The ‘Republic’ is a classical work of political philosophy that examines the nature of justice and its application on society. This is arguably one of the most influential works of philosophy in Western civilization, written by Plato around 380 BC. The Republic or Concerning Justice is the greatest work of Plato and presents his thoughts fully. The work was completed by Plato when he was around forty years of age. The work represents the ripeness of his ideas and philosophy. It consists of ten books which deal with both moral and political principles. It also includes within its compass the metaphysical, educational, sociological and host of other problems. In this dialogue, Plato presents his vision of an ideal state, which is governed by a tripartite theory of justice. This theory proposes that justice is comprised of three distinct parts – reason, spirit and appetite – which corresponds the three classes of individuals in society: philosopher kings or rulers, warriors, and producers. This research paper delves into the concept of “Justice” as proposed by the ancient Greek philosopher, Plato in his classic work, the Republic and examines the central role of poetic justice in Plato’s ideal state, and its influence on the formation of a just society.

This paper will examine the central role of poetic justice in Plato’s utopian state, and its influence on the formation of a just society. Through an analysis of key passages from the Republic, the research explores the practical application of poetic justice in various aspects of society, including education, governance and the distribution of wealth. In short, this paper aims to highlight the significance of poetic justice in Plato’s Republic and its lasting impact on the pursuit of justice and morality in society.

Plato’s “Republic” is a classical philosophical work that touches on various aspects of justice, including poetic justice. ‘The Republic’ or ‘Concerning Justice’ is the greatest work of Plato and represents his thoughts fully. The work was written by Plato when he was around forty years of age and represents the ripeness of his ideas and philosophy. It consists of ten books and deals with both political and moral principles. It also includes within its compass the metaphysical, educational, sociological and host of other problems.

There are some books which delve into the relationship between “The Republic” and the concept of justice though these works are not directly related to the application of poetic justice in “The Republic”. Some of them are-

1. ‘Plato’s ‘Republic’: A Reader’s Guide by Mark L. McPherran- This book provides an in-depth analysis of “The Republic” and explores its themes of justice, including its connection to poetic justice.[1]

2. “The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic” edited by G.R.F. Ferrari – This collection of essays offer different perspectives on various aspects of “The Republic” including its treatment of justice, and how it relates to poetic justice.[2]

3. “The Idea of Justice” by Amartya Sen – While not exclusively about “The Republic,” this book delves into different conceptions of justice, drawing on the ideas of various philosophers, including Plato. It discusses how different aspects of justice, including poetic justice can be understood in a contemporary context.[3] Sen’s intimacy with the Hindu, Buddhist and Muslim cultures of India, which is beautifully woven into the book, gives him access to a greater range of argumentation and reasoning than is common among philosophers who were educated exclusively in the Western analytical tradition. His knowledge of this vast cultural history and his profound respect for it is an important source of Sen’s humility in recognizing the essential plurality of legitimate claims- in rejecting any source of monism in the life. His work serves as an eloquent and human testimony to the power of reason, which respects the multiplicity of voices and traditions. Reason seeks truth where it may be found.

4. “The Philosophical Challenge of September 11” edited by Tom Rockmore and Joseph Margolis – This work features essays discussing Plato’s “Republic” in the context on the contemporary issues, including justice and poetic justice.[4]

5. “Poetic Justice- Rereading Plato’s Republic” by Jill Frank - Plato set his dialogues in the fifth century BC, when written texts were disseminated primarily by performance and recitation. He wrote them in the fourth century, when literacy was expanding. Jill Frank argues that there are to be gained from appreciating Plato’s dialogues as written texts to be read and reread. At the center of these insights is the analogy in the dialogues between becoming literate and coming to know or understand something, and two different ways of learning to read. One approach treats literacy as a top-down affair, in which authoritative teachers lead students to true beliefs. Another, recommended by Socrates in the Republic, encourages trial and error and the formation of beliefs based on student’s cognitive and sensory experiences. The approach to learning to read aligns with philosophy with authoritative knowledge and politics as rule by philosopher-kings. Following the second approach, poetic justice argues that the Republic neither endorses nor enforces fixed hierarchies in knowledge and politics but offers instead an education in ethical and political self-governance, one that prompts individual to challenge all claims to authority, including those of philosophy. Frank argues, Plato offers up not a critique of desire, but a counter-desire, accessible to anyone, ‘for fallible self-knowledge, wisdom, and truth as the basic conditions of ethics, politics, and philosophy.[5]

6.  “A Theory of Justice” by Johan Rawls - The principles of justice set forth in this work are those that free and rational people would accept in an initial position of equality. In this hypothetical situation, which corresponds to the state of nature in social contract theory, no one knows his place in society; his class position or social status; his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities; his intelligence, strength, and the like; or even his conception of the good. Thus, deliberating behind a veil of ignorance, people determine their rights and duties. The first section of A Theory of Justice addresses objections to the theory and discusses alternative positions, especially utilitarianism. Rawls then applies his theory to the philosophical basis of constitutional liberties, the problem of distributive justice, and the grounds and limits of political duty and obligation. He includes here a discussion of civil disobedience and conscientious objection. Finally, he connects his theory of justice with a doctrine of the good and moral development. This enables him to formulate a conception of society as a union of social unions, and to use his theory of justice to explain the values of community.[6]

