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This article aims to trace the strategic convergences between Russia and Pakistan after giving a brief overview of their Cold War relations. An alliance between the three countries will affect Asian security, especially India. Various factors such as the geostrategic location of Pakistan, deteriorated U.S.-Pakistan relations, and a robust Sino-Pak alliance had made it imperative for Russia to lean towards Pakistan strategically. Thus, in light of the above facts, it becomes imperative for the government to be prepared for the unwanted consequences affecting Indian security.

To trace the geopolitical rapproachment of Russia and Pakistan

Review of literature has been done by using SCOPUS and has been incorporated in the main text. 

Russo-Pak Divergences during the Cold War

Pakistan owing to its unique geostrategic location between South, Central, and West Asia, has been tactically lucrative for the powers since the cold war days. With regards to this, George Marshall wrote to President Truman that "the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf recognised as the centre of the aspirations of the Soviet Union" (Rose and Husain, 1987, p. 3). Consequently, in 1954, Pakistan signed a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the US and joined South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Further, it also joined the Baghdad Pact with Britain, Turkey, Iraq and Iran, which was renamed as Central Treaty Organization when Iraq left. Thus, it enjoyed the military patronage of the US and in turn, assisted it in containing Communism, especially during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. For the reasons described above, Islamabad was "America's most allied ally in Asia” (Mahmood, 1994a). One of the foremost reasons for the US to have a strategic depth in Pakistan was the essential bases in Lahore and Karachi. (Arif 1984 and Sattar 2007).

There was a brief period of geostrategic divergences when A.Q. Khan announced that Pakistan was successful in producing enriched Uranium. The development led the US to invoke the Pressler Amendment in August 1985, resulting in a sudden halt in the concessional military sales and a total ban on all military supplies and cooperation with Pakistan. Further, the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the end of the Cold War changed the South Asian power dynamics resulting in Pakistan losing its status as a frontline state. Consequently, “all economic and military aid to Pakistan negotiated in 1987 under a four-year package worth 4.02 billion dollars, was cut off from the new financial year, i.e. October 1990” (Mahmood, 1994b, p.104). Thus, the relations between the two were strained.

While understanding its strategic location, Pakistan stressed the Dulles proposal of a "Northern Tier" consisting of countries on the South of the USSR. Pakistan and Iran were hence important. However, owing to Islamabad’s aspiration, it stressed a strong Turkish-Pak alliance as a strong backbone while excluding Iran and the Arabian countries. Although the Turkey-Iraq agreement, also known as the Baghdad pact, was finally unveiled, Pakistan's aspirations to become a ‘leader’ of the Islamic countries could not be hidden for long. From the 1950s to 1960s, The US sold arms to Pakistan worth Dollar One Billion, out of which US Dollar 53 Million was in 1954 itself. Further, after a brief setback due to Pakistan’s nuclear issue, from 1983 to 1990, Pakistan received military aid of 3.73 Billion Dollars owing to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the component of U.S. arms sales was 2.20 Billion Dollars (Ali, 2019a).

Additionally, China was another crucial contributor to the Russo-Pak divergence during the Cold War. The establishment of close Sino-Pak strategic relations after India’s defeat in 1962 made the Soviets more uncomfortable with Islamabad. Although the Sino-Pak collision started at the 1955 Bandung Conference, it also marked the end of the Sino-Indian friendship (Patil, 1977). However, with Chinese dominance over the region, the Soviet Union hesitantly tried to reset its relations with Pakistan. It also offered economic aid to Pakistan in order to undermine the U.S. military alliances in the Asian countries. Additionally, the détente between U.S. and U.S.S.R. and the strategic competition between  U.S.S. R. and China contributed to the reorientation of the Soviet policy towards Pakistan (Hasan, 1969). Thus, as a weak state, Pakistan had remained lucrative for being a stepping stone for influence in South Asia.

Brief Period of Strategic Proximity 1965-1975

Makhdoom (2009) highlighted in his study Pakistan’s evolving foreign policy concepts in 1956. The then Foreign Minister Firoz Khan Noon conceptualised Pakistan's ideological and strategic interests through the concepts of Pak-Islamism, Two-Nation Theory, and Pan-Islamism. Pak- Islamism was based on strategic interests while pursuing an independent foreign policy. The Two-Nation theory focussed upon the ideological and religious identity, which would be entirely different from India, and Pan-Islamism focussed on Islamabad’s Muslim brotherhood through which it wanted to lead the Islamic world. Through Pak-Islamism, Pakistan carved out a space for forging strategic ties with the Soviets while not losing sight of its Islamic identity.

