originating from Afghanistan. 

Since common history, geography, cultural and ethnic ties on one hand and common political instability, economic problems, and shared security concerns on the other, tie down the Central Asian republics together, obliging them despite the differences of opinions,  population size, degrees of threat and military capacity to stand together and face the issues emanating from Taliban. The instability and unrest in Afghanistan have always disturbed its neighbours. However, the Taliban’s usurpation of the Afghan government proved to be the most destructive and insidious to regional security.

Goodson (2001), points out six important factors that explicate the collapse of Afghanistan as a state and the rise of the Taliban; linguistic and ethnic cleavages, social structures, religious ideology, the annihilative history of conflicts, geopolitical positioning and a very limited economic development. He also describes Afghanistan as an example of many third-world countries that have been trying very hard to maintain themselves as a functioning state since after the great power game.

By this time the situation in Afghanistan had become a textbook example of a failed state.  The continued civil strife led to economic collapse and breakdown of the welfare system, the people started fleeing to neighbouring countries as refugees, and some organized themselves along ethnic and tribal lines to establish independent fiefdoms, while others engaged in illicit economic practices, smuggling drugs and arms threatening the stability of the region (Helman & Ratner, 1993). Facing these challenges Afghanistan became its own worst enemy, unable to maintain its political and territorial integrity both within and outside the country it fell victim to designs of external powers and became a breeding ground for dangerous non-state actors. Most alarming of all Afghanistan as a failed state provided a perfect environment for the mercenaries, social rejects, religious fanatics,  ideologically blind politicians and criminals to colonize the physical space and use it to promote their particular vision or consolidate and expand their interests and operations (Gros, 1996). The same failed state theory suggests that the international community can intervene in such a state with the objective of regime change and bringing order to the situation. This suggestion stems from the reason that a failed state is not only a threat to itself but also to its neighbours, the region and to the international community as a whole. Hence it is the responsibility of the international community to do everything possible to uproot this threat. US intervention in Afghanistan and the unseating of the Taliban was viewed and started within this very framework of argument. Some scholars have often cited the UN Charter, Chapter 7 which says that, if a failed state is threatening the international order there is no normative predicament because the great powers are charged specifically with defending international peace and security.[2]

Taliban is an Islamic Fundamentalist group, predominantly deriving from the Pashtun tribe residing in the south and east of Afghanistan, which ruled from 1996 to 2001. It was formed in the early 1990s by one faction of the Mujahedeen, who fought the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan from 1979-1989, getting covert military and financial assistance from the US-CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) and its Pakistani cohort the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence). The people of America had no clue that their government along with the secret service of England, with the help of Pakistan had begun funding and training the religious fanatics including Osama Bin Laden – out of which came the Al Qaeda, Taliban and also the unfortunate 9/11. Initially, the Taliban attracted popular support for the promise to bring stability and peace in the wake of Soviet withdrawal and the period of conflict between various mujahedeen factions from 1992 to 1996. Taliban imposed its brand of rules and justice over the territory it had consolidated over the years. It drew from the pre-Islamic Pashtun tribal codes and interpreted the Sharia and Wahhabi doctrines to suit its cause. It rejected and neglected the social services and other functions of the state to its people, its Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice enforced prohibitions on behavior it deemed un-Islamic (Laub, 2014).  Taliban’s outlook and the world-view it had led to a complete breakdown of Afghan society, and the regime’s involvement in terrorizing the region outside convinced the international community that it was a threat not only to Afghanistan but also to the world peace at large.

Before 9/11 the world community had no clear approach to dealing with Afghanistan or particularly the Taliban. There have been a few indirect military confrontations by Washington and Iran and also an imposition of arms embargo, which could not be pursued owing to porous borders between Pakistan and Afghanistan.[3] The international community had chosen to ignore or rather not see in the direction as the Taliban went on violating all the international laws, human rights and so on. The list of inhumanity and atrocities included treating women as second-class citizens, extrusion of all international agencies and NGOs, mass abuse and persecution of religious and ethnic minorities, gross human rights violations, cultural vandalism which was in the form of destructing the  Bamian Buddhas and other artefacts of the country’s non-Islamic heritage, promotion of an illicit economy with networks covering the whole of Central Asia and Russia including opium trade and production, and finally providing a haven for militants to train and launch offensives from Afghanistan.

