1. To examine the function and role of panels and Appellate Body in resolving the disputes arising out of the operation of WTO agreements 

2. To scrutinize the procedural aspects of implementation of ‘recommendations and rulings’ of the dispute settlement body 

Amicable Settlement of Disputes

Setting up of Panel and its Functioning

The complaining party if consultations fail can ask ‘the DSB to establish a panel’ to resolve the disputed issues. The DSB shall convene a meeting within a time-period of ‘15 days of such request’, with at least ‘10 days’ notice’ in advance to every member. Except ‘the DSB decides by consensus to not establish a penal’, the panel in the very DSB meeting is deemed to have been established.[15] Therefore, under the WTO dispensation, a panel establishment is ‘quasi-automatic’,[16] unlike the GATT, 1947 regime. The decision-making under Art. 6(1) of the DSU is based on negative consensus process, which is also called ‘reverse consensus’ process. During the GATT, 1947 panel used to be set up based on positive consensus decision making process. According to positive consensus, a GATT panel would be established only if all the ‘contracting parties’, including ‘the parties to the dispute’, would agree to establish a panel. Should any ‘contracting party’, including the ‘complaining party’ against which complaint was made, have objected to establish a GATT penal, then the panel was deemed to have not been established. Hence, owing to positive consensus procedure under the GATT regime, ‘the contracting party against which complaint was made’ could successfully block the setting-up of a GATT panel.[17] Precisely, while under the GATT dispensation consensus was required ‘to establish a panel’, under the WTO system of dispute settlement consensus is required to not establish a panel and therefore the latter is considered to provide for virtually an ‘automatic establishment’ of a WTO panel.[18]  

Persons who compose panels are ‘well-qualified individuals selected from a sufficiently diverse background and a wide spectrum of experience’, worked in various capacities, such as governmental or non-governmental positions, ‘served on or presented a case before a GATT panel’ or was state representative before the GATT/WTO or worked in the GATT/WTO Secretariat, a senior official on trade policy of a member or ‘taught or published on international trade law or policy’.[19] The composition goes with a rider that citizens of ‘disputing parties’ and ‘third parties’ should not function as a panel member, save the disputing parties agree on such nomination.[20] In this regard, ‘the Secretariat shall maintain an indicative list comprising governmental and non-governmental’ persons and roster of non-governmental panelists under the GATT regime and ‘other rosters and indicative lists established under any of the covered agreements of the WTO’.[21]     

According to Art. 8(5) of the DSU, the DSU gives a three-member panel, otherwise the parties agree, within ‘a period of 10 days’ since the setting-up of panel, for ‘a panel of five members’. WTO’s Secretariat recommends ‘nominations for the panel’ and in case of ‘no agreement on the panelists within 20 days after the date of establishment of a panel’, the Director General, ‘having consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and the Chairman of the relevant Council or Committee’, determines the panel composition by appointing the ‘most appropriate panelists’ after consulting the disputing parties as per ‘relevant special or additional rules or procedures of the covered agreement or covered agreements’ that are connected with the dispute.[22] Panelists are required to ‘serve in their individual capacities and not as representatives of government or of any organization’. In a dispute including a ‘developing country’ member, if it so requests the panel shall comprise in any case one panelist from a ‘developing country’ member.[23]     