The first sign of a simple normalisation took place in January 1965 when Pakistan’s foreign minister Bhutto visited Moscow and later in April when Ayub Khan’s visit took place. One of the primary reasons for this rapproachment was the betterment in the relations between Soviet and China; thus, the Soviets wanted to widen their relations with the other prominent Asian nations. At a regional level, Pakistan forged Regional Cooperation for Development organisation (RCD) in 1964 between Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, independent of the U.S.-led alliances. Further, as the countries of RCD had a vital role to play as ‘northern tier’ partners for its containment policy, the Soviet military sales to Iran and Egypt marked the beginning of Russia’s post-Second World War pivot to Asia. Second, as America stopped its aid from Pakistan from 1965-67 owing to its 1965 war with India and post-Tashkent phase, Islamabad and Moscow as an opportune moment and hence reached out to each other.

Thus, the 1965 Indo-Pak war and the subsequent Tashkent agreement marked the ‘moment’ of Soviet neutrality between India and Pakistan. The Soviet Union agreed to assist Pakistan in implementing 30 major development projects, which included “steel plants, power plants, radio communications, seaports and airfields” and “allocated $50 million for oil exploitation and the purchases of industrial machinery” (Chaudhri, 1966, p.7).

In June 1966, there was unconfirmed news in the Pakistani media that Moscow agreed to provide armaments to Islamabad under the same conditions it was selling to India, although the Russian officials denied the reports. In July 1968, the Soviet Union and Pakistan concluded an arms deal while keeping India informed of the decision (Hasan 1968, Ayoob 1968 and Menon 1982). Furthermore, Pakistan’s former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto visited Moscow in 1974 and the Soviet Union agreed to build steel mills at Karachi worth 160 million Roubles, which later proved an important milestone for Pakistan’s industrial military set-up. A little before that Soviets also sold arms to Iran in 1967 and later to Kuwait in 1977, thereby expanding its geostrategic outreach to Asia.

However, the rapprochement was cut short due to the Soviet support to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. In January 1980, Beijing commented on the development as a Soviet measure that was a, “stepping stone for a southward thrust towards Pakistan and the whole subcontinent" (Mahdi, 1986, p.68). Both Pakistan and China thus called for a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Thus, the Soviet Union and Pakistan remained at odds with one another. There were sharp polarisations with China, Pakistan and the U.S. forming one axis and the Soviets along with India forming another axis.

Reconfiguration of the Post Cold War Priorities

To reset its Cold War foreign policy, as a goodwill gesture, Russian Vice President, Rutskoi, visited Pakistan in 1991 and consequently asked both the arch-rivals- India and Pakistan, to show respect for human rights, thereby causing displeasure in New Delhi. Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan's former Prime Minister, visited Russia in 1999 and hailed Moscow as a "global force" and highlighted Moscow's relevance in a multipolar global order. This development could be primarily seen from the prism of Sino-Russo and Sino-Pak strategic relations as Russia and China were forging close relations in diverse fields such as defence, maritime security, common anti-American approaches, etc. However, the newfound warmth in their bilateral relations was briefly cut short when the Russian President Boris Yelstin visited India in 1993, signed a 20 year year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, and further endorsed India’s stand on the Kashmir issue. The development was primarily seen as an attempt by Russia to simultaneously engage the arch rivals and keep India on its tenterhooks to dent the blossoming India-U.S. strategic partnership.

On the other hand, in an attempt to stress its policy of multipolarity while also not losing sight of its Eurasian identity that primarily arose because of the European Union’s Eastward expansion between 2004 to 2007, the Russian foreign policy experts also laid down the future course of actions in the following three alternatives:

1.     Priority laid on establishing a 'mature strategic partnership' with America

2.     Emphasis on the 'near abroad' as Russia's central concern, with some advocating a Moscow-dominated economic integration, thus restoring, though partially, the image of its former imperial control. Moreover, Russia's regional role as a power would be strengthened, thereby serving as a balance vis-à-vis America and Europe.

