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Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments: A Unique Experience of India | |||||||
Paper Id :
16826 Submission Date :
2022-09-16 Acceptance Date :
2022-09-24 Publication Date :
2023-09-25
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Abstract |
The duel between High Court and lawmaking body, overwhelmingly battled in the field of activity of legal survey power is examined. This duel was re-sanctioned with equivalent force in the field of altering power too. In the previous, the battle finished in the cancellation of the right to property from part III of the Constitution and growing the skylines of legal activism while in the latter the Court has secured a victory by its decision in Minerva Mills v. Union of India[1] which nullified the clauses (4) and (5) of Article 368 introduced by the Constitution (Forty-Second) Amendment Act, 1976. Constitution is the essential regulation crucial record of the land on the double restricting on the Public authority and individuals. Indian Constitution isn't just a political report it is essentially as much as financial and politico-authoritative record. It is a central regulation from where all regulations stream and take their source. Our Constitution is the Constitution of "We individuals of India" as projected in the Preface. The Prelude is the character of the Constitution, mirroring the brain of individuals, declaring their assurance to get the four philosophical and respectable goals judges, Freedom, Uniformity and Society. Our constitution was outlined by the Constituent Get together chosen on a thin establishment and it was not confirmed by individuals by any mandate. Prof. Where emphasized that “In India, ‘the people’ enacted the Constitution ‘in our Constituent Assembly’, but that Assembly was composed of representatives elected by minority of people of India and the Constitution it was never submitted to the people directly.[2]
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Keywords | Judicial, Constitution, Amendment. | ||||||
Introduction |
Constitution is an essential record and has an extraordinary lawful holiness setting out the structure and chief elements of the organs of the public authority of a state and proclaiming standards overseeing the tasks of those organs. It doesn't only make, sort out and disseminate administrative power yet in addition controls the activity of such power. As regulation is on the double a controller and regulator of individual power as well as friendly power, the Constitution adjusts the clashing interest and gets methodical Government. The motivation behind the Constitution is to direct limitation, refine, control and humanize they could of the Public authority as well as advances joy of all segments of society-finding some kind of harmony between power of Government and the crucial opportunities of Man and Society-an equilibrium which is essential to a free society.
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Objective of study | The object of the study is relate to experience about judicial review and Constitutional Amendments where The duel between High Court and law making body, overwhelmingly battled in the field of activity of legal survey power is examined. |
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Review of Literature | The Parliament has ability to make regulations for the entire of India. This regulative power is not the same as constituent power, which empowers alteration of the Constitution. A Constitution, if unbending, stops the country's development and development of 'living fundamental natural individuals'. The Constitution must be corrected to address the issues of the unique society and to keep up with financial and political fortitude of the country. The requirement for the ability to correct a Constitution can never be disclaimed. It was perceived by the producers of the Indian Constitution when they gave Article 368. It was recognized by the Supreme Court immediately after the adoption of the Constitution in Shankari Prasad v. Union of India.