In a dispute before it, the panel’s task is to provide ‘an objective assessment of the matter before it’ that must be based on ‘an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements’ along with further similar findings that support ‘the DSB’ with respect to drawing up ‘the rulings and recommendations’ in connection with the covered agreement to be notified for the disputing parties concerned.[24] Without causing undue delay into the process of the panel, it must be provided with enough flexibility in order to ‘ensure high quality panel reports’.[25] As per Art. 12(5) of the DSU, while fixing the time-table for the process of the panel, a clear time-limits must also be set by the panel for making ‘written submissions’ by the disputing parties and they must regard those deadlines. The party complaining must make its ‘first submission’ earlier to that of the opposite party save it is decided by the panel post consultations with the disputing parties that ‘the parties should submit their first submissions simultaneously’.[26] In its written report to the DSB, the panel gives its findings, setting out the case facts, the applicable stipulations and the basic reasons behind such findings and recommendations. In case the matter is found settled among the parties, the ‘panel report’ must comprise ‘a brief description of the case’, stating about the remedy that has been achieved.[27] As a general rule, under Art. 12(8) of the DSU, panel issues its report within 6 months, though in the situations of urgency, along with the cases of ‘perishable goods’, it is expected to issue the report within 3 months. However, if the panel finds that it cannot issue its ‘report within the specified time’, it can submit a request in writing to the DSB for additional time to submit the report, which in no case should exceed nine months.[28] If a developing country member is the responding party in a dispute, the panel shall provide enough time for preparing and presenting its arguments.[29] If the party complaining makes a request, the ‘panel may at any time suspend its work for a period not exceeding 12 months’ and as a consequence the time period for the panel to give its report must be proportionately extended. If the panel work remains suspended beyond 12 months, the DSB’s authority for the established panel lapses.[30] Though the parties are allowed to make written as well as oral submissions during the panel proceedings, subsequently panel report shall be written in the absence of disputing parties, as panel deliberations are confidential in nature. Moreover, views given by the panel members within the ‘panel report shall be anonymous’.[31]       

Multiple complainants and third parties

Where the DSB receives requests from more than one member to establish a panel concerning the same matter, ‘a single panel’  needs to be formed to look into such complaints whenever practicable, considering ‘the rights of all members concerned’.[32] Panel must carry out its proceedings in a way the rights of each complaining member are not impaired that member would have enjoyed if separate panels were set up. Every complainant enjoys the right to remain present, when other complainant makes its submissions to the panel and the submissions of every complainant must be given to every other complainant.[33] However, when greater than ‘one panel’ is set-up for looking into the ‘complaints’ concerning the  same subject-matter, ‘to the maximum extent possible the same panelists must serve on each of the separate panels’, besides in such disputes the ‘panel process’ must accordingly be harmonized.[34]    

Another vital feature of ‘the WTO dispute settlement system’ is third party rights. Any member having ‘a substantial interest in the subject matter of a dispute’ while not being a disputing party can still notify the DSB to take part in the panel proceedings. Such a member is referred to as ‘third party’ in the dispute. Unlike the consultation process where a member having ‘a substantial trade interest’ can join the consultations only with the consent of the member for which consultation request is made, under Art. 10 of the DSU if the member concerned notifies the DSB its interest to join the panel proceedings, it shall be joined in the proceedings as a ‘third party’. Third party must get the submissions made by the disputing parties. It has ‘the right to present written submissions before the panel’ and the same must be provided to the disputing parties and must be the part of the final report.[35] Though the ‘third party’ does not have the right to appeal, it must be given an opportunity of being heard, both orally and written, before the AB when the disputing parties appeal the ‘panel report’.[36]

Interim review and adoption of panel reports

At interim review stage, as per Art. 15(1) of the DSU, descriptive part of ‘draft report’ comprising factual aspects and arguments is given by the panel to the parties once the rebuttal submissions and oral arguments are complete and then the parties can give their written comments within the time-period established by the panel. Thereafter, ‘interim report’ is given to the parties, which comprises the ‘descriptive parts and the findings and conclusions of the panel’.