In literature, poetic justice is an ideal form of justice in which the good characters are rewarded and the evil characters are punished, by an ironic twist of fate. English drama critic, Thomas Rymer coined the phrase in ‘The Tragedies of the Last Age Considered (1678)’ to describe how a work should inspire moral behavior in its audience by illustrating triumph of good over evil. The demand of poetic justice is consistent in classical authorities and shows up in Horace, Plutarch and Quintillion. So, Rymer’s phrasing is a reflection of a commonplace. Philip Sidney, in “The Defence of Poesy (1595)”, argued that poetic justice was, in fact the reason that fiction should be allowed in a civilized nation. It is a strong literary view that all forms of literature must convey moral lessons. In other words, poetic justice in literature is an outcome in which vice is punished and virtue rewarded, usually in a manner peculiarly or ironically appropriate. Notably, poetic justice does not merely require that vice be punished and virtue rewarded, but also that logic triumph. If for example a character is dominated by greed for most of a romance or a drama they can’t be generous. The action of a play, poem or fiction must obey the rules of logic as well as ‘morality’. A work of literature should uphold moral principles and instruct the reader in correct moral behavior. Generally the purpose or function of poetic justice in literature is to adhere by the universal code of morality in that virtue triumphs vice. The idea of idea of poetic justice in literary texts manifests the moral principle that virtue deserves a reward, and vices earn punishment. In addition, readers often identify themselves with good characters. They feel emotionally attached to them, and feel for them when they suffer at the hands of the wicked characters. Naturally, readers want the good characters to triumph and be rewarded; but they equally wish the bad characters to be penalized for their evilness. Thus, poetic justice offers contentment and resolution. Hence it can be said that the theory of poetic justice gained prominence in various literary works and has been used to emphasize the moral and ethical dimensions of storytelling. Poetic justice can be found in numerous plays, novels and other forms of literature throughout the history reflecting societies’ desire for moral balance and resolution in storytelling. “The Republic” wholly verifies these principles. 

The Republic or Concerning Justice is the greatest work of Plato and presents his thoughts fully. The work was completed by Plato when he was around forty years of age. The work represents the ripeness of his ideas and philosophy. It consists of ten books which deal with both moral and political principles. It also includes within its compass the metaphysical, educational, sociological and host of other problems. In the words of Nettleship, “The whole Republic is really an attempt to interpret real nature psychologically; the postulates upon which its methods rest is that all the institutions of society, class, organization, law, religion and so on ultimately products of the human soul and inner principle of life which works itself out in these outward shapes.”[7] Prof. Barker also says, “It is an attempt at a complete philosophy of man. Primarily, it is concerned with man in action, and it is therefore occupied with the problems of moral and political life. But man is a whole: his action cannot be understood apart from his thinking; and therefore the Republic is also a philosophy of man in thought and of the laws of his thinking. Viewed in this way, as a complete philosophy of man, the Republic forms a single and organic whole.”[8]  The Republic of Plato starts with the proposition what is a good man and how one can become so. As no one can live outside the society and this naturally leads him to the problem as to what is a good state? Plato says that a good state must have a philosopher king who possesses the knowledge of good and reality. As regards the methods through which the state can take the individual to the ultimate good, Plato advocates the instruments of education which produces good citizens which solves many of our social and economic problems. Thus we find that in Republic Plato starts with ethics and enter in the domain of politics, sociology, metaphysics, education etc. Plato is able to deal with so many subjects in Republic because during his times no rigid division of subjects was made. Further the life of Greek so much unified that no distinction was made between politics and religion. The use of dialectical method and the system of dialogue also helped Plato to cover various subjects in his discussion. The use of such a broad field could have not been possible under any other method. Thus, viewed in its divisions, it would almost seem to fall into a number of treatises, each occupied with its separate subject. There is a treatise on metaphysics, which exhibits the unity of all things in the Idea of Good. There is a treatise on moral philosophy, which investigates the virtues of the human soul, and shows their union and perfection in justice. In this chapter this part will be discussed in details. There is a treatise on education. According to Rousseau, “The Republic is not a work upon politics, but the finest treatise on education that ever was written.”[9] There is a treatise on political science, which depicts the polity, and the social institutions, especially in respect of property and marriage, which should be in an ideal state. Again there is a treatise as it were on the philosophy of history, which explains the process of historical change and the gradual decline of the ideal state into tyranny. But all these treatises are woven into one, because all these subjects as yet were one. There was no rigorous differentiation of knowledge into separate studies, such as Aristotle afterwards suggested, rather than himself made. He wrote separate treaties, the Metaphysics, the Ethics, and the Politics. But political science and moral philosophy, at any rate, are in his eyes, still one and indivisible. It must be admitted, however, that the separate treaties on ethics and politics tend to diverge not only on name, but also in spirit, the realistic tone of Books IV-VI of the Politics show little trace of an ethical point of view.