[3] In this case, Supreme Court ruled that Parliament can amend any provision of the Constitution including fundamental rights in accordance with Article 368. It was also not denied by the subsequent case[4], which followed. However the limit of that power has been questioned even in the crying need to change the Constitution. A razor slight greater part in Golaknath decided that part III of the Constitution can't be so revised as to compress or remove Essential Privileges. In Keshavarumda case, by larger part of 7:6 the Court overruled Golaknath and held that Parliament can't in exercise of amendatory power under Article 368 of the Constitution adjust the essential design of the Constitution. There is an impediment on the force of the change by important ramifications. In this manner, there are two speculations the hypothesis of 'fundamental design' and the hypothesis of 'suggested constraint' on revising force of the Parliament. These two speculations are commonly interwoven. The super-power, the correcting power, the constituent power, is cherished in Article 368, which shook the Parliament on many events.This Article itself endured changes and incited such countless juristic debates as well as the milestone for the matchless quality of force of Parliament versus force of legal executive. This Article is perhaps of the most dubious Article in the Constitution. It is by the translation of the Article that the High Court cut out the hypothesis of Essential Construction. It is in this Article that the High Court tracked down the constituent power. |
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Main Text |
The nature and ambit of constituent power has been
depicted in more ways than one. It is depicted as sovereign power not expose to
any constraints at all. It is free of Partition of abilities and involves
regulative, chief and legal powers. It is sui-generis. As per Seervai, the
differentiation among official and constituent power is significant in an
unbending Constitution like our own yet not in an adaptable Constitution. The
unamended Article 368 was said to have the constituent
power as per a few choices of the High Court. Assuming it is viewed as that
Constituent Power is limitless than the lawmaking power, then, at that point,
High Court can't restrict the limitless power. Thusly, the force of Parliament
under Article 368 is unique in relation to the power
practiced by the Constituent Gathering. However both are called Constituent
power, both are not and can't be something very similar. Seervai calls the
power to frame the Constitution as primary power and the power to amend the
constitution as derivative power.[5] Once the constituent
power is exercised in enacting or framing the Constitution, it channels into
judicial, legislative and executive powers. The changing power under Article 368 is no question higher than legal, chief and regulative
powers yet lower than the constituent power in the genuine sense. The
Parliament essentially can practice power looking like the Constituent power
which may extensively be named as "Semi Constituent Power'. It is this
semi constituent power in obvious sense which can be practiced by the
Parliament. Just the Constituent Get together can exercise can practice
Constituent power in evident sense. This semi constituent power has impediments
since it can't do what should be possible by essential Constituent Power
itself. These limits are inferred from the actual idea of the semi
Constitutient power. The power is restricted to the Fundamental Design of the
Constitution. “What is basic structure will depend upon what is vital to Indian
democracy and that cannot be determined except with reference to history,
politics, economy and social milieu in which the Constitution functions.[6] The amendment power outlined by Article 368
is unique and par excellence. However, the concept of “constituent power” was
clearly recognized in Shankari Prasad case[7], where
Patanjali Shastri J. distinguished “constituent “law from “legislative” law. In
that decision which held sway from 1951 to 1967,
the Supreme Court affirmed that Article 368 manifests
“sovereign Constituent Power” which may be exercised to produce “abridgement or
nullification” of fundamental rights by “alterations of the Constitution”. It
saw no difficulty in equating amendatory power with constituent power. In
addition to this, in Sajjan Singh, Chief Justice Gajendragadakar and Justices
Wanchoo Raghubir Dayal, described the power given by article 368
as “comprehensive power”.[8] They declined the invitation
to examine that power “on any theoretical concept of political science that
sovereignty vests in people and that the legislatures are merely the delegates
of the people.”[9] It must be noted here, that the dissentient
judges in Golak Nath left open several questions concerning the nature and
scope of constituent power. Justice Wanchoo noted the Union of India’s argument
that the “power contained in Article 368 is the same
sovereign power possessed by the Constituent Assembly when it made the
Constitution and, therefore, not subject to any fetters of any kind”.[10] However he did not decide whether this was actually so.
Also, Justice Wanchoo observed “it may be open to doubt whether the power of
amendment contained in Article 368 goes to the extent of
completely abrogating the present Constitution and substituting it by an
entirely new one.”[11] Keshavananda invited judicial
consideration of the nature and scope of “constituent power” rather directly.