Still a party may request in writing the panel to review ‘precise aspects of the report’. Panel needs to talk to the parties on such issues. After the comment period, the ‘interim report’ will be considered as ‘the final panel report’ and circulated to all the members.[37] Panel report does not have the binding force by itself. It becomes binding and enforceable only when it gets adopted at the meeting of the DSB. Nevertheless, as per Art. 16(1) of the DSU, 20 days’ time must be allowed to members to go through the ‘panel report’ before the DSB convenes a meeting for adopting the report. Subject to Art. 16(1) of the DSU, the panel report shall be adopted at a DSB meeting within a 60 days’ time period post the date of its circulation to members, unless ‘a party to the dispute officially informs the DSB of its decision to appeal the panel report or the DSB resolves by consensus not to adopt the panel report’.[38] In case of appeal, panel report must be adopted when AB report gets adopted, following the successful completion of appeal process. The ‘panel report’ is adopted under Art. 16(4) based on negative consensus procedure, also known as reverse consensus procedure, as followed for the setting up of the panel under Art. 6(1) of the DSU.[39]    

Appellate Procedure

Under Art. 17(1) of the DSU the WTO comprised ‘a standing Appellate Body’, which hears appeals from panel cases, comprising ‘seven persons, three of whom serve on any one appeal in rotation’. The WTO appellate process is a distinct process, unique to any international adjudication, which was absent under the GATT regime. In line with Art. 17(2) of the DSU, AB members must serve in rotation; they are selected for a four-year period and are eligible for reappointment once. Those members should be of recognised authority having ‘established expertise in law, international trade and subject matter of the covered agreements concerned in general’, reflecting a broad representation of WTO membership. Besides, they must not be ‘affiliated with any government and must not partake in any dispute potential to create a direct or indirect conflict of interest’.[40] It is required for AB ‘to circulate its report within a period of 60 days from the date a disputing party formally informs its decision to appeal the panel report’. If AB cannot issue its report within a period of 60 days, it must write to the DSB the causes of delay along with an estimate of period for providing report but such a period must not be more than an overall 90 days’ period from the day of appeal.[41] The appeal is subject to ‘issues of law dealt with and legal interpretations made by the panel’ as reflected in its report.[42] AB may ‘uphold, modify or even reverse the legal findings and conclusions’ given by the panel.[43] With regard to appellate review process, AB draws-up procedures for working after consulting the ‘DSB chairman’ and the ‘Director-General.’[44] Like panel proceedings, in accordance with Art. 17(10) of the DSU, ‘the AB proceedings are confidential’ in nature and its reports are written in the absence of parties in view of the information supplied and statements given. Opinions of AB members in the report are treated anonymous.[45] Within 30 days following the circulation of AB report to members, it is required to be ‘adopted by the DSB and the parties must accept it unconditionally, unless the DSB by consensus decides not to adopt the report’.[46] It indicates that adoption of AB report is also based on negative consensus process like the case of panel report adoption. To add, during the AB report gets adopted, the panel report also needs to get adopted at the DSB meeting, as in the case of appeal panel report does not get adopted at the completion of panel process.

Either of the disputing parties cannot make ‘any ex parte communications’ before panel and AB on the issues being considered under the dispute.[47] Any written submissions made before the panel or AB must be regarded to be confidential though the same must be made available to the disputing parties. While parties can make public their own position on the dispute, they are required to treat the information provided by other parties before the panel or AB to be confidential. Besides, the parties, if requested, must issue ‘a non-confidential summary of the information’ submitted to panel or AB, which can be placed for the public information.[48]   

It is crucial to see that AB is not functioning at present owing to the situation of vacancies. This situation arose way back in 2019 due to ‘the blocking of appointment of members to the AB’ by the United States. The US blocked the reappointment of AB members since 2016[49], as it started feeling the ‘judicial overreach’ by AB, especially in connection with the cases concerning it. Under the Barak Obama Administration the US blocked the reappointment of a South Korean in AB.[50] Later, the Donald Trump administration successfully blocked the appointment and re-appointment of members in AB.[51] This has led may members notifying the DSB of their appealing panel report and as a result it cannot be adopted till the appeal process is complete. As currently any appeal is not possible to be decided by AB, it leads technically to a stalemate situation where it is not possible to implement the panel report, thereby dispute settlement system coming to a standstill. In this way the countries that lost the dispute can informally prevent the implementation of the panel report as the dispute hangs in appeal. Certain members have taken some alternatives, such as Indonesia and Vietnam agreeing not to appeal panel report[52] and some other members went for ‘voluntary arbitration’, officially being called ‘Multi-party Interim Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA)’, as per Art. 25 of the DSU, till the AB resumes functioning.[53] The first use of this system is made by Columbia in DS591, a dispute brought by European Union against Columbia’s anti-dumping measures on frozen fries from Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. [54]    