The philosophy of man stood as one subject, confronting as equal or superior to the other subjects of philosophy of nature. The question which Plato sets himself to answer was simply this: What is a good man and how is a good man made? Such a question might seem to belong to moral philosophy and to moral philosophy alone. But to Greeks it was obvious that a good man must be a member of a State, and could be made good only through the membership of a State. Upon the first question, therefore a second question naturally followed: What is the good State, and how is good state made? Moral philosophy thus ascends into political science: and the two joined in one, must climb still further. To a follower of Socrates it was plain that a good man must be possessed of knowledge. A third question therefore arose: What is the ultimate knowledge of which a good man must possess in order to be good? It is for metaphysics to be answered; and when metaphysics has given its answer, still a fourth question emerges- by what methods will the good state lead its citizens towards the ultimate knowledge which is the condition of virtue? To answer this question, a theory of education is required; and indeed a readjustment of social conditions seems necessary to Plato if his scheme of education is to work satisfactorily, a reconstruction of social life must also be attempted, and a new economics must reinforce the new pedagogy. As Barker says, “In brief, the Republic is a ‘philosophy of mind’ in all its manifestations; and the modern work with which it may most easily be compared is that section of Hegel’s sketch of philosophy entitled the ‘philosophy of mind’, in which he discusses the inner operations of mind as consciousness and as conscience, its external manifestations in law and social morality (the sphere of the State), and its ‘absolute’ activity in art, religion and philosophy. It has been suggested[10] that mainspring of the Republic is Plato’s aversion to contemporary capitalism and his desire to substitute a new scheme of socialism. This would make the Republic an economic treatise; and the author of the suggestion enforces his point by attempting to show that in contemporary Greece the struggle is between capital and labour, and that in Plato we find vivid sense of evils of this struggle and an attempt to deal with those evils by means of socialistic remedies. Hence, he thinks, comes his attack on private property and his proposal to abolish the use of money.” But Plato says that it is the guardian alone who will have neither silver nor gold; from which one may gather that the other classes of the State use the precious metals.[11] Aristotle, equally with Plato, is brought into line with the theory; for through Aristotle does not commit himself to the socialistic attack upon property, he never the less (it is urged) advocates a simple economy in kind; he attacks money in the very spirit of Plato; and he even goes beyond Plato in attacking trade as a species of robbery. The objection which naturally occurs – that such a theory means the importation of modern socialism, which is a revolt against a complex system of production, into the far simpler conditions of the economic life of the Greeks – is met by reply that those conditions were not simple. Credit was highly developed in the city-state: overseas trade was abundant in a city like Coritnth. Usury was not merely the loan of money to needy farmers, but a vast system running through commerce; and the attacks of philosophers on interest (Zins) indicate a socialistic propaganda, such as today connected with attacks upon profits (Kapitalzins). Whatever may be the truth of the view of Greek economics which such a theory postulates, it is difficult to agree with the view of Greek political thought which it suggests or to admit that the reform of the State proposed by Plato as meant as an economic reform of an economic evil. Plato may touch upon economic questions; but he always regards them as moral questions, affecting the life of man as a member of moral society. He may speak, for instance, in praise of division of labour; but we soon teach that division of labour concerns him, not as a method of economic production, but as a means to the moral well-being of the community.

But while many disagree with the application of considerations of political economy to the Republic, we must none the less admit that its practical motive is fact. It is written in the imperative mood – not by the way of an analysis, but rather for warning and counsel. As Barker says, the Republic is in many respects a polemic – a polemic directed against current teachers and the practice of contemporary politics. The teachers against whom it is directed are the younger generation of Sophists, of the type already portrayed in the Gorgias. It was they and not Socrates, who in Plato’s view were the true corruptores juventutis, by the lectures they gave and the training in politics they professed to give; and if Greece was not to follow in the paths they had indicated, their hold on the young must be destroyed, and their teaching must be refuted. They had preached (so it seemed to Plato) a new ethics, or ‘justice’, of self-satisfaction; and they had tended to revolutionize politics accordingly, by making the authority of the State a means to self-satisfaction of its rules. In opposition to such tenets Plato taught a conception of justice as a quality of the soul, in virtue of which men set aside the irrational desire to taste every pleasure and to gain a selfish satisfaction out of every object, and accommodated themselves to the discharge of a single function for the general benefit; and he taught a corresponding conception of politics which made the State no longer the field for self-satisfaction of its ruler, but the body of which he was a part and the organism in which he had a function. No longer should individualism infect the State: on the contrary, a spirit of collectivism (for the Platonic reaction runs to its extreme) should permeate the individual. No longer should the ruler use the State for his own ends: the State should demand for the ruler, if it were necessary, the sacrifice for his private ends, if indeed he had ends distinct from those of the State, to the interests of the general welfare. But in truth there was no such necessity, and there was no such distinction. In a true State, individual can secure his own ends securing those of his fellows; ‘he will have a larger growth, and be the savior of his country as well as of himself.'[12] The old harmony of the interests of State and the individual, interrupted by the teachings of Radical Sophists (as it was also interrupted by the teachings of Cynics and Cyre-naics), these Sophists did indeed reconcile State and individual, by making the State a tyranny working for the satisfaction of one individual. They reconciled it, however, from the wrong end (if indeed they can be said to have reconciled it at all), when they adjusted the State to one individual, instead of adjusting all individuals to the State. Yet it shows how closely the State and the individual were connected, even by the revolutionaries, that individualism, instead of seeking to destroy the State, should have attempted to recreate after its own image; is thus restored in the teaching of Plato, but restored on a new and higher level, because it has been elevated into a conscious sense of harmony. In this connection Plato, radical and reformer as he may elsewhere appears, is conservative enough. In his mission to prove that, “the eternal laws of morality are no mere ‘conventions’, which must be destroyed to make way for a regime of ‘nature’; but they are on the contrary, rooted beyond all possibility of overthrow in the nature of human soul and in the system of universe. Here psychology of man and metaphysics of the world enter into the plan of the Republic. Its author has to show that the State cannot be regarded as a chance congeries of individuals, to be exploited by the strongest individuality; but, on the contrary, is a communion of soul rationally and necessarily united for the pursuit of a moral end, and rationally and unselfishly guided towards that end by the wisdom of those who know the nature of soul and purpose of the world.

