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The third-largest body of water on the planet is the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean is sometimes referred to as the "sea of stability." Carrying two-thirds of the world's oil shipments and one-third of the world's bulk cargo traffic, the Indian Ocean is a vital conduit for worldwide trade and transportation. Minerals, natural gas, and oil are abundant in the Indian Ocean, which is a very wealthy region. The area is essential to the economic dynamism of both Asia and Europe. The Indo-Pacific region, and more specifically the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), are becoming the focal points of almost all major powers due to a shift in geopolitical and economic priorities. This paper deals with the significance of the Indian Ocean region and the role played by India in the Indian Ocean region. Moreover, it also delves into the expansionist policy followed by China in the Indian Ocean region, its implications on India, and countermeasures taken by India. 

To analyse how China’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean Region impacts India, giving rise to security and economic concerns in the region. 

The Indian Ocean acts as a vital strategic link between India and the countries in its near and wider maritime neighbourhood. India's interests in the Indian Ocean are intrinsically tied to both its national and economic goals.  India's goal of "SAGAR," which stands for "Security and Growth for all in the region" and means "ocean," clearly demonstrates its position in the region (India’s Efforts to Strengthen Indian Ocean Security | Council on Foreign Relations, n.d.).

In terms of global strategy, the Indian Ocean has long had a special role. To safeguard their strategic interests, several countries have made their way into the area. But India has never wavered in its support of maintaining the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace (Brewster, 2010, p. 10). India's new maritime security strategy is outlined in detail in "Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy," a document released by the Indian Navy. It makes clear that, among many other countries and regions, the Indian Navy's interest areas include the Red Sea, the Gulf of Oman, the Gulf of Aden, IOR Island nations, the Southwest Indian Ocean, and littoral countries along the East Coast of Africa. India's readiness for a pivotal role in the region is demonstrated by the Malabar Exercise and other bilateral drills with states such as Indonesia, as well as by re-engaging with the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and South Pacific, island nations. With the delivery of the Indian-built patrol boat Barracuda to Mauritius, the stationing of P-8I planes in Seychelles to monitor its exclusive economic zone, and the agreements to establish connectivity infrastructure in Agalega, Mauritius, India's efforts to secure the Indian Ocean have already started to take tangible form (India’s Ambitions in the Indian Ocean Region – South Asian Voices, n.d.).

India has been actively involved in relief efforts for natural disasters and humanitarian causes. It helped not just Indians but other nations were also saved. For instance, India has extended its efforts to disaster relief in other nations. Following the 2004 tsunami, it provided aid to Indonesia and Sri Lanka; following Cyclones Nargis and Sidr, it assisted Myanmar; and following Cyclone Roanu, it assisted Bangladesh.

In 2014, India sent "water aid" to Male, the capital of the Maldives, as part of "Operation Neer," following the destruction of the largest water treatment plant's generator by fire.

The Indian Navy's publication, the India Maritime Security Strategy, outlines the nation's maritime policy. According to this, India is committed to the following in the Indian Ocean region: ensuring a safe, secure, and stable area; strengthening security cooperation by stepping up surveillance and monitoring with regional partners; creating a multilateral cooperative maritime security initiative in the Indian Ocean to fight piracy and terrorism; strengthening ties with the local populace on a cultural level; and positioning the Indian Ocean region as a frontier for sustainable economic development. The Joint Strategic Vision between India and the US, Japan's participation in the Malabar Exercise, bilateral exercises with nations like Japan, Australia, and Indonesia, and the signing of Mutual Logistics Support Agreements with the US, France, and Singapore demonstrate India's readiness for its crucial role in the region (Review of “Defining U.S. Indian Ocean Strategy” | Intelligence Analysis | 笹川平和財団| 海洋情報 FROM THE OCEANS, n.d.).

India's approach to the Indian Ocean is focused on ensuring political stability and security for its "maritime neighbourhood," which comprises the Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Sri Lanka, in the face of China's growing naval and strategic manoeuvres in the region.

Mausam Project would enable India to build a new "Indian Ocean world" along the Indian Ocean's shoreline and restore relations with its historic trading partners.

India- China relationship challenges

The relationship challenges between India and China is not a thing of today rather it first flared with the Indo-Sino War, also known as the Indo-China War, of 1962. Relationship dynamics between the two range from economic disputes (intersection of interests leading to competition between two) to border disputes (dispute along LAC, Galwan valley dispute, Doklam issue) to maritime disputes (establishment of various naval and ports encircling the Indian Ocean- String Of Pearls strategy) (India vs China: The String of Pearls and Belt & Road, n.d.).