Implementation of ‘Recommendations and Rulings’ of the DSB

In the absence of mutual agreement by the ‘disputing parties’ otherwise, the period from the date of formation of panel till ‘the DSB considers the panel or AB report for adoption shall not generally exceed 9 months’ if the parties do not appeal ‘panel report’, or 12 months when the report is appealed. Nevertheless, the additional time taken by the panel under Art. 12(9) or the AB in accordance with Art. 17(5) to issue the report must be added to the above-mentioned time periods.[55]

A striking aspect of WTO dispute settlement system is the surveillance the DSB maintains on the implementation of ‘recommendations or rulings’ specified in the adopted panel and / or AB report by the party that lost the dispute. ‘Prompt compliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB’ by the party that lost the dispute is vital so as to guarantee effective resolution of disputes.[56] Such compliance is effective when the party that lost the dispute makes immediate withdrawal of the domestic measures that are found by the panel or AB incompatible with the requirements of the covered agreements concerned.[57] So, as per Article 21(3), the party that lost the dispute is required to apprise the DSB of its intentions to carry out the ‘recommendations or rulings’ at a meeting of the DSB conducted within ‘30 days’ subsequent to the panel or AB report’s adoption. If the party that lost the dispute finds it not practicable to implement forthwith the ‘recommendations or rulings’, it gets a reasonable time for complying with the same. Such ‘reasonable period of time’ must be either (a) ‘the period of time proposed by the party that lost the dispute’, provided that the DSB approves it, or in the case of no such approval, (b) ‘a period of time both the parties to the dispute mutually agree within 45 days after the DSB adopts panel or AB recommendations or rulings’, or no such agreement therein, (c) ‘a period of time established through binding arbitration within 90 days after the DSB adopts panel or AB recommendations or rulings’.[58] While determining the reasonable period of time in accordance with Art. 21(3)(c) of the DSU, the arbitrator is guided that such time does not surpass ‘15 months from the date of adoption of the report of panel or AB’. Nevertheless, the additional time taken by the panel or AB in providing its report must be added to the period of 15 months, but the total time-period must not go beyond 18 months, unless under exceptional circumstance if the disputing parties mutually agree for a lengthier period of time.[59]

The DSB surveillances over the carrying out of ‘recommendations or rulings’ by the party concerned. Art. 21(6) of the DSU allows any ‘member’ at any time post the ‘adoption’ of the report to raise any issue regarding its implementation by the party concerned and after 6 months subsequent to the date of setting-up of ‘reasonable time period’ any implementation issue will remain on the DSB’s agenda till it is settled. Nevertheless, during the implementation of the DSB ‘recommendations or rulings’, if the party that won the dispute disagrees with the ‘existence or consistency’ of the complying measure resorted to by the other party, the said dispute must be resolved by having resorted to dispute resolution procedure prescribed under the DSU, wherever possible to be settled by the original panel within a time period of 90 days, except in the case of delay where the panel requests the DSB additional time to circulate the report.[60]  