The six judges[12] led by Justice Ray, regarded
constituent power as sui generis and “Sovereign”. Justice Ray, said: “When the power
under Article 368 exercised, Parliament acts as a
recreation of Constituent Assembly”.[13] Justice Palekar
described the amending power as “sovereign constituent power”.[14]
Justice Dwivedi holds that amending power is a constituent power of the
same order and quality as the power possessed by the Constituent Assembly. He
along with Chandrachud J. also maintained “Parliament acts as a perpetual
Constituent Assembly.”[15] According to John Burgess, a
complete Constitution consists of three fundamental parts. The first and most
important part is the organization of the State for the accomplishment of
future change in the Constitution. This is called the amending clause and the
power it describes and regulates is called the amending power. The second and
third being the Constitution of Liberty and the Constitution of Government. The
amending provision is all the more necessary in the modem world, which is
growing constantly, crowded and complicated, and there is constant pressure on
Constitution for amendment or abandonment. A Constitution, which does not
contain provisions for its amendment with development, growth and expansion of
the community, is the most inadequate and imperfect “deed of partnership.”[16]It could fall to break underneath the tension of public
powers, which it have no control over or oppose, and without assistance of
recreation. The Constitution of a country should be receptive to the changes;
change is the law of the life. Hence to be responsive to the outward changes,
the Constitution must have the essence of workableness and this can be achieved
through an amending clause. Any stagnation is sure to cause steadily depending
discontent and to invite recourse to extra constitutional devices, which border
revolution.[17] Amending the
Indian Constitution has become a serious national joke. It has become something
of a joke because successive Parliaments and State legislatures have amended
the Constitution with ever-increasing alacrity.[18] It is
serious because the Indian Constitution has been amended 86
times. This leads us to ask us some important questions. Such as, • Was the
Indian Constitution planned to be a persevering through system for political,
sacred, financial and social movement for a long time into the future? • Was
the Constitution just a stopgap interstitial game plan to be slashed and
changed at whatever point people with significant influence however it right it
to do as such? Did the Constitution project a specific political belief
system, and was it powerless to change to change to suit the encouragement of
this political philosophy?• Was the Constitution viewed as a simple in-between
time record, completely debatable, to be shaped by the mallet and blacksmith's
iron of future governmental issues? However, an ordinary citizen of India may resolve all
these questions by simply saying:"A Constitution is a Constitution. It
required three years to devise this Constitution. The Constitution was intended
to serve individuals of India for some ages to come. It was to be the
fundamental system by which the legislative issues, financial matters and
public activity of the country were to be run. Every Constitution must be
changed now and again. The Constitution makers very wisely included a power of
amendment to make these adjustments possible.”[19] This is obviously, a speculative assertion, yet here is
no question that it addresses a presence of mind mentality to the Constitution
and the aim of the designers of the Constitution. The Constitution was to be
sure assigned to be what an unfamiliar notice has called "the foundation
of a country. However, this is only the hypothesis behind the Indian Constitution.
Functional encounters were very unique one. The Constituent Get together, which
declared the Indian Constitution itself, turned into India's most memorable
Parliament in 1950-51. Peculiarly, similar individuals who
had made the "foundation of the country" themselves chipped this
foundation. They authorized the Primary Revision to the Constitution. This
Revision wail to remove property privileges of specific landowners to
additional the reason for agrarian change and the rearrangement of rustic
property. As a matter of fact, the Main Change of the Constitution only looked
to give impact to specific strategies, which the Constituent Gathering had
consented to effectuate. The Principal Correction subsequently did a
maintenance work. The Constitution had gotten a hole on the grounds that the
Courts had supposedly misjudged the genuine Goals of the Constituent Gathering.
The Principal Alteration looked to clear the misconception; fix the break and
yet again send off the Constitution. The Principal architects who enlightened the Constituent
Gathering were extraordinary legal advisers, experienced legislators and
legislators. They formed Article 368 after intensive and
significant consultations. Simultaneously conversation in the Constituent
gathering a proposition of putting express constraints on changing power
relevantly figured. The subject of restricting the force of Parliament to
correct the Constitution is a topic of significant conversation both in the
High Court as well as in Parliament. This has produced tremendous measure of
debate, however accommodated for a brief time. However one isn't certain
concerning when the contention might additionally restore, since the approach
producers of every Parliament might want to execute their commitments and
affirmations they have given, without, in some cases, diving deep into the
repercussions on the general assessment. In Golak Nath, the contradicting
passes judgment on distinguished the amendatory power as "Constituent
power" to "change the central regulation" The Twenty fourth
Amendment brought into the text of the Constitution the idea of
"constituent power" both in article 368 and
article 13. Thus, the High Court till 1967
had likewise conceded that Parliament has entire ability to revise the
Constitution. The mistaken understanding of article 13 and
article 368 made by the High court in Golaknath
constrained the Parliament to alter Article 13 and 368 by the Constitution 24th Amendment Act,
1971. What was implied in Article 368
was made unequivocally clear by that Change. When the Constitution 24th Amendment was challenged in Keshavananda Bharati, all
thirteen judges, by a unanimous vote, upheld the impugned Amendment Act. They
clearly reasserted the plenary power of amendment of the Parliament. A close
scrutiny of Keshavananda Bharati reveals that if there emerged any clear and
unambiguous ratio decidendi; it is unanimous opinion of all the thirteen
judges, on the constitutional validity of 24th Amendment.[20] The composers of a Constitution were never unaware of the
way that in the working of the Constitution numerous hardships would need to be
experienced, and that it is past the insight of one age to hit upon for all
time useful answer for all issues which might be looked by the State in its
ahead walk towards additional advancement. In some cases, a legal understanding
might make a constitution expansive based and put life into dry bones of a
Constitution to gain it vehicle on country's headway. Events may likewise
emerge where legal translations might deny a few arrangements of the
Constitution or a piece of its viability as was mulled over by the Designers of
the Constitution. If no provision is madder for the amendment of the
Constitution, the people would be left without remedy except recourse to extra
constitutional methods of changing the Constitution by revolution or the like.