But this, which is the true idea of the State and its natural and normal condition, was exactly what in Plato’s view, contemporary States were not. The spirit of excessive individualism had not infected not only theory, but actual life; and Sophists were only popular, because they had caught what was in the air. ‘Or do you, like the many, really think that there are, in any degree worth speaking of, young men corrupted by Sophists, or Sophists in a private capacity who corrupt them? Plato exhibits the Sophist in different lights – here in a more favorable one. The point of this passage is to show that whether the Sophists are good or bad, their influence is unimportant compared with that of the great Sophist, public opinion, which they merely echo.[13]  In the words of Barker, “ Sophists… in fact teach nothing but the opinion of the many, that is to say, the opinions of their assemblies; and this is their wisdom’’(493A).[14] The States of contemporary Greece seemed Plato to have lost their true character, and to have forgotten their true aim. In opposition to their actual character, and to their aims they actually pursued, he turns as definitely radical, as, in opposition to Sophistic views, he shows himself conservative. Thinking mainly of the Athenian democracy in which he lived (and the hands of which Socrates had died), he finds in contemporary politics two great and serious flaws. One is the ubiquity of ignorance masquerading in the guise of knowledge: the other is a political selfishness which divides every city into two hostile cities, standing ‘in the state and posture of gladiators’ over against one another. Plato’s criticism of contemporary politics is found in the eighth and ninth book of Republic. As Nohle remarks with justice that Plato depicts actual States after he has sketched his ideal State; while nevertheless, in the actual development of his thought, the study of actual State came before the construction of the ideal and served as an incentive to its construction. Moreover, the defects of the actual showed him what to seek in an ideal; and in this sense his critique of the actual controls and determines his ideal State which seem most idealistic are in a sense most realistic: they are the results of an ardent impatience with the elements of actual life which he had thoroughly studied, and of which he thoroughly disapproved. His communism, for instance, is largely the result of a lively sense of evils actually inherent in a ruling class which had its own economic interests, and used its political position to advance those interests.[15] To create efficiency in the place of amateur incompetence – to replace selfishness and civil discord by harmony – these are therefore his aims and ‘specialization’ and ‘unification’ are therefore his watch words. These two aims the political teaching of the Republic is addressed; and as means of these ends even its apparent eccentricities, such as the advocacy of community of wives, acquires meaning and find justification.

Ignorance was to Plato the especial curse of democracy. Here, instead of the professional, the amateur was predominant. In Athens especially democracy seemed only to mean the right divine of the ignorant to govern wrong. Any man might speak in the Assembly and help to sway its decisions: any man whatever his capacity, might be appointed to executive by the chance of the lot. Besides the inefficiency which it entailed, and the parade of a false equality which it involved, such a system was to Plato unjust. Justice meant, in his eyes, that a man should do his work in the station of life which he was called by his capacities. Everything has its function. An axe which is used to carve a tree, as well as to cut it down, is an axe misused (cf. 353A); and a man attempts to govern his fellows, when at best he is only fit to be a tolerable craftsman, is a man of only mistaken, but also unjust – doubly, indeed, unjust, for not only does he not to do his own proper work, but he shoves the better man aside. But nothing impressed Plato more in contemporary politics, and nothing more surely drove him along the path of reform, than that violent spirit of individualism, which sought to capture the offices of the State for the better fulfilling of its own selfish purposes, and divided every city into two hostile camps of rich and poor, oppressors and oppressed. This was the special vice of oligarchy. The ruling body always tended to dissensions within its own ranks; and it was always in a state of opposition to its subjects. An oligarchic city was a city set in two camps, spying for an opportunity against the other. And the root of all evil was the love for money. It would have been well if this passion had been confined to private life; but it infected politics. The rich who sought to be still richer monopolized office for the sake of the advantage which is corrupt use might give them in their private enterprise: they seized the authority of the State for the sake of the ‘spoils’ which it might bring. Nowadays men seek to be always in office for the sake of the advantages they can gain from the public revenues and from the office.[16] The Rajsik and Tamsik men in Srimad Bhagwad Geeta are of the same quality.[17] The State, whose essence it is that it should be a neutral and impartial arbitrator  between the different interests of different classes, became itself the tool of one of these classes. The authority, instead of binding class to class, merely accentuated their differences by adding its weight to strengthen one class against the rest. No wonder the State was divided against itself, of that, as Plato says, in every State there were two separate States. Not one of them is a State, but many States; for any State, however small, is in fact divided into two – one of the State of the poor, the other that of the rich – and these are at war with one another[18] This view of the ‘two States’ is one that recurs in Plato. ‘Such a State’, he says of oligarchy, ‘is not one, but two States, the one of poor, the other of the rich men; and they are living on the same spot and always conspiring against one another[19] Similarly in the Laws he urges that the ordinary State has no constitution: it is mere territory divided into parts one of which is master and the other is slave.[20] The Platonic view of the two States within each State naturally suggests Disraeli’s phrase of the ‘two Nations’, and the modern socialist idea of ‘class-war’.

Political selfishness was not the fault of oligarchies only. Democracy itself was not exempt from this vice. Its supporters indeed viewed it as the true State, where man was equal to man, and an impartial law ruled all – a State which served no particular interest, but did justice to every class. Democracy represented the whole community: oligarchy represented a part. Democracy made room for the rich in finance, the wise in council, the masses in decision – The argument is that of Athenagoras, the democratic leader at Syracuse (Thucydides: vi. 39). But what struck Plato, and indeed Aristotle, was, that the citizens of a democracy not only paid themselves from the coffers of the State by the wages which they received for political services, but also used their authority to pillage the rich, confiscating their estates upon spurious issues, or plundering them more subtly by heavy ‘liturgies’. They too, like the governing class in oligarchy, made politics into a source of economic gain. It is this confusion of economics and politics, alike in oligarchies and in democracies that lends to Greek civic strife its fury. Political struggles may be moderate, and combatants may act by legal form: it is the social war in which passions are as bitter as gall. Greek civil strife meant such a social war; and constitutional opposition readily turned into a Jacquerie. (Cf. the picture drawn by Thucydides at Corcyra: ‘And the cause of all these things was the pursuit of office for reasons of greed and ambition- III 82). Hence it became the mission of political philosophy, in the hands of Plato, to rehabilitate a strong and impartial authority, which should mean, not the rule of the rich over poor, or the poor over the rich, but something either above or at any rate combining both. Whereas ‘men came to public affairs hungering for their own profit thereby’, and, ‘as a result, struggles for office arose which grew into civil war’, there must be unselfish government and civic harmony. Plato suggests, ordinary rulers, are like ‘watch dogs, which from wants of discipline, or hunger, or some evil habit or other, turn upon the sheep and worry them, and not behave like dogs but wolves.[21]