Art. 22 of the DSU provides for a compensation as a temporary measure to be granted by the party that lost the dispute to the other party that won the dispute in the event that the former has not yet complied with the DSB ‘recommendations or rulings’ within the determined reasonable time period. Compensation is not as such a monetary compensation; rather it is a trade-off between the ‘disputing parties’ if they mutually agree on the same. The party that lost the dispute cannot however be obligated to grant the compensation; it is voluntary being a provisional measure and, if given, must be according to the ‘covered agreements’.[61] The only obligation that binds the party that lost the dispute is that it is bound to enter into negotiations, if requested, before the completion of reasonable time period, with the other party to develop a mutually agreeable compensation and not anything beyond it.[62] When no ‘mutually satisfactory compensation’ is agreed upon by the parties within 20 days following the expiry of reasonable time period already set, the party that won the dispute can demand the DSB to authorize it to halt the ‘concessions or other obligations’ under the ‘covered agreements’.[63] Nevertheless, it is significant to note that ‘either compensation or the suspension of concessions or other obligations’ is not preferred to full implementation of the DSB ‘recommendations or rulings’.[64]  

The party so authorized while going for suspending the concessions or other obligations is required to follow the principles and procedures enumerated under Art. 22(3) of the DSU. The authorized party, which won the dispute, must ‘first seek to suspend concessions or other obligations’ against the other party, which lost the dispute, under the same sector where an infringement has been found. If it is not realistic or effective to ‘suspend concessions or other obligations’ under the same sector, then the authorized party can go for suspending ‘concessions or other obligations’ in ‘other sectors of the same agreement’. However, if the authorized party finds it ‘not practicable or effective to suspend concessions or other obligations in other sectors of the same agreement’ and situations are severe enough, it can go for suspending ‘concessions or other obligations’ under another covered agreement.[65] Besides, the authorized party must take into consideration the trade, the broader economic elements concerning ‘the nullification or impairment and the broader economic consequences of such suspension’.[66] The level of the ‘suspension of concessions’ must correspond to the level of the violation, provided such suspension is not prohibited by the covered agreement concerned.[67] Nevertheless, should the party concerned opposes the suspension level, or it alleges that the procedures provided under para 3 are not observed while grating the suspension of obligations, the matter must be referred to ‘arbitration’, if feasible, by the ‘original panel’ that decided the dispute, or by an ‘arbitrator’ chosen by the WTO ‘Director-General’. The ‘arbitration’ must conclude within 60 days’ period following the date of expiration of reasonable time-period.[68] The ‘disputing parties’ must agree with the decision of the arbitrator as final and no second arbitration is permissible.[69]    

Arbitration and Non-violations

Art. 25 of the DSU provides for speedy ‘arbitration within the WTO dispensation’, as an alternative mode of settling disputes, if both the disputing parties mutually agree to have ‘recourse to arbitration procedures’ to be followed therein.[70] Other members can join the arbitration proceedings if the arbitrating parties agree. The award issued under arbitration is final and binding upon the parties. Arbitration award must be notified to ‘the DSB and the relevant council or committee’ for members’ information, in which any member can raise any opinion thereto.[71] Once arbitration award is notified, Arts. 22 and 23 of the DSU will apply ‘mutatis mutandis’ in respect of implementation surveillance of the award and ‘compensation and suspension of concessions or other obligations’ the DSB allowed.[72]     

Besides, the DSU provides for two more distinct features of settlement of disputes like its predecessor the GATT, 1947 in the form of ‘non-violation complaint’ procedure and ‘situation complaint’ procedure.[73] However, it needs to be noted that while only few ‘non-violation complaints’ are settled under the ‘GATT/WTO’ regime, no situation complaint has so far successfully been brought before the regime. Remedy under non-violation complaint is treated as an exceptional instrument of dispute settlement, as it is aimed at settling a dispute arisen with regard to a domestic measure of a member even when it does not violate any covered agreement of the WTO. Precisely, though there is no infringement by national measure of a member, a non-violation compliant with a detailed justification can be filed by another member if the latter is aggrieved by the measure that ‘nullified or impaired the benefits’ it could have availed from the relevant covered agreement.[74] Under a non-violation complaint, ‘a panel or the AB can only make rulings and recommendations’ and as there is no violation by the domestic measure, member concerned is under no obligation to withdraw it and becomes the subject-matter of a mutually satisfactory adjustment, including voluntary compensation. In other words, unlike the cases of violations, the ‘rulings and recommendations’ of a panel or AB in a ‘non-violation compliant’ is not subject to DSB’s implementation linked by ‘surveillance and suspension of concessions’ as per Arts. 21 and 22 of the DSU.   