As observed by Mukherjee J. “a Constitution which cannot be constitutionally
amended is an invitation to revolution.”[21]According to
Finer, the amending clause is so fundamental to a Constitution that it may be
called Constitution itself. The amending clause is the most crucial part of the
constitution.[22] As per John Stuart Plant; no Constitution can be
anticipated to be super durable except if it ensures progress as well as
request. Human social orders develop and create with the pass of time, and
except if arrangement is made for such protected re-changes, as their
improvement requires, they should deteriorate it retrogress. The apparatus of
change, it has been said, ought to resemble wellbeing valve, so formulated as
neither to work the machine with too extraordinary office nor to expect, all
together getting under way, and an aggregation of power adequate to detonate
it. The letter of Constitution must neither be idolized as a sacred instrument
with that mistaken conservatism which clings to its own wornout garments until
the body is ready to perish from cold, nor it ought to be made plaything of
politicians, to be tempered with and degraded to the level of an ordinary
statute.[23] The designers of the Indian constitution were aware of
the attractiveness of accommodating the desire for change with the need of
congruity. Change with coherence implies progress. The Constitution-producers
found some kind of harmony between the risk of having non-amendable
Constitution and a Constitution, which is excessively effectively amendable. As
a matter of fact the primary issue before the designers of the Constitution
comprised in finding some kind of harmony among unbending nature and adaptability.
No Constitution of a country on the planet has been corrected so often inside
brief time frame as India's. The inquiry emerges: Was the Constitution too
quickly drafted by unpracticed sketchers who neglected to think about the
ramifications of social, financial, political and lawful parts of India's life?
Answer would be "No" in light of the fact that the India's
constitution was drafted by educated legal advisers, who required three years
to finish this work, subsequent to concentrating the greater part of the
current Constitutions of the world and embracing such of their arrangements as
were viewed as appropriate to Indian life. Allow us to look at this response.
The drafting of altering arrangement began in June 1947 when the Association Constitution Panel started its
gathering. The Draft Constitution of K. T. Shah given that revisions ought to
initially be passed by a 66% larger part in each Place of
Parliament and afterward be endorsed by a comparative larger part of
Commonplace Councils and supported by most of the populace in a referendum.443 K. M. Munshi's Draft Constitution required a 66%
larger part in each Place of Parliament and confirmation by one portion
of the regions. Notwithstanding, B. N. Rau, the sacred counsel to the Public
authority of India assumed his remarkable part with respect to the changing
arrangement. His view was that a changing bill ought to be passed by a 66% greater part in Parliament and sanctioned by a like greater
part of Common Councils. However, he needed to embed a 'expulsion of-troubles
provision in the Constitution so parliament could make transformations and
changes' in the Constitution by revising it through a normal demonstration of
regulation. This removal-of difficulties clause was to remain in force for three
years from the commencement of the derived from Art. 51 of
the Irish Constitution.[24] K. M. Munshi also supported
Rau on this point and he justified it on the ground that: “In framing a
Constitution as we are doing under a great pressure, there are likely to be
left several defects; and it is not necessary that we should have a very
elaborate and rigid scheme for amending these provisions in the first three
years.”[25] Moreover, many members have apprehensions that
the Constitution might turn out to be bad when put into practice because this
was the first attempt to frame a Constitution and they lacked experience of
Constitution-making.[26] In October 1947 Rau
went to Europe to counsel different judges and legislators of the U.S.A.,
Canada and Ireland. The majority of them upheld him on an arrangement for
simple change of the constitution in the initial three as opposed to five years
of the Constitution. Rau composed a letter to Dr. Prasad, the Leader of the
Gathering who passed the data to the Drafting Board of trustees and to the Get
together. Yet, the Drafting board dismissed the proposition of embedding a
statement for simple change of the Constitution in the Momentary Arrangements.