Post 9/11 US-led NATO forces invaded Afghanistan invocating Article 5 of the treaty (NATO: 2005).[4] The offensive launched was named the War on Terror for toppling the Taliban regime which provided sanctuary to Al-Qaeda and the mastermind behind the attacks Osama Bin Laden. So now we see that the whole world has come together to end terrorism and the terrorist organizations that were operating from Afghanistan. Even Russia and Central Asian countries joined the Great War on Terrorism, by providing logistical and military use of the bases to support the foreign forces fighting the Taliban.  In a few years, the Taliban were ousted from Afghanistan, the insurgents scattered and found a haven across the border in Waziristan, FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Area)[5] of Pakistan. They regrouped under the leadership of Mullah Mohammad Omar and began fighting the Western-backed government in Kabul. The resurgence of the Taliban post-2001 was financed by the drug cartels operating across borders to Central Asia and Russia and also the revenues from illicit mining.[6]

The war on terror and the invasion of Afghanistan started with the main objective of rooting out terrorism by capturing or killing Osama Bin Laden, wiping out al Qaeda and all its networks, eliminating the Taliban or making it defunct and in the process democratizing Afghanistan. Although the global war on terror started with Afghanistan on the frontline, no definition of terrorism included all (Rahman, 2010).

Terrorism used to be a crime before 9/11 and the terrorists were brought to the court of justice, then there was a necessary investigation to find out the cause and the motivation behind the acts of terrorism; the rationality behind doing so was that any act of terrorism was not itself an end, but was used as a means to achieve something concrete. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the US changed the whole world's perspective towards terrorism. It was an act that now needed no investigation but only punishment and elimination. It made the whole world terrified at the level to which the terrorists had gone this time and every nation in the world was afraid it could be the next target. So the whole world joined US troops and stood up against Osama Bin Laden the mastermind of the attacks and the Taliban. This intensified anti-American feeling which further increased the numbers joining terrorist organizations and also new organizations came up parallel to the war on terrorism. Afghanistan became the region to be bombed by international forces, the objective was not only to eliminate the Taliban but also to help the country democratise and bring back the peace. 

Gradually and perhaps because of the failures that happened in the actual execution of the plan, the objectives of the war kept shifting and reshaping accordingly to serve the interests of the forces that were fighting the war in the region. At times it focused on cutting down the Taliban and at others the focus was on rehabilitating and strengthening the political structures and other democratic institutions of the country, the recent focus has been to train and support the Afghan forces to combat the terrorists that have now been seen taking up new territories. The Taliban with its fellow insurgent groups like the Haqqani Network[7], Hezb-e-Islami and others are still deep in the region and the emergence of ISIS at this point cannot be ignored nor can it be seen in isolation.  It won’t be wrong to say that the dominant US strategy did not work the way they hoped it would, to name one was the implementation of Counter-Insurgency (COIN). It is high time that the US military policy-makers realised that COIN did not give the desired victory in Afghanistan or anywhere in the world. What they fail to understand is that more guns with people in a foreign territory will never win a war. The tragedy behind COIN was that it delusioned the policy-makers into believing that if the military force was used in a certain manner it could give them political gains and outcomes further culminating into victory.

Thousands of troops withdrew from Afghanistan in December of 2014 the ones that remained were called the Resolute Action Force, with the primary objective of training and supporting the Afghan National Force to take over the combating operations and securing the region from the Taliban.  As the ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan approached, the international community increasingly looked towards the impact that a stable or unstable Afghanistan might have on the broader region, including Central Asia. Radical Islamism along with extremism originating from Afghanistan threatens the stability and peace of the whole region and also Central Asia.

Furthermore, the risk of spillout stems from the potential failure of Afghan security forces and the state apparatus. One cannot deny that the coming back of the Taliban regime has shown that after more than two decade of this war on terrorism and against Taliban, the international forces could not neutralize Taliban or the Al-Qaeda. The Doha 2020 agreement between the Taliban and the United States paved the way for a drawdown of American forces, hastening its eventual return to power. In August 2021 they overran Kabul with minimal resistance from Afghan forces, precipitating the fall of the Afghan government. The so called war on terror has come to an end and the future for Afghanistan looks bleak at best.