1. Article II(2) of the Agreement Establishing the WTO (WTO Agreement) provides that ‘multilateral trade agreements contained Annexes 1, 2 and 3 of the Agreement are binding on all members’. (‘Art.’ hereinafter stands for Article.) As per Art. XVI(5), no reservation can be appended to the ‘Annexes of the WTO Agreement’.
2. As per Art. II(3) of the ‘WTO Agreement’, ‘plurilateral trade agreements contained in ‘Annex 4’ are obligatory on only those members which have accepted them.       
3. Art. 1:1 of the ‘Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes’ (DSU) of the WTO. If parties to the dispute mutually agree, they can also have recourse to ‘alternative methods of settlement of disputes’, which is voluntary in nature, for amicably setting their disputes as provided under Art. 5, DSU within the WTO dispensation. 
4. The ‘General Council of the WTO’ convenes as the DSB to carry out the responsibilities under the DSU. The DSU is placed under Annex 2 of ‘the WTO Agreement’. The DSB establishes panel and adopts panel and AB reports, besides maintaining surveillance on implementation of the rulings and recommendations by the party to the dispute concerned.
5. Art. 6(1), DSU. 
6. Art. 3(10), DSU
7. John H. Jackson, ‘The Role and Effectiveness of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism’ (2000) Brookings Trade Forum 179 at 186.
8. Wolfgang Alschner, ‘Amicable Settlements of WTO Disputes: Bilateral Solutions in a Multilateral System’ (2014) 13 World Trade Review 65. See Art. 3(7), DSU
9. Art. 4(2), DSU and Art. XXII(1), the GATT, 1947
10. Art. 4(6), DSU
11. Terence P. Stewart and Mara M. Burr, ‘The WTO Panel Process: An Evaluation of the First Three Years’ (1998) 32 The International Lawyer 709 at 730. Art. 4(7), DSU. However, ‘in urgency cases, including cases of perishable goods, parties to the dispute are required to enter into consultations within a period of 10 days after the date of consultation request’. If ‘consultations’ fail to ‘resolve the dispute within a period of 20 days after the date of consultation request’, the member requesting the consultations can approach DSB to set-up a panel. See Art. 4(8), DSU. 
12. Jeffrey Waincymer, ‘Transparency of Dispute Settlement Within the World Trade Organization’ (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review 797 at 815.
13. Gary N. Horlick, ‘Symposium on the First Three Years of the WTO Dispute Settlement System’ (1998) 32 The International Lawyer 685 at 690. See Art. 4(11), DSU
14. Art. 3(6), DSU
15. Art. 6(1), DSU. By consensus a decision is taken without any formal objection.
16. Peter Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2008), p.242. See also Peter Van den Bossche and Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials (3^rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2013).     
17. Marc L. Busch, ‘Democracy, Consultation, and the Paneling of Disputes under GATT’ (2000) 44 The Journal of Conflict Resolution 425 at 428. See also Jeffrey Waincymer, ‘Transparency of Dispute Settlement within the World Trade Organization’ (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review 797 at 807.  
18. Bossche, n.16.
19. Art. 8(1), DSU, See Xavier Philippe, ‘The dispute resolution mechanism of the World Trade Organisation five years after its implementation’ (1999) 3 Law, Democracy & Development 69 at 81.   