There were, then, two factors – a certain amateur meddlesomeness which its friends called many-sidedness, characteristic of democracy, and a political selfishness, resulting in constant disunion, characteristic of both of oligarchy and democracy – which suggested to Plato the direction of future reform. It is from the common error of amateurism that Plato starts in constructing his ideal state; and its opposition to the many gospel of many-sidedness he enunciates that of specialization. The Sophists had, to some extent, been apostles of many-sidedness; and Hippias of Elis, had given a practical demonstration its meaning, when he appeared in Olympia in ring and cloak and shoes of his own making. Yet they had also felt that it was for a man if he had been trained in the profession he intended to pursue; and they had also attempted to give training themselves for the profession of politics. Socrates, had knowledge as the necessary basis of action; and the Socratic conception of government, as an art which involved special knowledge, had especially influenced Plato. Nor were the tendencies of actual life altogether adverse to doctrine of specialization. The professional soldier and the professional orator were already beginning to appear. The victory of a professional force of light-armed troops in 394 B.C. had already shown the efficiency which the new tendency could impart; and though a Phocion might, at a still later day, appear as an exception. It was the day of Iphicrates and Isocrates – the day in which the professional training had replaced the fresh improvisations of a Themistocles or a Cleon. But the teaching of Plato goes far beyond and preceding teaching or tendencies. He divides his ideal State into three classes, the rulers, the fighters, the farmers-the men of gold, the men of silver, and the men of iron and brass. Each of these has its appointed function, and each of these concentrate itself entirely upon the discharge of that function. Government, defense, sustenance – the three necessary functions of the State – are all made into professions and assigned to professional classes. It is only with the governing and fighting classes that Plato is really concerned; but he is careful to train for their work by every means in his power. Primarily he trusts to an education which shall train them thoroughly for their duties: secondly, not quite content with spiritual, he has recourse to material means. He suggests a system of communism, so ordered that it shall set the time and all the minds of these classes free from material cares, and shall enable them to give themselves fully to the acquisition of knowledge and the discharge of their function in the community. He deprives both the administration and the army of private property, and seeks to concentrate them to their public duties by freeing them from any temptation to engage themselves in other interests.

The way of specialization was also to Plato the way of unification. If a separate class was appointed to the work of government there would hardly be any room for the old struggle to capture the government. If each class abides within its own boundaries, concentrated upon its own work, no class would readily come into conflict with another. Civil dissension had been rendered possible by want of specialization. Because there was no proper government ready and able to do its work, there had been in every State a number of men with no settled function or regular place – men who had more than one place or no proper place at all – there had been all the jostling and turbulence which had culminated in civil war. With specialization these things would cease; each class would work at its appointed function in contentment. Those who confine themselves to discharge their function cannot be selfish. Selfishness consists in going outside one’s own sphere, and trespassing upon that of another; and a governing class duly trained in its proper duty will never commit such trespass. But Plato provides a further guarantee than training. Not all who have been trained for government are allowed to join the governing class. To make the assurance of unselfishness doubly sure, he reserves office for those, and only those, who, under a system of trials and temptations, weal, and its woe their own woe. And besides these spiritual means – besides this training for a special work, and this selection of those whom the special training has shown to be most unselfish – there is finally the material guarantee of communism. Rulers who have no home, no family, no possession, have no temptation to selfishness: they have nowhere to carry their gains, no body upon whom to spend them, no interest in making them. ‘Both the community of property and the community of families … tend to make them more truly guardians; they will not tear the city in pieces by differing about ‘mine’ and “not ‘mine”…but …they all tend towards a common end.[22] They will call a different wife and children his own.[23]