However the arrangement was dismissed, yet the rule of simple correction was
taken on in that in certain articles it has been given that specific matters
can be changed by a basic larger part in Parliament. According to Granville
Austin, “it appears that Rau was stretching the customary meaning of a
removal-of-difficulties clause into a device for the easy amendment of the
Constitutionthe need for which he strongly believed.”[27] Subsequent
to arriving at the finish of this long excursion, one understands that the last
structure and shape which Workmanship. 368 accomplished,
arose out of a hard skirmish of thoughts inclining toward unbending nature from
one perspective, and adaptability on the other, in some cases unbending nature
having the high ground and some of the time adaptability making progress. In
this battle occurring for the most part in the boards of trustees, allies of
unbending nature persevered firmly and were not ready to yield. All in all,
adaptability appears to have endured extensively, however it entered through
the secondary passage. This will clarify in the accompanying sections in which
Workmanship. 368 itself will be exposed to minute
examination and through investigation. The simplicity or trouble with which a
Constitution might be revised has come to be involved by sacred scholars as the
essential proportion of its 'adaptability' or 'unbending nature'. By this
Measuring stick the Indian Constitution during the 10 years
and a portion of its presence has demonstrated truly adaptable as a matter of
fact excessively adaptable for the pundits who charge that the 'holiness' of
the Constitution is dismissed or light he4artedly
disregarded. Consequently, the three components of the revising system were
compromises worked out by the Drafting Board of trustees, and were planned, as
Dr. Ambedakar said while presenting the Draft Constitution, to accomplish an
adaptable organization. The trade off was between a little gathering of Get
together individuals, who suggested the reception of a changing cycle like that
of the US, and a to some degree bigger gathering that pushed correction of the
whole Constitution, basically during an underlying period, by a straightforward
greater part of Parliament. As time continued on, the Constitution was revised
consistently. The people who upheld the revisions safeguarded by saying that the
projected changes were, as a matter of fact, something like fix occupations
intended to give impact to the genuine expectations of the Initial architects.
Presently, the genuine inquiry is: Were this multitude of Sacred Revisions
truly fix occupations? Have they, as a matter of fact, been ordered to give
impact to the genuine goals of the Initial architects? Changes to the
Constitution have, in any case, gone on. A portion of these changes have been
exceptionally unusual, in that it would be hard to relate the reason for these
revisions with goal of the Initial architects. Simultaneously another
hypothesis of sacred change was additionally advanced. The new hypothesis
depended on the possibility that the Indian constitution can be revised over
and over to safeguard the eventual fate of the Indian nation all in all. This
new hypothesis has extremely wide ramifications. It proposed that each
progressive Parliament or party in power could conclude what India's future
requirements were and change the Constitution appropriately. It comprised huge
change in way to deal with the utilization of force of alteration. As a matter
of fact, the Constitution of India is a public legacy; it ought to be corrected
just when it is felt by individuals that revision is fundamental. |
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Conclusion |
Assuming we dissect the choice of the beyond fifty years, one of the unmistakable highlights of the Indian governmental issues is the contention between the Court and the Parliament-chief. Each of you choices looked for to draw certain lines on the activity of political power, and each came about into the contention between the Court and the public authority. Any organization which, because of moves it makes, can ruin a Government which has at its order larger part support in Parliament is a significant political institution. The more the court manages significant policy centered issues, the more the court can be seen as a significant political establishment. This is conceivable simply because the weapon of legal audit power-the capacity to upset or invalidate choices of the Bureau and Parliament. Legal audit puts the Court in political cycle. The entirety thought of judicial survey, its raison d’être, is that the court ought to act as brake-addressing a super durable regulation, controlling the impulses of sitting administrators, if fundamental "battling" the results of political process, for the sake of a higher law. In this way, legal survey empowers the Court to restrict leader and regulative power, and, it can put forth these lines more remarkable than individuals of this nation set for them. In this setting the Court