20. Art. 8(3), DSU
21. Art. 8(4), DSU
22. Art. 8(7), DSU
23. Art. 8(9) and (10), DSU
24. Art. 11, DSU. See generally Mitsuo Matsushita and others, The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice and Policy (OUP 2006).
25. Art. 12(2), DSU
26. Art. 12(6), DSU
27. Art. 12(7), DSU
28. Art. 12(9), DSU
29. Art. 12(10), DSU 
30. Art. 12(12), DSU, See Thomas A. Zimmermann, Negotiating the review of the WTO dispute settlement understanding (Cameron May 2006) at 137.
31. Art. 14, DSU
32. Art. 9(1), DSU
33. Art. 9(2), DSU
34. Art. 9(3), DSU, See Matsushita, n. 24.
35. Art. 10(2), DSU
36. Art. 17(4), DSU  
37. Art. 15(2), DSU
38. Art. 16(4), DSU
39. Peter Van den Bossche and Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials (4^th edn, Cambridge University Press 2017), p.210.    
40. Art. 17(3), DSU
41. Art. 17(5), DSU
42. Art. 17(6), DSU, See Philippe, n. 19, at 83.
43. Art. 17(13), DSU
44. Art. 17(9), DSU
45. Art. 17(11), DSU
46. Art. 17(14), DSU
47. Art. 18(1), DSU
48. Art. 18(2), DSU
49. Ana Peres, ‘World Trade Organization: Challenges and opportunities’ (25 March 2024) The House of Commons Library Research Briefing at p.26.     
50. Geraldo Vidigal, ‘Living Without the Appellate Body: Multilateral, Bilateral and Plurilateral Solutions to the WTO Dispute Settlement Crisis’ (2019) 20 Journal of World Investment and Trade 862 at pp. 866-67. 
51. See generally James Bacchus and Simon Lester, ‘The Rule of Precedent and the Role of the Appellate Body’ (2020) 54 Journal of World Trade 183.    
52. Peter Ungphakorn, ‘Technical note: Appeals ‘into the void’ in WTO dispute settlement’ available at https://tradebetablog.wordpress.com/technical-note-appeals-into-the-void-in-wto-dispute-settlement/, accessed on 05 March 2024.
53. Isabelle Van Damme, ‘25 Years of Law and Practice at the WTO: Did the Appellate Body Dig its Own Grave?’ (2023) 26 Journal of International Economic Law 124, at 125.
54. Peter Ungphakorn Arbitration, ‘the stop-gap when WTO appeals are unavailable’ available at https://tradebetablog.wordpress.com/2020/08/04/arbitration-wto-appeals/, accessed on 05 March 2024.   
55. Art. 20, DSU
56. Art. 21(1), DSU
57. Art. 3(7), DSU
58. Art. 21(3), DSU
59. Art. 21(4), DSU
60. Art. 21(5), DSU
61. Art. 22(1), DSU
62. Art. 22(2), DSU
63. Ibid.
64. Art. 22(1), DSU
65. Art. 22(3), DSU
66. Art. 22(3)(d), DSU. For goods sector means all goods, for services, a service identified under ‘Services Sectoral Classification List’ and for trade-related IP right, ‘each category of IP right falling under Part-II or Part-III or Part-IV of the TRPS agreement’. Agreement comprises Anex 1A, 1B and 1C agreements of the WTO Agreement. 
67. Art. 22(4) and (5), DSU
68. Art. 22(6), DSU, See also Zimmermann, n.33, p.154. 
69. Art. 22(7), DSU
70. Art. 25(1) and (2), DSU  
71. Art. 25(3), DSU
72. Art. 25(4), DSU 
73. Art. 26, DSU and Art. XXIII(1)(b) and (c), the GATT, 1994
74. Robert W. Staiger and Alan O. Sykes, ‘Non-Violations’ (2013) 16 Journal of International Economic Law 741 at 742. See also Robert W. Staiger and Alan O. Sykes, ‘How Important Can the Non-Violation Clause Be for the GATT/WTO?’ (2017) 9 American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 149.