3.     Consideration of an Eurasian counter alliance, designed to reduce the preponderance of the U.S. unchallenged global influence (Brzezinski 1997, p.98-99).

Further, Russia’s Eurasian identity compelled it to carve out its sphere of influence, so it became essential for Russia to reach out to the other Asian countries as a part

of its rapprochement policy. In this light, it has been highlighted that,

“instead of integrating itself into a globalising international system, Russia should stay outside of globalisation and strive to maximise its independence” (Baranovsky, as cited in Siddiqi, 2017,p.72).

Nevertheless, new partners to strengthen an Anti America alliance became necessary in light of the new foreign policy objectives. Pakistan hence was an alternative waiting to be strategically explored. Soon, the developments of 9/11 changed the narratives and the discourses of geopolitics for a temporary period wherein China, Russia, and Pakistan decided to cooperate with the U.S. on its War on Terror. On the other hand, the U.S. also renewed its interest in Pakistan and the South Asian region. Pakistan found an opportune moment, offered a safe passage to the US, and became a major non-NATO ally. As per the data retrieved from U.S. Aid and SIPRI, from 2002-2014, Pakistan, as a major non-NATO ally, got military aid worth 5.81 Billion Dollars, and the arms sales component was 3.202 Billion Dollars (Ali, 2019b).

On the other hand, Russia also found an opportunity to coordinate with the U.S. It first tried to achieve a geopolitical condominium with the U.S. and the West by wishing to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (N.A.T.O) in order to create a “single defence and security space” (Rauch, 2001), but with a precondition that, “if and when Russia’s views are taken into account as those of an equal partner” (Rankin, 2021). It also portrayed itself as a “sovereign democracy”, but it was not accepted, and hence Washington’s liberal hegemony approach (Ikenberry, 1999; Mearsheimer & Walt, 2016) was seen as a “counter ideology” to the principles of Western democracy (Stent, 2014).

When it became clear to Russia that establishing a ‘mature strategic partnership’ was not insight, the Russian foreign policy analysts stressed the strategising of Russia’s Eurasian identity with a solid anti-American stand. Thus, the concepts of anti-imperialism (against the West), multipolarity, and Russia’s strategic backyard evolved, focussing mainly on ‘greater Central Asia’ that encompassed the five Central Asian states apart from its renewed interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Moreover, the West's financial crisis reinforced Russia's belief that Asia had become the “fastest-developing geopolitical zone, toward which the centre of world economy and politics is gradually shifting” (MOFA, 2013). Pakistan, an ally of the U.S. and an occupant of a strategic location in the region, became necessary for Russia, given its strategic interest in curtailing the Islamist separatist movements in Chechnya and Tajikistan. Pakistan’s role in fuelling radical Islam was not hidden from Russia. In a nutshell, Russian interests in South Asia have been described by Menon (2015) as follows:

“Preventing the fragmentation of a nuclear-armed Pakistan; rooting out al-Qaeda facilities and operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan; creating an Afghanistan that, at long last, settles into a life free of war, terrorism, and warlordism; preventing an India-Pakistan confrontation over Kashmir; disrupting the financial operations of terrorist networks and the flow of weapons in and through Afghanistan and Pakistan” (p. 220) 

Strategic Convergences between Russia, Pakistan and China

From a strategic perspective of the Sino-Russo entente, Russia could not ignore the strong nexus between China and Pakistan. The gradual rapprochement was initiated by establishing the Pakistan-Russia Joint Working Group on Terrorism in 2002, followed by a dialogue on strategic stability in 2003. The breakthrough came in 2007 when the Russian Prime Minister, Mikhail Fradkov, visited Islamabad. The pace of their bilateral relations increased from 2009 on the side of annual quadrilateral summits between Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia and Tajikistan. Further, the Sochi Summit of 2010 led to establishment of the Russia-Pakistan Inter-Governmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technological and Cultural Cooperation.

During Washington’s War on Terror (WOT), Russia had also realised the aspirations of Pakistan to have a different, well-established influence in Afghanistan. Consequently, in 2009, a new regional group called ‘Dushanbe Four’ consisting of Russia, Tajikistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan was formed to discuss regional security and economic issues. Additionally, Chechen and Uzbek extremists functioning in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) pose a significant danger to Russian security. Thus, Russia perceived that enhancing relations with Pakistan could immensely help its security issues.