Domestic stability is an important part of the broader security puzzle. And in this regard it seemed that Afghanistan made some progress when the power was peacefully taken up by the National Unity Government. But over the years, even after constant support of the international community and with money pouring in for rehabilitation, the re-emergence of Taliban and especially the ISIS, poses a serious threat to Afghanistan and the neighbourhood, now more than ever before. Quite a lot of concerns about the phenomenon of ISIS which has come to the region recently as opposed to the Taliban which were Pashtun and more pan-Afghan and were not interested in going beyond the Amu Darya. ISIS does have interest to go beyond not only Amu Darya but to take over the whole area and it also is multi-ethnic unlike Taliban. ISIS also does a huge amount of recruitment in Central Asia, though the numbers are contested, but huge numbers of people are fighting along with ISIS in Syria and Iraq.

The neighbourhood of Afghanistan is seriously worried about the fate of the country and of their own. Central Asia has been the most affected by the spillovers from Afghanistan and the military withdrawal of the international forces have raised many questions and issues relating to the security of this part of the world. The bordering countries of Central  Asia already face many internal challenges to their governments and state like insurgency  from the Fergana Valley, narco-trafficking, small arms and weapons proliferation,  corruption and to top it all the influence of Islamic terrorism from Afghanistan have been  a serious trouble for them.

Taliban 2.0: Continuity and Change

Before taking control of Kabul, the Taliban had already demonstrated their increasingly sophisticated propaganda tactics. In recent months, during a diplomatic outreach to regional powers, well-prepared Taliban representatives made assurances about respecting women’s rights and controlling terrorist groups within Afghanistan.

However, experts caution that, despite these pledges, Taliban governance could resemble the harsh realities of the 1990s. During that era, women's rights were nearly nonexistent, and brutal punishments, including public executions, were commonplace.

Many of the movement's current senior leaders were in power during the Taliban's previous rule from 1996 to 2001, which ended when U.S. forces overthrew the regime following the September 11 attacks orchestrated by al-Qaeda, an Islamist organization affiliated with the Taliban.

The last U.S. troops departed Afghanistan on August 30, 2021. Three years later, the Taliban’s return to power has allowed al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations to reestablish their presence in the country and has stripped Afghan women and girls of the fundamental freedoms they experienced during the two decades of Western-backed governance following the U.S.-led invasion in 2001.

To mark their third year in power, the Taliban held a parade at Bagram Airfield earlier this month. Once the main base for U.S. forces targeting Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters over the two decades after the September 11 attacks, the airfield now served as the backdrop for a Taliban display of U.S. and NATO military equipment left behind during the chaotic withdrawal. Taliban fighters also assembled in Kabul’s diplomatic district, outside the deserted U.S. embassy, chanting "death to America" while trampling a U.S. flag attached to a truck once used by the U.S.-backed police.

Human Rights and Suppression of Women

Afghan women and girls have faced severe repression under the Taliban's authoritarian regime. The new government has issued numerous oppressive decrees, systematically excluding women and girls from public life, denying them access to education and employment, and even subjecting them to detention and physical abuse for advocating for their rights. Afghanistan is now the only country in the world where girls and women are banned from pursuing secondary and higher education.

In August, the Taliban introduced further restrictions through a new "vice and virtue" law. One of its 35 articles states that woman’s faces and voices are sources of temptation and should not be seen or heard in public. The law also prohibits Afghan women from interacting with non-Muslim women and men from engaging with non-Muslim foreigners. Men can be jailed for activities like listening to music, trimming their beards, or wearing neckties.

Roza Otunbayeva, the U.N.’s Special Representative and head of the U.N. mission in Afghanistan, described the law as a distressing vision of Afghanistan’s future, where moral inspectors have the authority to detain individuals based on vague offenses (Mukhtar 2024). According to UNESCO, over 1.4 million girls are being deliberately denied schooling, endangering the future of an entire generation. The Taliban has also reinstated public floggings for various crimes, with hundreds of people being lashed over the past three years. Human Rights Watch, based in New York, has stated that under Taliban rule, Afghan women and girls are enduring the worst women’s rights crisis globally (Mukhtar 2024).