The conclusion of the whole matter would seem then to be this, that everyone should do his own allotted work in contentment. But this in Plato’s eyes is justice or, in other words, the true principle of social life; and therefore the Republic is also called ‘a treatise concerning justice’. Its purpose is the substitution of a true conception of justice for the false views which common error and Sophistic teaching had contrived to spread. Where he is combating the theory of the Sophists, or seeking to reform the actual practice of society, justice is the hinge of Plato’s thought, and the text of his discourse. It remains therefore to inquire, what were the reasons for which he rejected those views: in what way he justified the conception which he advocated, and what were the results to which that conception led. In the course of this inquiry it would be better to expound in detail what has already been depicted earlier – the polemic of Plato against the current conception of justice, and his reconstruction of the State with a view to realizing his own conception of its nature. We shall see how, beginning as it were dimly with the practical principle of specialization, Plato throws fresh lights on its meaning, until finally we realize that in specialization justice it may be found – for justice, being seen, is nothing more and nothing less than man’s performance of the part which the purpose of society demands that he shall play. In brief, Plato attached great importance to the concept of justice and it is evident from the fact that he subtitled his book Republic as ‘concerning justice’. In fact, the discovery of the nature and habitation of justice is the fundamental issue of Republic. At the outset it may be pointed out that to the Greeks, term ‘justice’ carried wider implications than the word justice actually connotes. While explaining his theory of justice, Plato starts by discussing the various prevailing theories of justice and after rejecting them, puts forward his own views. The remainder of the Book IV falls into three divisions. In the first of these, Plato determines the virtues of the state, with special object of discovering justice among them (427 E to 434 D). Then he investigates the nature of the soul, and shows that the virtues of the sate are merely expressions of the inward conditioned of the soul (434 D to 441 C). Finally, he applies the results of this investigation in determining the virtues, and among them the justice, of the individual.[24] For a comprehensive understanding of Plato’s views on justice it is desirable to examine the various prevailing theories of justice and the grounds on which Plato rejects them. Before proceeding further, we have to remember the words of Barker: it must be noted that no legal significance attaches to ‘justice’ in Plato’s use of the word. Justice, along with courage, self-control, and wisdom, is one of the four virtues which constitute moral goodness. Such goodness is the quality both of an individual soul and a community of individuals; and justice, therefore, is a quality of both. It is thus one of the constituent parts both of individual morality and of social morality; but it is morality rather than law that is connected in either form. The justice of the state and the justice of the individual are both exhibited by individuals. The difference is that the individual exhibits the former as a part of society; he exhibits the latter within his own mind. Thus justice is not a legal mater, nor is it concerned with any external scheme of legal rights and duties. It belongs not to the sphere of Recht (legality), but to that of Sittlichkeit (social morality). Sittlichkeit is neither the subjective morality of our inward conscience, nor the external legality of mere law: it blends and transcends both. It is a spirit and habit of life expressed in the social opinion and enforced by the social conscience of free people. By it our relations to one another are controlled; and since our relations flow from our position or station in the community – or rather, since the sum of the relations in which we stand constitute position or station – we may say that it controls our position or station.[25] It is not a matter of law, or again of individual ethics, nor is it confusion between the two: it is a conception of social morality and a definition of the code of social ethics which no less than law, and perhaps even more than law, underlies the play of social relations. It deals with the ways in which a whole society may attain goodness and thereby happiness.[26] It is not confined to the goodness or the happiness of individuals. Its formula is that the essence of social morality lies in the fulfillment of ‘my station and my duties’; and this is a formula which modern thinkers can still employ. It is implied in Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, and employed by Bradley in Ethical Studies (Cf. the chapter on ‘My Station and its Duties) and by Bosanquet in the Philosophical Theory of State. Behind this formula, and behind the whole conception of society as moral whole or organism, living a moral life of which every individual is an organ and in which every individual has a function. The Political Theory of Plato is a theory of this moral organism; and his theory of justice is a theory of ethical code by which it lives. He does not start from the conception of a legal society based on legal rights, and he does not conceive justice as a system of a maintenance and correlation of such rights. He starts from the conception of an ethical society based on the moral duty of discharge of specific function, and he conceives justice as the spirit by which men are animated in the fulfillment of that duty.

According to Sabine, the theory of state in the Republic culminates in the conception of justice. Justice is the bond which holds a society together, a harmonious union of individuals each of whom has found his life work in accordance with his natural fitness and his training. It is both, a public and private virtue because the highest good both of the state and of its members is thereby conserved. There is nothing better for a man to have his work and to be fitted to do it; there is nothing better for other men and for the whole society than that each should thus be filling station to which he is entitled. This is Plato’s prima facie definition of justice as ‘giving to every man his due’. For what is due to him is that he should be treated as what he is, in the light of his capacity and his training, while what is due from him is the honest performance of those tasks which the place accorded him requires. To a modern reader such a definition of justice is at least as striking for what it omits as for what it includes. In no sense is it a juristic definition. For it lacks the notion, connoted by the Latin word jus  and the English word right, of powers of voluntary action in the exercise of which a man will be protected by law and supported by authority of the state. Lacking this conception Plato does not mean by justice, except remotely, the maintenance of public peace and order; at least, external order is but a small part of the harmony which makes the state. What the state provides its citizens is not so much freedom and protection as life – all the opportunities for social interchange which make up the necessities and amenities of a civilized existence. It is true that in such a social life there are rights, just as there are duties, but they can hardly be said to belong in any peculiar sense to individuals. They are inherent rather in the services or functions that individuals perform. Resting as it does upon the principle that the state or society is created by mutual needs, the analysis runs necessarily in the terms of services and not of powers. Even the ruler is no exception, for he has merely the special function to which his wisdom or reason entitled him. The notion of authority or sovereign power, such as the Roman attached to his magistracies, has practically no part in Plato’s political theory, or indeed in that of any Greek philosopher.[27] In fact the discovery of the nature and habitation of justice is the fundamental issue of Republic.

Application of poetic justice

In the Republic there are instances of what could be considered as poetic justice, where individual receiving consequences that are fitting or symbolic of their actions or believs? We can evidently see the application of poetic justice in following theories described in the Republic:

1. Theory of Tripartite Soul: in brief, we can say that the concept of poetic justice is evident in the idea of the tripartite soul, which we have discussed above. According to Plato, the human soul consists of three parts: reason, spirit and appetite or desire. Poetic justice is reflected when these three parts are in harmony, with society, each individual’s soul should reflect this balance, mirroring the ideal state where philosopher-kings (representing reason) govern, guardians (representing spirit) protect, and producers (representing desire) fulfill their roles. The harmony within the individual and state embodies a poetic justice envisioned by Plato. In other words, ‘Plato’s theory of tripartite soul, consisting of reason, spirit and appetite or desire plays a significant role in his concept of justice. Poetic justice is present in the idea that the just individual has a harmonious soul where reason rules over desire and spirit. Conversely, the unjust person’s soul is in turmoil with desires over powering reason’. Thus individuals experience the consequences of their inner balance and imbalance.