India has mostly had to deal with numerous maritime security issues because of China stationing troops in the Indian Ocean. The only way for India's strategic influence to grow if it is to become a great power is beyond the oceans, according to former Secretary of the Indian Foreign Ministry Rajiv Sikri. There are strong restrictions in every other direction (Brewster, 2010, p. 2). Historically speaking, India has faced major threats from its North West Frontier (NWF). These threats have evolved over the period, with threats from NWF and the Northeastern boundary of India with China and the Indian Ocean Region. China's trade, especially in the energy sector, depends on a stable, peaceful, and secure Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean is traversed by nine out of China's top 10 exporters of crude oil. China uses the Indian Ocean as a main transit area while travelling across the vast ocean to engage with the Middle East, Africa, island nations, and littoral regions. Beyond that, it is the primary commercial route connecting Europe and China. Europe maintains almost 35 per cent of its exports to Asia and has 4 out of its 10 major trade partners in the IOR. Thus, China's interest in the Indian Ocean is evident, at least from an economic perspective. There is no denying China's geopolitical interest in the Indian Ocean, and this interest will only increase (Surrounding the Ocean: PRC Influence in the Indian Ocean - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, n.d.). Despite its reputation as a newcomer to the region, Beijing maintains diplomatic and political connections with numerous littoral states on the other side of the Indian Ocean. As an illustration, China is the only country having an embassy in each of the six Indian Ocean islands—Malaysia, Comoros, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Mauritius. The US, the UK, India, France, and other traditional players do not have embassies in all six. In contrast to the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, who have long-standing sovereignty disputes resulting from decolonization, China does not possess any territory or sovereignty problems in the Indian Ocean. In the region, Beijing is frequently regarded as an alternative and a welcome player. Hence, despite the constraint of distance between Chinese ports and the Indian Ocean, Beijing has effectively increased the size of its military presence in the region. Beijing now has an increasing presence of People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) warships and submarine deployments performing naval operations in the northern Indian Ocean, compared to having a minor military presence in the region during the 1990s. Regular exercises have been conducted by China in the eastern Indian Ocean since 2014. Through its overseas naval station in Djibouti, China has cemented its presence in the western margins of the region. It is not unexpected that Beijing's marine calculations place the Indian Ocean higher (Izuyama & Kurita, n.d., p. 44).

China’s String of Pearls Strategy:

Defence and strategic analysts from both the United States and India used this phrase to describe China's main aim to encircle India by building ports and airports in the nations that surround it. The phrase "String of Pearls" was initially used in 2005 in a report named "Energy Futures in Asia," which defence contractor Booz Allen Hamilton gave to US Defence Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. It claimed that China was constructing bases from the Middle East to Southern China using the "string of pearls" tactic (Growing Chinese Presence in the Indian Ocean: Prospects and Challenges Prospects and Challenges on JSTOR, n.d., p. 73).

These "pearls" were Chinese-built naval bases or electronic espionage installations in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Myanmar. Protecting its commerce exports and its abroad power were the main goals. Another crucial element of China's "String of Pearls" strategy is the deep seaport of Gwadar, located in Balochistan, Pakistan. In addition, China has a substantial presence throughout the South China Sea and IOR through the Chinese base in Burma, Chinese intelligence activities, Chinese-established facilities at the Bay of Bengal, the Kra Isthmus proposal towards the Thai authorities, and military pacts with the Cambodian authorities" (India vs China: The String of Pearls and Belt & Road, n.d.), posing a security threat to India through waters.

However, this policy of China holds strategic and economic impact as well, besides the maritime impact discussed above. Strategically speaking, since China lacks an opening in the Indian Ocean, the String of Pearls will indicate that China is encircling India to be the location of the Indian Ocean. There will be a reduction in India's current strategic influence in the Indian Ocean. Countries that now consider India as a member in reaction to China might eventually come to rule China. Economically, the allocation of Indian resources will go towards defence and security (China and India Jostle in the Indian Ocean, n.d.). As a result, the economy of the nation will not grow to its full potential, impeding economic progress. Instability throughout the nation particularly in the southeast and east could result from it.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI):

In September 2013, President Xi gave several speeches in Kazakhstan and Indonesia to introduce the BRI. The programme has its origins in China's longstanding role in promoting trade and commerce along the historic Silk Road routes that linked Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road are the two main parts of the BRI that were initially developed. The strategy's Economic Belt component seeks to establish and broaden land links for travel and trade between Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia, and Asia. In the meantime, plans for extended marine routes via Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia make up the Maritime Road component (China’s Belt and Road Initiative Turns 10. Here’s What to Know | World Economic Forum, n.d.).

Image Source: (The Unprecedented Promises – and Threats – of the Belt and Road Initiative, n.d.)

However, not every project under BRI is financially feasible, raising the possibility of their inclusion being motivated by geopolitics or other factors. For example, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has no economic rationale; rather, its strategic components, such as the port, have been put into action first. Some of the world's most dangerous and chaotic areas will be crossed by the CPEC. The fact that it passes through Indian territory that is occupied by Pakistan adds another layer of complexity for India, and investing heavily in that premise appears to validate and legitimise that occupation (China and India’s Intense Contest for Influence – The Diplomat, n.d.).

India needs the cooperation of the surrounding island states to become a powerful maritime force to oppose China's rise in the Indian Ocean. A framework for international relationships that is inclusive and sustainable is required for the Indian Ocean Region. To safeguard its fundamental security interests in the Indian Ocean, India must further enhance, fortify, and expand its security cooperation with regional allies like the United States, Japan, Australia, and Seychelles, as well as with regional partners like Sri Lanka.

The Indian navy's ambition to serve as the provider of net security has not yet fully materialised, despite recent maritime outreach to smaller island states. Innovation and R&D must be prioritised if biotechnology, marine biology, and ocean energy are to achieve significant market shares (India, China and the Indian Ocean: Reading the Tea Leaves and Preventing Coercion, n.d.)

Recently, India has begun to work on dual-use logistics facilities and other infrastructure development projects in Mauritius and the Seychelles.  India wants to improve the Agaléga Islands' infrastructure in Mauritius. An agreement was made in 2015 by Mauritius and India to upgrade the aviation and sea infrastructure on Agaléga Island.

The Mauritian government has disregarded the Agaléga islanders' knowledge that building a naval base would force them to relocate because they want India to continue sending its money through Mauritius, their main foreign direct investment source (Ghosh, n.d., p. 148).

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