A year after the U.S. and NATO withdrawal, a U.S. drone strike killed al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul. However, since then, the group has resurfaced and established new training facilities in Afghanistan. A July U.N. Security Council report noted that al-Qaeda had regrouped and was aiming to conduct attacks beyond Afghanistan’s borders, collaborating with other terrorist groups and prioritizing its relationship with the Taliban (UNSC Report 2024).

Despite a commitment to fight ISIS-K, the Taliban lacks the operational capability to effectively combat the group. Though the Taliban claims to have neutralized ISIS-K, the group remains a significant threat to the region and beyond, as shown by recent attacks and foiled plots.

Seeking Legitimacy

Since retaking control of Afghanistan in August 2021, the Taliban have actively sought international recognition, Afghanistan's U.N. seat, and access to frozen funds. To achieve this, they have launched a public relations campaign to present a more moderate image, referred to as “Taliban 2.0,” while also engaging in “hostage diplomacy” tactics, a strategy they have employed since their first rise to power in 1996.

Despite assurances to international audiences of changed behavior, the Taliban's actions within Afghanistan contradict these claims. While they have promised amnesty and freedom of movement for former government officials and critics, reports of targeted killings, torture, and disappearances persist. The Taliban have also pledged not to use Afghanistan as a base for terrorism, yet have established a “martyrdom brigade” and continue to celebrate suicide bombers domestically.

The group has implemented oppressive measures against women and minorities, barring women from education and public life, and displacing ethnic minorities. Despite claiming to support media freedom, they have severely restricted press activities, harassing and detaining journalists, and shutting down critical media outlets.

The Taliban’s narrative of a more inclusive government is contradicted by the composition of their administration, which is almost exclusively male and Pashtun, and includes individuals with terrorist backgrounds. Their promises of upholding the 1994 constitution appear to be aimed more at appeasing international actors than reflecting any genuine commitment to governance reform.

Conclusion

The Taliban's messages to the domestic audience are intentionally ambiguous. They tie the reopening of girls' education to vague economic and moral prerequisites. Recently, Deputy Prime Minister Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar stated that once “economic challenges are resolved, we will provide education for all those who want to pursue their studies.” Additionally, the Taliban have prohibited most female government employees from returning to work, a move that is estimated to result in economic losses of $1 billion.

The only discernible change in the "new Taliban" is their more refined and strategic public relations efforts, which are aimed at concealing ongoing human rights abuses. Ultimately, the international community needs to recognize the gap between the Taliban’s rhetoric for foreign audiences and their actions within Afghanistan. While they seek global legitimacy and economic support, domestically, they continue to enforce their rigid ideological rule and suppress dissent, showing little genuine change in their fundamental beliefs and practices.

References
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  2. Chebil, Mehdi, (2021), “The Taliban 2.0? Militants seek image revamp in a bid to legitimacy”, France24, August 17, 2021. URL: The Taliban 2.0? Militants seek image revamp in a bid for legitimacy (france24.com)
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Endnote
[1] Northern Alliance was an anti-Taliban group led by the previous president Burhanuddin Rabbani, Defense Minister Ahmed Shah Massoud (both ethnic Tajiks), Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum, and Hazara leader Abdul Karim Khalili, other Hazara and Pushtun factions and forces under the leadership of commanders such as Abdul Haq, Haji Abdul Qadri, Qari Baba or diplomat Abdul Rahim Ghafoorzai.
[2] “Charter of United Nations”, Chapter VII.
[3] Regardless of the problems with border control, the council of European Union at the end of 1996 imposed an embargo on the delivery of arms, ammunitions and military materials to Afghanistan. But it had little or no effect.
[4] Article 5 of NATO states that, the signatories agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.
[5] FATA is a semi-autonomous tribal region in northwestern Pakistan; it comprises of seven tribal districts, six frontier regions and is directly governed by Pakistan’s federal government through a special set of laws called the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR).
[6] First report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Implementation Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) concerning the Taliban and associated individuals and entities. UNSC report 2012.
[7] Haqqani network composes of the Zadran tribe, based in Waziristan conducted cross-border operations into eastern Afghanistan and Kabul. Centered in the city of Kosht, in the 1980s Jalaluddin Haqqani fought as a mujahedeen leader against Soviet forces, receiving substantial financial and military assistance from the CIA through ISI.