2. The Guardian’s Education: Plato’s concept of education, as we have discussed earlier, and training for the guardian class is designed to ensure that only the most virtuous and capable individuals become rulers. Those who excel in this education system are rewarded with the responsibility of leadership while those who do not, are excluded from it. This can be seen as a form of poetic justice based on merit and virtue. In the Republic, poetic justice is a concept intertwined with his theory of education, particularly in the context of the censorship and regulation of literature and arts within the ideal state. Plato believed that the arts, including poetry and drama, could have a powerful influence on individuals’ moral and intellectual development. Poetic justice in Plato’s education theory refers to the idea that artistic expression should align with the values principles upheld by the society. In Book X of the ‘Republic’ Plato expresses concerns about the potential negative impact of certain types of poetry on the citizens’ characters. He argues for the censorship of literature that portrays immoral behavior or undermines the virtues promoted by the state. Plato believed that exposure to certain poetic elements could shape individuals’ attitudes and behaviors, and thus, he sought to control the narratives presented in literature to ensure they supported the moral and ethical foundations of his ideal society. By advocating for poetic justice, Plato aimed to use literature as a tool for reinforcing virtue and fostering a harmonious and just society. In practical terms, this meant that certain genres and themes, especially those depicting gods and heroes behaving immorally or engaging in undesirable activities, were to be excluded from the educational curriculum. Plato’s application of poetic justice in education was a means to mould citizens who would uphold the values of justice, wisdom, and temperance within the structure of his envisioned society.

3. Division of Labor and Poetic Justice: In Plato’s ‘Republic’ the concept of poetic justice is closely related to his theory of division of labor in the ideal state. Following are the main points where poetic justice is applicable in the division of labour-

        i. Justice as Harmony: Plato argues that justice in the state is in harmony with the individual soul. In a perfectly just society, each individual should perform the role that suits them best; just as each part of the soul fulfills its function. This leads to the idea that people should specialize in their occupations.

       ii. Three Classes: Plato proposes a three classes system for ideal society. First – Guardians or rulers and protectors of the state. Second – Auxiliaries or warriors and defenders. Third – Producers or farmers, craftsmen and merchants. Each class has a specific role and their occupation is assigned based on their natural aptitudes and abilities. Poetic justice comes into play when individuals are placed in the class that correspond their innate talents and abilities. For instance, the most philosophically (or reasonably) inclined individuals became the rulers, the courageous and spirited became the warriors and those with practical skills became producers. This aligns with the idea of each individual doing what they are naturally suited for.

      iii.  Avoiding Social Discontent: Poetic justice in the division of labour, aims to minimize social unrest and dissatisfaction. By assigning roles based on aptitude, Plato believes that people are more likely to accept their place in society and feel content reducing the chances of social upheaval.

      iv.  Maintaining Order and Balance: Plato’s vision of the ideal state is one, where each class co-operates and contributes to the greater good. Poetic justice keeps order and balance by ensuring that each class fulfills its role effectively, contributing to the overall harmony and stability of society.

Over all, poetic justice in the division of labour in Plato’s Republic, is about aligning individuals natural abilities with their societal roles to create a just and harmonious state.

4. The Allegory of the Cave: In book VII of the Republic, Plato presents the allegory of the cave[28], where prisoners are trapped and only see shadows on the wall. When one prisoner is freed and exposed to the truth, he initially struggles but ultimately gains knowledge and understanding. This can be seen as a form of poetic justice; as the prisoner sought knowledge and enlightenment is rewarded.

5. The Myth of Er: In the concluding myth of the Republic, the story of Er; illustrates the idea of cosmic justice. Er, a soldier, who was thought to be dead, returns to life and recounts his journey in the afterlife. Those who were virtuous in life, are rewarded and those who were wicked face consequences in the afterlife. This myth reflects a sense of poetic justice, where individual’s actions in life determine their fate in after life. In Book X, Plato describes the story of Er.

6. The Noble lie: In the Republic, Book III, especially in the section beginning with 414 B, Plato proposes the idea of noble lie as a means to maintain social order and harmony. This lie involves telling citizens that they are born from different metals, (gold, silver and bronze), to justify the social classes: ‘Now is the time for the founder of the state to invent a myth respecting its origin. Like the warrior of Cadmus, our citizens – so the tale will run – have sprung in full armour from the bosom of the land, who is their mother, so that they are brethren all. The rulers have Gold in their composition: the auxiliaries Silver, the artificers and husbandmen Brass and Iron. But as they all spring from a common stock, these class-differences will not be absolute hereditary. It will be therefore be a taste of the chief rulers to test the metal  of the children of the citizens, and assign them to their proper classes, so that brass and iron may never take the place of gold and silver in the government of the state’.[29] (414 B – 415 D).

7. The Guardian’s lack of private property: The Guardians in Plato’s ideal state are not allowed to own private property. Instead, they share everything in common including spouses and children. As described by Benjamin Jowett, “Now let the earthborn men go forth under the command of their rulers, and look about and pitch their camp in a high place, which will ‘be safe against enemies descending upon the fold, and also against insurrection from within. There let them sacrifice and set up their tents; for soldiers they are to be and not shopkeepers, the watchdogs and guardians of the sheep; and luxury and avarice will turn them into wolves and tyrants. Their habits and their dwelling should correspond to their education. They should have no property; their pay should only meet their expenses; and they should have common meals. Gold and silver we will tell them that they have from God and this divine gift in their souls they must not alloy with that earthly dross which passes under the name of gold. They only of the citizens may not touch it, or be under the same roof with it, or drink from it; it is the accursed thing. Should they ever acquire houses or lands or money of their own, they will be house holders and tradesmen instead of guardians, enemies and tyrants instead of helpers, and the hour of ruin, both to themselves and the rest of state will be at hand.”[30] Here, the concept of communal property can be seen as a form of poetic justice, as it eliminates envy and greed promoting equality and justice within the guardian or ruling class.

8. The Philosopher King’s Disinterest in Material Wealth: In Plato’s ideal state, the philosopher kings who are the rulers and guardians are expected to be disinterested in accumulating wealth or possessions. Their primary focus is the pursuit of wisdom and the well-being of the state. This can be seen as a form of poetic justice because those who govern are not motivated by personal gain but by the betterment of society, aligning their action with the principle of justice and virtue.