With regard to U.S.-Pak relations, in 2011, the killing of Osama Bin Laden in Abottabad deteriorated their relations and Moscow, and Islamabad found an opportunity to come closer to each other. It is essential to point out that the Russian PM Dmitry Medvedev and Asif Ali Zardari’s six meetings between 2008 and 2012 helped strengthen the Russo-Pak ties. In May 2011, President Zardari became the first Pakistani President to visit Russia. Further, Russia and China also aimed to integrate the Eurasian Union and the Silk Road Projects in which Islamabad “strategically approved the use of Gwadar by Russia. Through Gwadar, Pakistan will be connected to Russia through Afghanistan and Central Asia” (Kaushiki, 2019a: 52).

In June 2014, Moscow lifted its self-imposed and undeclared embargo on arms supplies to Pakistan. Further, Russia signed a broader ‘military cooperation’ agreement with Pakistan during its Defence Minister, General Sergei Shoigu’s visit to Islamabad in November 2014. Russia’s shift towards Islamabad was confirmed as a strategy when Korybko (2015), a Russian geopolitical analyst, “referred to Pakistan as the ‘zipper of Pan Eurasian Integration’ – situated in a location that strategically integrates the three regions of South, Central and West Asia ‘through which the future of oil supplies of Moscow can be guaranteed” (as cited in Kaushiki, 2019b, p. 49). In 2015, another significant development that affected India was the Russian decision to sell four MI-35 attack helicopters to Pakistan. Russia further shocked India at an anti-terror meet in Brisbane in 2015 when it blocked an Indian effort to reprimand Pakistan for its inactivity against terrorist organisations -  Lashkar e Taiba and Jamaat ud Dawa.

In 2016, bilateral joint military exercises were introduced. In 2018 Russo-Pak joint military commission was formed, and a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on naval cooperation was signed apart from a ‘Rare Military Cooperation Pact’ with the aim that Russia would train the Pakistani army and improve its overall armed forces. The pact indicates the future shifting horizons. The military cooperation got further solidified when Russia did not object to China’s transfer of Russia’s Klimov RD-93 engine, which became instrumental in making the JF-17 Thunder aircraft. Such developments have caused Indo-Russo relations to be strained. From a Russian perspective, another contributory factor to the Russo-Pak rapprochement was India’s search for alternative defence partners that had pushed Russia closer to Pakistan and Iran. In this context, “Russia was the largest supplier of major arms to India in both 2012-16 and 2017-21, but India's imports of Russian arms dropped by 47 per cent between the two periods” (Economic Times, 2022).

China, Russia and Pakistan thus have overlapping convergences because of their respective grudges against the U.S. As Russia and China have officially been branded as “revisionist states” by the U.S. as they aim to challenge the western norms-based international order, the formation of Quad and AUKUS only reinforces their commitment to their joint cause. Thus, the reshaping of the Asian power dynamics can be spelt out in the following words,

“India has officially become an ally of the US by boycotting China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and becoming a member of the Quad, which China-Russia perceive as a military alliance against them in Asia-Pacific. To put it bluntly, Russia has come closer to China and Pakistan in response to India’s drift towards the US”. (Swain, 2022).

The proposed research will involve both Primary and Secondary sources. Data has been extracted from JSTOR and SCOPUS

As India currently seeks to expand its sphere of influence by initiating defence exports apart from creating a pool for its defence imports, India’s defence trade with Russia will decrease even further. Thus, in such a case, Russia through the support of China will expand its influence deeper in Asia and hence would initiate an Axis with not only Pakistan but Iran too. The recent statements of Pakistan’s former PM Imran Khan that the future of Pakistan is tied with Russia directly points out to the emerging contours of the new alliances. In the times to come, a strong nexus involving Russia, Pakistan, China is set to emerge. The axis of these three countries, predominantly anti American in nature will hold immense security threats not only for the South Asian region but also for India. Finally, to conclude, it would appropriate to quote Joshi and Sharma (2017) who stated that, “India should be ready to face some even-handed response from Russia in context of India– Pakistan relations (p. 49).

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