has guaranteed and practiced the force of legal audit not exclusively to dismiss regulation yet since Golaknath and Keshavananda, the Court has expanded its power than some other established court on the planet and negated protected correction. Also, this case of the Court, in exercise of its legal survey ability to choose the legitimacy of sacred changes, furthermore, that too which have been propelled by what the prevailing political first class has viewed as deviant, has been subject of a lot discussion. The outcome is this, as a rule, the Public authority's reaction to an unfriendly choice has been a modification of the regulation found needing by the Court, along lines proposed by the court. In any case, the official reaction to a critical number of significant choices that have conflicted with the public authority has been a work to evade such choices through alteration of the Constitution, the shielding of certain regulation from court examination in the 10th Timetable, the contriving of new constraints on the Court's power, or another step accepted equipped for tackling the issue introduced by the Court. Of 45 changes authorized between 1951-1980, 21 tried to restrict the practice of judicial power. Thus, legal assurance that a specific demonstration or mandate is illegal or generally ultra virus rarely settles the matter or on the other hand brings about the issue being taken out from the political plan. The Court asserts that the Constitution Court says it is, and indeed, even cases the ability to decide the legitimacy of protected revisions. The truth, notwithstanding, is that the Parliament-chief gives intense rivalry with regards to deciphering the Constitution. To be sure, starting around 1950, the accompanying situation has been rehashed on various events. Parliament passes a regulation, distressed party intrigues move to the Court, and case that rule encroaches their naturally ensured freedoms, the Court concurs furthermore, proclaims the law invalid to a limited extent or its completely, Parliament answers either by passing a reconsidered rendition of the action with the expectation of either meeting the adjudicator's analysis or making their purpose all the more clear, or makes the more grounded stride of sanctioning a sacred revision intended to dispense with the court's survey powers in work to dispose of additional legal detours in the topic region, the abused party then, at that point, gets back to the courts with the contention that this administrative reaction is to unavoidably needing here and there. At this point, the appointed authorities either give their favors on the resolution or alteration, or track down it naturally needing once more, and consequently, inciting another official reaction, more suit, one more decision by the Court, almost ceaselessly. These chains of occasions and there have been a few replays of this situation including muddled and close to home property freedoms land change remuneration issue. In this way, neither court choice nor parliamentary reactions are the last word, which comprise the demonstration of extensive and complex political show, and that victors are frequently challenging to recognize. |
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References | 1. AIR 1980 SC 1789
2. Prof. k. C. Where, “Modem Constitutions”, p. 143
3. Shankari Prasad V. Union of India. AIR 1951 SC
4. Sajjan Singh v. State of v. State of Punjab
5. Seervai, Indian Constitutional law, 2nd Edition
6. S. P. Sathe, “Constitutional Amendments: 1950-1988, p. 94
7. Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 458
8. Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajsthan, AIR 1965 SC 845
9. ibid at 858
10. Golaknath at 1679
11. ibid
12. M. H. Beg, D. G. Palekar, K. K. Mathew, Y V. Chandrachud, A. N. Ray, Dwivedi, J.J.
13. Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461 at para 532
14. ibid at 676
15. ibid at 986
16. P. H. Lane, “Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth”, p. 989 as cited by A. Lakshminath in Basic Structure and Constitutional Amendments: Limitations and Justifiability, p. 31
17. Rose Water, “A curious Chapter in Constitution changing” in Political Science Quarterly, 409 (1921), p. 36
18. Rajeev Dhavan, “The Amendment: Conspiracy or Revolution” p. 1, Wheeler Publishing, 1978
19. Granville Austin, “Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of Nation” Oxford University Press
20. P.K.Tripathi, “Keshavananda Bharati v,. State of Kerala, who wins? Published in The Fundamental Rights Case- The critics speak, p. 89, Edited by S. Malik, 1975
21. H. R. Khanna, Judicial review of confrontation, P. 4
22. Finer, “The theory and Practice of Modem Government”, p. 34, Vol. I, 1932
23. Jameson, “Amending the Constitution
24. Shah, Draft Constitution, I. N. A. Cited by Austin, p. 257
25. Rau B. N„ “India’s Constitution in the Making', p. 96, 1960
26. Rau, Draft Constitution, cl. 238 Cited by Hari Chad, Amending Process in the Indian Constitution, p. 12
27. Constituent Assembly Debate Vol. IV, I, P. 546 |