9. The Removal of Mimetic Poetry: In Book III of the Republic, Plato argues for the removal of certain types of poetry and stories from the ideal city. He contends that stories depicting gods and heroes behaving badly or unjustly should be banned because they can corrupt the moral character of citizens. According to Plato, “There are three kinds of poetry: - (1) the simple narrative, of which the dithyramb is given as an example (394 C): (2) The opposite kind, which has only action and no narrative, as is the case in tragedy and comedy: (3) the union of the two, as in Epic poetry, which, if you leave the speeches only, becomes a drama and if you omit the speeches or report them in ortio oblinqua, takes the form of simple narration (392 D). So much is said with regard to the substance of the new literature. Next as to the form, shall it be (1) narrative, or (2) dramatic, or (3) a mixture of both? The speeches in Homer are dramatic, but they are linked together with bits of narration. Tragic poetry is dramatic throughout. Homer, again, would be entirely narrative, if the speeches were reported indirectly. And this is the mode actually adopted in the Dithyramb. The purely dramatic form is to be excluded from our state. For we have long since decided that simplicity is to be our rule; and he imitation of various characters is fatal to simplicity. Our youth may be allowed to impersonate the virtuous and good, but nothing that is vicious or mean, or a female in any condition, nor a slave; still less, in happens in comedy, a drunkard or a coward. They must indeed know such characters from without, but never for a moment must they be identified with them. Nor they mimic menial arts, of which they are to know nothing, nor unmeaning noises, such as the neighing of horses or sound of thunder. In narrating the fortunes of some hero, if they are carried away into impersonating him when he is about some noble deed, well and good. Or if they scornfully throw in a dramatic touch in characterizing some bad man, there is no great harm, provided that such points in their discourse are few and momentary. But the main tenour of the recital will be pure narration, and the manner of the recitation in the pitch and cadence of the voice will be simple and uniform.”[31] The poetic justice here lies in the idea that art and literature should upheld virtuous ideals and moral lessons reinforcing the values of justice and righteousness.

10. Ring of Gyges Story: The story of Gyges is described in Book II of Plato’s ‘Republic’, specifically in the sections 359 A to 360 D. It is part of the dialogue between Glaucon and Socrates, where they discuss the nature of justice. The story serves as a moral lesson, emphasizing the interconnectedness of actions and their consequences, aligning with the concept of poetic justice.

These examples demonstrate how Plato’s the ‘Republic’ explores various aspects of justice and virtue within the context of his ideal society, often emphasizing the alignment of actions and beliefs with moral and ethical principles as a form of poetic justice.

1. Mark L. McPherran, ed. Plato’s Republic: A Critical Guide, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pp.   ------ + 272. ISBN 978-0-521-49190-7.(https://ancienthistorybulletin.org>....).

2. Ferrari Publisher: Cambridge University Press Publication Year 2007 ISBN – 13: 978-0521839639

3. Published by Penguin Books 2010- 016 ISBN: 978-0-141-03785-1

4. Publisher: Wiley – Blackwell Publication Year: 2003 ISBN- 13: 978- 1405116225

5. Publisher: The University of Chicago Press Year:2018 ISBN- 13: 978-0-226-51577-9

6. Publisher: Harvard University Press year : 1971 ISBN- 978-0-674-24456-6 (Indian edition)

7. Prem Arora: Studies in Political Science, Theory: Publisher: Book Hive Publication, IAS Study Circle: Ring Road, Naraina, New Delhi-28. Year 1994.P. 3

8. Sir Ernest Barker: Greek Political Theory: Plato and his Predecessors: Volume 18: Publisher: Routledge, 2010, 270- Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016. P.168. ISBN: 978-0-415-55553-1

9. Quoted by Barker: p-168

10. Pohlman: Geschichte des antiken Kommunismus und Sozialsmus: Quoted in Barker: footnote- pp-169.

11. The Republic: 417A

12. 497A

13. B. Jowett: Plato’s Republic the Greek Text – Primary Source Edition in Three Volumes, Volume III., Notes: Oxford at the Clarendon Press – 1894, PP- 277.                                            

14. Barker: Foot note-1- Pp.172.

15. Nohle: Die Staatslehre Platos, 101, quotes by Barker, Pp- 172.

16. Cf. Aristotle, Politics, 1279, a 13-15 (III.6 – I0)

17. Cf. Srimad Bhagwadgeeta: Chapter: 14.

18. The Republic: 422E.

19. The Republic: 551D

20.  Plato: The Laws: 712 E 

21. The Republic: 521A, 416A.

22. The Republic: 464 C-D.

23. B. Jowett: p-238.                                         

24. Richard Lewis Nettleship: Lectures on the Republic of Plato: Publisher- University Press of the Pacific Honolulu, Hawaii, 1961. P- 145. ISBN: 1-4102-0655-6

25. Political Thought from Herbert Spencer to Today, pp. 61-2.Quoted by Barker: PP. 207.

26. The Republic: 421B-C.

27. George H Sabine: A History of Political Theory, Fourth Edition, Revised by Thomas Landon Thorson: Publisher- Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd. 1973.Pp-64-65. ISBN: 978-81-204-1706-9

28. Talks with Socrates about life; translations from the Gorgias and the Republic of Plato: Scholar’s Choice: New York CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS 1887;  PP. 121-134

29. B. Jowett: Plato’s Republic the Greek Text – Primary Source Edition in Three Volumes, Volume III., Notes: Oxford at the Clarendon Press - 1894. Notes: Book III p.156                                           

30. The Republic (414-416), Translated by Benjamin Jowett:  p. 101-2

31. B. Jowett: Plato’s Republic the Greek Text – Primary Source Edition in Three Volumes, Volume III. (392 A to 394 D) Notes: Oxford at the Clarendon Press – 1894, PP- 121-23.